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ABSTRACT 
Procurement of NHS primary care buildings was reserved for the DH working 
through PCTs until LIFT was introduced. The DH anticipated that LIFT would 
effectively mobilise private sector finance and expertise in improving the quality of 
buildings. But LIFT’s suitability to achieve this is questioned on grounds that it 
uses market mechanisms that may fail when applied in health. This case-study 
explored with people directly involved in LIFT their views and experience of how it 
helped them in procuring desired buildings. It was driven by desire to understand 
whether and how contextual factors and mechanisms in LIFT supported staff 
efforts, hoping the findings would influence DH officials in revising the guidance 
to make LIFT effective.      
Evidence was primarily collected through in-depth interviews with 25 informants 
drawn at two PCTs, the LiftCo and LIFT buildings. Data from interviews was 
complemented by documentary analysis and tours to make observations at four 
LIFT buildings. The data was coded for analysis in NVivo. The key findings were 
organized into four analytical categories aligned with the research questions for 
interpretation to generate relevant answers.  
The study revealed that the important factors for progress in LIFT involved 
commitment of PCT boards; engaging PCT managers in strategic decisions and 
empowering them in influencing governance issues. Progress may be enhanced 
through DH officials encouraging increased collaboration between LIFT partners 
and promoting contractor competition in service delivery. Barriers to progress 
included the LiftCo over-prioritising efficiency, hiring of contractors lacking 
experience in health, and the DH not sufficiently supporting PCT managers in 
increasing their capacity to make LIFT effective. Informants believed LIFT could 
improve procurement provided ways of addressing the barriers were explored.  
LIFT outcomes are a result of factors in its contexts influenced by policy-makers 
and decisions taken by operational staff. Recommendations are offered for these 
constituents in LIFT and for future research. DH officials should get feedback on 
practicalities of LIFT guidance by engaging PCT managers in making strategic 
decisions and empowering them in translating their experiences into actions. This 
could make LIFT effective and reduce the risks that were highlighted.  
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
From the 1990s, the National Health Service (NHS) experienced changes 
that included decentralising policy-making from Whitehall to health 
departments in the individual countries (England, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales) (Stevens 2004). Subsequently, reforms within England 
have favoured market mechanisms ostensibly to free the NHS’ 
components like Strategic Health Authorities, Foundation Trusts, Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs), and general operational staff from Department of 
Health (DH) bureaucracy in order to improve performance. The 
government prefers policy that de-concentrates decision-making about 
health provision and management from the DH to lower level NHS units. 
This includes encouraging agents other than NHS units in delivering 
healthcare and related physical infrastructure (DH 2001). Changes of this 
nature mean that some practices within the NHS in England could be 
interpreted and legitimised under the label of decentralization.  
Historically, decentralization was understood from both public 
administration and economic perspectives. The public administration 
approach suggested by Rondinelli (1983) uses the concepts of devolution, 
delegation, and de-concentration to analyse how government departments 
pass authority and independence for decision-making from higher to lower 
levels of governance. The economics perspective considers 
decentralization in terms of the flow of resources for public service from 
the higher to lower levels within government systems (Wolman 1990).  
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It is argued that these perspectives to decentralization were developed at 
a time when health systems across the world were protected against major 
changes to how they were organised to function (Saltman et al 2006, 
Bossert 1998). They may need to be expanded to include new concepts 
like public-private partnerships (PPPs) emerging within most health 
systems (Atun 2007, Perrot 2006, Saltman 2003). Different forms of PPPs 
are being used to provide services or finance delivery and management of 
healthcare functions. Previously, the roles were reserved for the 
government yet the public administration and economic perspectives to 
decentralization do not adequately explore the role of PPPs.       
1.1.1 Problem Statement  
The Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT) is a PPP model that seeks to 
improve procurement of primary care buildings within PCTs (DH 2001). But 
some commentators argue that significant numbers of PCTs using LIFT are 
sceptical about its ability in helping them to efficiently procure the desired 
buildings (Fitzsimmons et al 2009, King’s Fund 2008). Despite 
commitment to improve the condition of their buildings, some PCTs still 
have deficits in stock of new or upgraded buildings. Research has been 
conducted to understand the problems in LIFT but have not adequately 
explained whether it is the flaws in its design or challenges in executing 
projects that are barriers to progress.     
1.1.2 Purpose of the research  
The purpose of this research was to explore with staff involved in LIFT 
implementation their perceptions of why it produced outcomes that they 
experienced within their PCT areas. The views of PCT managers, the Chief 
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Executive Officer (CEO) at the LIFT Company (LiftCo) and GPs and 
administrators at LIFT buildings were prioritised because they are directly 
involved in executing LIFT schemes. The researcher believed that a better 
understanding of their experiences and perceptions about what influenced 
LIFT outcomes within their PCT areas may help DH officials that oversee 
LIFT in identifying ways of supporting local staff in making it effective. The 
local staff would be also helped in making more informed decisions for 
maximising benefits from LIFT. 
1.1.3 Research questions 
The following research questions are addressed within the case-study: 
(i) What did DH officials perceive were the contexts and 
mechanisms for effectiveness in LIFT and who were expected to 
benefit from its outcomes?  
(ii) What factors were perceived to facilitate staff directly 
operationalizing LIFT schemes in discharging their 
responsibilities? 
(iii) What factors did operational staff perceive might influence or 
help them in progressing against LIFT’s expected outcomes? 
(iv) What lessons can be learnt from the case-study experiences to 
better explain and understand LIFT for the benefit of future 
schemes and other PCTs?   
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1.1.4 Objectives 
i. To construct a case-study comprising two PCTs, a LiftCo and LIFT 
buildings; 
ii. To gather individual and group perceptions of PCT managers, 
LiftCo staff, General Practitioners (GPs), and building administrators 
on how performance of their responsibilities is facilitated or 
constrained by LIFT mechanisms; 
iii. To ascertain how any social, economic, or financial contexts 
produce effects for the different groups of LIFT participants;  
iv. To synthesize the shared experiences and perceptions to suggest 
the critical factors which explain whether LIFT succeeds; and 
v. To draw conclusions for policy-makers and practitioners adopting 
LIFT.     
1.1.5 Overview of research design and methods  
The main methodological elements of this research are described by the 
following: (i) context of the research; (ii) assumptions held at research 
commencement; (iii) rationale for using an embedded case-study 
methodology; (iv) rationale for choosing the case-study area; and (v) the 
preferred evaluation approach. Each element including procedures taken 
to conduct the research is discussed in detail in Section 2 (Methodology). 
1.1.5.1 Context of the research  
Given mixed opinion about LIFT’s ability to improve procurement, the 
current research develops conceptual and empirical approaches to 
explore the real-world experience of LIFT based on a case-study of two 
PCTs that were part of the first wave to pioneer it within the NHS. LIFT has 
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since been endorsed by among others, the National Audit Office (NAO) 
(2005), Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE) 
(2008), and King’s Fund (2008) for its ability to deliver improved buildings 
on time and within budgets.  
The studies of Fitzsimmons et al (2009), Aldred (2008) and Pollock and 
Price (2006) criticise LIFT for having complex designs and procedures that 
reduce the local staff’s capacity to manage related risks. Wall (2007) 
identifies frequent repairs at LIFT buildings as one indicator for reduced 
capacity of staff in monitoring to ensure that LiftCo activities in designing 
and constructing the buildings respect tenants’ priorities. For these 
reasons, the commentators view LIFT as expensive compared to 
government led procurement.  
1.1.5.2 The Researcher and research assumptions 
The researcher acknowledged that his previous research experience and 
interest in PPPs for health could be a liability. This experience may have 
originated from developing countries but its potential in introducing bias in 
framing the research design and choosing aspects in LIFT to investigate, 
or where to put emphasis in interpreting the findings existed. The concern 
was addressed through being supervised by a team with a different 
orientation. In addition, triangulating data collection methods, data sources 
and types, and having regular reviews with the supervisors helped in 
minimizing researcher subjectivity to enhance credibility of the findings.  
This research was done under the primary assumption that LIFT is a 
decentralisation strategy for both the funding and financing of primary care 
buildings. This assumption is based on that the DH intends to overcome 
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shortage of public funds and expertise needed for improving the buildings. 
Here, funding refers to the DH investing in activities to procure buildings 
without implied recovery of money spent. The government may be 
providing funding for the buildings but the decisions about using the funds 
through LIFT are decentralised from the DH right down to PCTs. Previously, 
the PCTs could not invest public funds in private companies like LiftCos 
that finance LIFT.  Financing refers to DH investing in activities to procure 
buildings using repayable loans facilitated by the LiftCo. It means that the 
DH still funds the procurement but direct financing of LIFT buildings is 
delegated to private financiers through the LiftCo.  
A secondary assumption was that if LIFT represented decentralised 
procurement, the PCTs will be self-directed and self-reliant in using it to 
improve buildings in their areas. This is guided by Mills & Vaughan (1990), 
and Bossert’s (1998) principle that local staff are allowed sufficient 
authority including discretion in performing the decentralised functions. 
The researcher expected PCT staff to be able to vary the guidance in 
operationalizing LIFT schemes depending on circumstances and 
preferences in their areas. These assumptions were verified by examining 
how informants perceived LIFT mechanisms and contexts to facilitate or 
constrain their progress.   
1.1.5.3 Rationale for an embedded case-study  
 Yin (2009) conceptualises embedded case-study designs as involving 
analyses of programmes at either more than one level or units of analysis. 
Although the current research focuses on the operational level at the 
expense of policy-making and care provision levels (Figure 1.0 page 9), it 
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still meets Yin’s (2009) criteria for an embedded case-study on the basis 
of having multiple levels and units of analysis. The multiple levels and 
units of analyses involved are explained in subsection 1.1.5.3.1 (page 7) 
addressing the boundaries set to narrow the scope of this research. The 
PCTs, the LiftCo and LIFT buildings were considered as units to be 
analysed to better understand their roles in LIFT as were the different 
categories of staff involved. Also, how informant perceptions and 
experiences differed along their responsibilities in LIFT needed to be 
understood. For example, it may help to understand how and why estate 
and facilities managers’ views about LIFT differ from those of the finance 
directors or other groups at the same PCT.  
A number of studies indicated that LIFT was a complex initiative (Beck et al 
2009, Fitzsimmons et al 2009, Aldred 2008). An embedded case-study 
design avoided attempting to analyse complex issues from the perspective 
of only one institution (e.g. PCT, or LiftCo, or LIFT premises); or that of one 
professional group. This might have risked disregarding other important 
sources of data on LIFT yet they could be defined within the case-study.  
1.1.5.3.1 Boundaries of the research 
The boundaries in this research are defined by the theory on which to 
base the study of LIFT; focus at the operational level for data collection; 
and targeting staff at the PCTs, the LiftCo and LIFT buildings as the right 
people to provide information. Setting these boundaries facilitated timely 
completion of the research by focusing it on specific aspects to analyse for 
developing relevant answers to the research questions. This may not have 
been achieved if it had considered too broad issues.   
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1.1.5.3.1.1 Concept on which to base LIFT 
Pawson (2006) advocates for realist evaluation informed studies to 
prioritise analyses of theories or concepts on which a programme is 
based. The present research hypothesized decentralization as the concept 
on which LIFT is based. Decentralization is the processes of redistributing 
responsibilities, powers and resources for selected functions from a 
central location. The present research therefore sought to understand 
LIFT’s effectiveness in dispersing key aspects in procurement of primary 
care buildings from the DH through case-studying two PCTs and a LiftCo 
located in east London.     
1.1.5.3.1.2 Operational level 
Within the hierarchy of LIFT activities, the focus for data collection was on 
the operational level illustrated in Figure 1.0 (page 9). The operational 
level is where LIFT’s primary activities concern translating the guidance 
into buildings that are needed to improve patient experiences. This 
boundary was preferred at the expense of the policy-making level and 
care provision activities.  These were not prioritised for focused analysis 
because activities at those levels are not directly concerned with executing 
and managing LIFT schemes. 
At the operational level, the PCTs, the LiftCo and LIFT buildings were 
prioritised in providing data for the research. Unlike the DH, Treasury and 
the Strategic Partnering Board (SPB); the PCTs, LiftCo and LIFT buildings 
are directly affected by activities in LIFT implementation.  
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Figure 1.0: The research’s focus and analysis units  
The SPB is a locally based entity working as an agent of the DH and 
treasury in overseeing LIFT implementation. The SPB and officials at the 
DH and treasury were all considered to be at policy-making level and 
therefore distant from local experiences in LIFT. Similarly, activities at the 
care provision level may have less to do with LIFT than with the PCTs and 
GPs that retain the responsibility to provide care using LIFT buildings.  
1.1.5.3.1.3 Informants on LIFT activities 
PCT managers, senior staff at the LiftCo, and GPs and building 
administrators were prioritised as the people likely to possess relevant 
information and experiences for answering the research questions. Neither 
public sector officials nor shareholders in the LiftCo and patients would 
sufficiently provide the needed information. As previously indicated, they 
are not directly involved in local activities in LIFT.  
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1.1.5.3.1.4 Units of Analysis 
The units of analysis comprised the elements identified within the 
boundaries of the research. Table 1.0 (pg 11) describes the “ordinate” 
units of analysis involving (i) the concept chosen for explaining LIFT 
(decentralization); (ii) experiences at the operational level by (iii) the 
different categories of sampled informants. Analysis of the “ordinate” units 
involved locating them in a wider context of decentralization to better 
understand factors that may facilitate progress by the different categories 
of informants at LIFT’s operational level. It is possible that the outcomes of 
implementing decentralization through NHS LIFT are influenced by 
challenges faced by participants in implementing concepts like New Public 
Management, “Third Way” or other variants of public-private partnerships.   
A deeper understanding of LIFT was possible if the same factors identified 
within the ordinate units were further analysed at multiple levels of 
specificity. Table 1.0 (pg 11) describes the “subordinate” units of analysis 
which if investigated may enable understanding whether features that 
portrayed LIFT as decentralization at first analysis could offer consistency 
in explaining it the same in relation informant experiences of, for example, 
decision-making or procedures in financing LIFT schemes. Any 
inconsistencies may indicate how LIFT works in a wider policy context.   
The ordinate and subordinate units of analysis contributed evidence about 
how in a wider policy context; factors surrounding LIFT, and mechanisms 
through which activities are performed affected decentralization in 
delivering benefits anticipated. They also indicated how the factors 
affected the PCTs, the LiftCo and LIFT buildings in performing their roles, 
and the different categories of staff in discharging their responsibilities.            
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Table 1.0: Ordinate and subordinate units of analysis  
Ordinate units  Subordinate units Sources of the evidence   
Decentralization: 
theory on which LIFT 
is based 
Elements in decentralized 
procurement – e.g. 
planning, finance, 
decision-making.  
LIFT guidance, local 
documents, literature, interview 
transcripts 
 
Operational level 
Roles of PCTs, LiftCo, 
LIFT premises in 
addressing LIFT objectives 
Literature, local documents and 
observations at buildings. 
Operational staff 
(categories of staff) 
Individual perceptions & 
experiences 
 
Interview transcripts cross-
checked against LIFT guidance 
Group perceptions & 
experiences – e.g. Lead 
GPs, administrators or 
Finance directors 
 
Interview transcripts, minutes 
of meetings and management 
documents 
  
Overall, the units of analysis recognised that perceptions about LIFT may 
be product of activities and experience whether at the PCTs and LiftCo 
levels, or by individuals or professional groups. Hence the suggestion that 
usage of the RE approach may facilitate better understanding of social 
constructs of programmes at their different levels (Pawson and Tilley 
2004).  The knowledge may be further enhanced by using embedded 
case-studies that involve multiple units of analysis (Yin 2009). 
The current research did not compare experiences of staff from one PCT 
against another. The interest was more in what the different informants 
experienced in LIFT than with specifics about what happened within 
individual PCTs. Priority was given to understanding how, for example, the 
different PCT managers, LiftCo staff, and GPs and building administrators 
experienced and perceived LIFT either individually or as professional 
groups. This was achieved by examining the different types of data from 
documentary analyses and in-depth interviews with informants sampled at 
the operational level, a process of triangulating data sources (Creswell 
2002).    
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Designing an embedded case-study and using the described research 
boundaries facilitated within-case data analyses. The overall analysis then 
reconciled the variations in experiences between informant groups and 
how LIFT was perceived at the local level to enhance validity of the 
findings without having to study a range of LiftCos. The findings could 
therefore show a typical PCT’s experience since they were derived from 
experiences of people actually implementing LIFT at the local level.     
1.1.5.4 The case-study area 
The case-study was within the former NHS North East London. Figure 1.1 
describes its geographical spread before some PCTs were merged in 
creating NHS London as a single health authority (NHS London 2007c). 
For example, City & Hackney PCT existing during the research involved 
merging of two health units into one PCT. At that time, east London area 
comprised seven PCTs including those case-studied. All the PCTs were 
then phased out under the Health and Social Care Act passed at the end 
of this research in 2012.   
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Figure 1.1:  Geographical spread of NHS North East London 
The case-studied PCTs were chosen for three reasons. First, their history 
of collaborative research with the University was convenient for the 
research. Second, they had experience as pioneers of LIFT in London. 
Third, they shared the same LiftCo whose portfolio of buildings allowed 
enquiries at sufficient number of premises. 
1.1.5.5 Realist evaluation (RE) 
This research was guided by RE principles. The detailed rationale for 
adopting this particular approach is explained in Section 2 that addresses 
methodological issues. RE principles facilitate explanations about how, as 
opposed to merely seeking answers about whether a programme works or 
not. Pawson and Tilley (2004) state that this is understood through asking:  
“What works, for whom, in what circumstances, and in what respects, and 
how”? (pg 2)  
The questions are helpful in the present research where interest resided in 
capturing the real-world experiences of connections between LIFT 
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contexts, mechanisms, and outcomes. They offer a systematic approach 
in enquiring complex mechanisms and governance arrangements believed 
to characterise LIFT (Aldred 2008, Beck et al 2009). For example, the 
questions may guide in integrating different analytical strategies to explain 
and understand LIFT through identifying and matching major themes from 
documentary data with those from in-depth interviews. Using RE principles 
represented analytical triangulation within-case for explanations of LIFT 
along the ordinate and subordinate units of analysis.  
Within the case-study, it helped in explaining the aspects of LIFT that 
worked to benefit whom, in what circumstances, and how, among the 
different groups of participants. Thus, the researcher was able to 
systematically evaluate LIFT mechanisms and contexts to understand how 
they supported informants in achieving the expected outcomes. The 
meanings of “contexts” and “mechanisms” in relation to RE principles are 
clarified in Section 2 (page 92). Informant experiences played an important 
role in identifying practices that made LIFT effective under given contexts 
and mechanisms.   
1.1.6 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is made up of six sections including this introduction. The 
sections and their contents are explained as follows:  
1.1.6.1 Section 1   
Section 1 comprises subsections 1.1 and 1.2. Subsection 1.1 introduces 
the research through subsections addressing: problem statement that 
influenced this research (1.1.1); purpose of the research (1.1.2); research 
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questions (1.1.3); the objectives (1.1.4); overview of the research design 
and methods (1.1.5); and structure of the thesis (1.1.6).  
Subsection 1.2 presents the background and context of LIFT. Subsection 
1.2.0 gives the historical procurement of NHS estate before LIFT was 
introduced. A discussion of the conceptual framework guiding the research 
- decentralization is presented in subsection 1.2.1. This is followed by an 
explanation of the different approaches to decentralization (1.2.2) and a 
tracing of decentralization experienced within the NHS (1.2.3). Subsection 
1.2.4 identifies New Public Management, Third Way, Localism, and PPPs 
as possible conceptual perspectives driving LIFT within the NHS. Their 
objectives are discussed in subsection 1.2.4.5.  
The discussion in subsection 1.2.5 considers LIFT in context of public-
private partnerships. PPP concepts are defined and their possible drivers 
and perceived benefits within the NHS are addressed. The discussion 
extends beyond the confines of the public administration and the 
economic perspectives to decentralisation (Rondinelli 1983, Wolman 
1990). Subsection 1.2.6 traces the NHS’ experiences with public-private 
partnerships in service delivery. It argues that PFI and LIFT are examples 
used to finance or deliver services by collaborating with the private sector.   
1.1.6.2 Section 2   
Section 2 deals with the methodology of the research. Its five subsections 
address specific issues of gathering and manipulating data for the 
research. The conceptual framework guiding conduct of the research is 
discussed (2.1) followed by the research design (2.2). The primary 
methods employed for data collection are presented in subsection 2.3 in 
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the order of: documentary reviews (2.3.1); in-depth interviews (2.3.2); and 
tours of LIFT buildings (2.3.3). This is followed by a discussion of the data 
analysis (2.4) and explanation of ethical issues about the research (2.5).  
1.1.6.3 Section 3   
Presentation of the findings is organised around the research questions 
and data collection methods. The findings on LIFT contexts, mechanisms 
and outcomes (CMO configurations) answering research question (i) 
based on documentary analysis are in subsection 3.1. Those answering 
research question (ii), based on informant interviews are in subsection 3.2. 
Subsection 3.3 presents the CMO configurations answering research 
question (iii) also based on informant interviews. Within it are subsections 
presenting the findings on informant perceptions of influential LIFT 
mechanisms; influential contexts; perceived progress against the expected 
outcomes; and other emerging unintended outcomes in LIFT. The findings 
from tours at LIFT buildings are in subsection 3.4.  
1.1.6.4 Section 4 
Analysis and interpretation of the findings is organised around analytic 
categories aligned with the research questions (4.0). The analytic 
categories were determined in order to synthesize the several components 
of the research findings. It helped in developing a holistic understanding of 
LIFT. A detailed discussion of each analytic category is in subsections 4.1 
to 4.4. The ideas that emerge from the analysis and interpretation are then 
considered in revising the middle range theory explaining LIFT (4.5).  
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1.1.6.5 Section 5   
The key findings and how they relate to literature are discussed in 
subsection 5.1 and their implications for policy and practice are considered 
subsection 5.2. This influenced the decision to provide a feel of how LIFT 
and the Health and Social Care Act introduced in 2012 may mesh (5.3). 
The section ends with a reflection on limitations of the research (5.4).  
1.1.6.6 Section 6   
The conclusions and recommendations are organised as follows: The 
conclusions on key findings and lessons learnt from the case-study are 
presented in subsection 6.1. Recommendations are offered for 
consideration by the DH officials, operational staff, and for future research 
on LIFT (6.3). Finally, subsection 6.4 explains the research contribution.     
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1.2 Background and Context of LIFT  
From the public management and the economic perspectives (Rondinelli 
1983, Wolman 1990), the NHS has always been a decentralised 
organization. Apart from services being managed through hierarchically 
organised administrative units of the government, significant numbers of 
non-governmental bodies including independent general practitioners 
(GPs) have been involved in NHS economic activities. In recent years, 
there has been a proliferation in types of NHS functions that are delivered 
through working in partnerships with the private sector. Perhaps it is the 
result of the DH being more receptive to new thinking like New Public 
Management and related concepts that decentralise aspects of procuring 
NHS functions using various strategies. For example, the financing and 
management of primary care buildings is done through LIFT as opposed to 
directly by the DH. It underlines the importance of exploring some of the 
factors that may influence effectiveness of decentralization strategies in 
delivering the desired outcomes.   
There may be the case for identifying the different approaches to 
decentralization and analysing them to understand how their drivers may 
influence effectiveness in service delivery. Within the NHS, New Public 
Management, Third Way and Localism may be particular concepts that 
influenced variants of PPPs such as the PFI and LIFT. The perceived 
benefits and risks of using such concepts in financing or delivering public 
functions need to be understood whether or not applied under government 
regulation and supervision. The concepts are central to discussions in 
subsections 1.2.1 to 1.2.6 of this research.  
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1.2.0 Estate procurement in the NHS 
The likely effects of the LIFT model of procurement may be better 
interpreted if read in context of how NHS estate was procured in the past. 
1.2.0.1 Historical perspective  
Before 1994, development of hospital accommodation in the NHS was 
funded by the Treasury (Pollock et al 2005). DH officials used to invite 
expertise from the private sector to compete in tendering for contracts 
funded by the Treasury. The companies would bid to design and deliver or 
provide maintenance at the new buildings following specifications provided 
by NHS managers and clinicians. At that time, the Treasury was seen as 
best able to mobilise money and effective at controlling expenditure by DH 
agencies. It changed in 1994 when the private finance initiative (PFI) was 
preferred to having direct recourse to public funds in developing new 
hospitals (Gaffney et al 1999a).  
There were attempts to invest and strengthen primary care estate well 
before LIFT came to prominence in 2000. The DH invested in its own 
buildings and also provided grants for independent GPs to build new or 
upgrade existing private surgeries. As well as this, it encouraged third 
party developers working for-profit to seek loans from private banks for 
developing their own buildings. This could be considered DH investment in 
the sense of saving public money in the long run. It reduced the net 
present value of its liabilities by avoiding long term renting of private 
facilities for primary care delivery by its agencies. Yet it raises questions 
about whether LIFT increases or reduces investment. 
20 
 
Despite the attempts, centralised procurement did not meet patient 
demands for facilities appropriate in providing modern care (DH 2001). An 
analysis of the functional suitability of GP surgeries revealed that how the 
buildings were designed and located failed to support improvements in 
care provision (DH/PfH 2003). They were obstructed from delivering 
modern care by insufficient space for the services offered, amenities, and 
unsuitable environmental conditions. These factors were blamed on 
problems of increased costs, inadequate funding by the DH, bureaucracy, 
and shying away from full participation in developing healthcare buildings 
by some local authorities (DH/PfH 2003).  
Perhaps decentralized procurement would increase the stock of 
appropriate buildings, at the right places, and at the time when they are 
needed. Proponents of LIFT believed it would solve problems of insufficient 
funding by the Treasury; inefficient performance by DH agencies; demands 
for a greater say in governance of services by patients; and economic 
decline in the NHS (Milburn 2004). The government advocate market 
mechanisms to reduce public monopoly because bureaucracy and 
inflexible management practices of public agencies obstruct them in cost-
efficiently responding to patient demands. In this case, LIFT redistributes 
responsibilities and authority for risks that are important in procuring better 
facilities. 
But there is disagreement on the most appropriate route to procure 
premises in the NHS. Staff at the frontline of NHS activities prefers 
government led procurement and management of the buildings because 
they believe it prioritises public interests. Government has the ability to 
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deliver more appropriate and higher quality buildings compared to private 
developers (Gaffney et al 1999b). Often, business principles that drive 
private developers tempt them into overemphasizing efficiency than quality 
in procurement and management of NHS premises.  If decentralization is a 
response to problems in procurement; choice of the route used may be 
influenced perceived ability in managing risks believed to increase 
benefits. For example, PCTs may avoid exclusive use of the conventional 
route because problems in centralised procurement. But they may also 
avoid exclusive use of the private route if they believe that market 
mechanisms may introduce disadvantages in procurement activities.  
1.2.0.2 The LIFT model 
Perhaps the DH considered the LIFT model to be a compromise for 
ensuring that only the strengths of conventional and private routes were 
retained in procuring GP surgeries. If so, whether and the ways in which 
LIFT contracts increase benefits in procurement may be interpreted better 
by understanding how strengths vis-à-vis objectives within the 
conventional and private routes mesh to influence outcomes. 
LIFT seeks to increase the quality and stock of modernised GP surgeries 
through accessing private sector capital, skills and expertise plus 
management practices missing in government led procurement (DH 2001). 
Thus, it not only changes the funding arrangements but also how GP 
surgeries are financed and management. The difference between funding 
and financing resides in their underlying motive.  
Funding refers to investing in the procurement of service without intention 
to recoup the investment. With financing, there is always implied intention 
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on the part of the investor to recover the full investment plus profit. For 
example, with LIFT, the fact that PCTs rather than DH officials decide when 
to initiate LIFT projects using public resources may be construed to 
represent decentralized funding. The PCTs do not have intention to recoup 
their investment in LIFT buildings. They also choose to spread funding of 
the buildings over a 25 year period under LIFT contracts rather than paying 
cash up front. The LiftCo is delegated the responsibility to raise finance 
that is needed to deliver LIFT buildings. This also represents decentralized 
financing from the DH or Treasury to private banks through the LiftCo. But 
this time the banks acting through the LiftCo have implied intention to 
recover their full financial outlays plus profit. 
From these angles LIFT may be viewed as a hybrid of decentralized 
funding and financing where the PCTs fund procurement through a rent 
payment to the LiftCo that finances delivery of the buildings without direct 
recourse to the public purse. The LiftCo is also delegated a central role in 
management of LIFT buildings, meaning financial decentralization runs 
alongside administrative decentralization. The funding and financing 
arrangements may hard press PCT and private shareholders in the LiftCo 
to ensure good use of resources with their governance activities ultimately 
influencing LIFT outcomes. Some analysts (e.g. NAO 2005 and King’s 
Fund 2008) endorsed the model (see subsection 1.2.6.2.4 pg 85) as more 
efficient and cost-effective than public agencies in producing benefits in 
procurement.  
Provisions like duration of contracts have characteristics that are likely to 
influence the model’s effects. LIFT contracts are valid for 25 years. Over 
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this period, the LiftCo is expected to recover capital plus profit for the 
financiers through rent payments by the PCTs (DH/PfH 2003). There is 
therefore chance that governance arrangements may evolve to produce 
outcomes contradictory to the model’s original objectives.  
Under the LIFT model, PCTs only pay for use and not end of contract 
ownership of buildings which remains with the LiftCo. The change in status 
at the end of contract may involve either the PCTs exercising the right to 
buy or first refusal to buy the buildings from the LiftCo. There are 
instances where the land on which LIFT buildings are developed is owned 
by the PCTs (DH/PfH 2003) hence calling it the land retained model. In 
such cases, the PCTs have preferential rights to acquire the buildings at 
below market values should they opt to buy at the end of contract.  
The alternative is the land purchase agreement model in which the LiftCo 
owns the land and buildings leased to the PCTs. Should the PCTs decide 
not to buy the buildings whether under the land retained model or land 
purchase model; the LiftCo is left with the risk of disposing of the buildings 
as they may wish. This may include continuing to lease them to the PCTs 
on new terms outside the original LIFT contracts.  
1.2.1 Conceptualizing LIFT: decentralization and its definitions 
In light of the above context of LIFT, and nature of the research questions, 
decentralization was chosen as the appropriate conceptual framework to 
guide this research. Decentralization is the process of shifting power, 
authority and responsibility from the national level to sub-national levels of 
government (Mills and Vaughan 1990). The downward flow of power, 
authority and responsibility may be in respect of activities to plan and 
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deliver selected services, or managing performance, or distributing 
resources to fund activities (Saltman et al 2007).  
Within the UK, for example, decentralization may involve the transfer of 
power, authority and responsibility from the national level to the individual 
countries. Or, within the individual countries, it can occur when the same 
are transferred from the central level to organisational structures. That 
power, authority and responsibility to deliver selected health functions are 
shifted from the DH to strategic health authorities or Foundation Hospitals 
is one of the examples of decentralisation within the NHS in England today 
(Wall 2007). These sub-national government units also in turn pass power, 
authority and responsibility to PCTs or independent agents like GPs and 
voluntary service providers.    
Across the world, decentralization appears to be now a common reform 
strategy within most health systems (Saltman et al 2007). Approaches to 
decentralization vary significantly from one country to another because 
implementation may be based on a number of concepts that are 
underpinned by different reasoning (Bossert 1998). Hence argument that 
decentralization is not a single approach but a strategy under which many 
approaches to shift aspects of public service delivery from central to 
peripheral government units may be considered (Sharma 2006). 
The traditional understanding limited decentralization to the dispersal of 
governance in political, administrative and financial functions (Rondinelli 
1983, Mills and Vaughan 1990). Contemporary commentators on health 
activities (e.g. Atun 2007, Saltman et al 2006) argue for decentralisation to 
reflect economic dispersal of control that adds tiers within the systems. 
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They advocate inclusion of outsourcing of public service provision and 
other forms of PPPs in decentralization discourse. It means that 
decentralization can involve, for example, the private for-profit and not for-
profit providers (Bennett et al 1997).  
This has given rise to differences in opinion regarding the extent to which 
decentralization is useful in health systems (WHO 2008). Differences also 
exist regarding the correct approaches to evaluation of decentralisation 
outcomes (Sharma 2006). Therefore, it is pertinent to consider some of 
the arguments offered for and against decentralization to contextualise the 
appropriateness of PPPs such as LIFT in reforming the procurement of 
NHS buildings.  
1.2.1.1 Perceived benefits and risks of decentralization 
When practised in health, decentralization has been associated with 
benefits and risks including the following:  
1.2.1.1.1 The benefits 
It is argued that decentralization can facilitate improvements in health 
systems performance leading to better health outcomes (Wolman 1990, 
Zwi and Mills 1995, Dubois and Fattore 2009). Some of the approaches 
used address the problems of government monopoly and bureaucracy that 
obstruct appropriate responses to changing consumer needs (World Bank 
2006). In England, for example, improvements in technology and 
increased patient knowledge and expectations for quality put pressure on 
the NHS to modernise its buildings (Milburn 2004b).  Yet the DH has been 
slow to improve the condition of buildings citing the shortage of funds (DH 
2005).  
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In this case, decentralization may be an opportunity for the DH to reduce 
administrative or financial burdens that are associated with public 
procurement of some health functions (Atun 2007). Among other things, 
this can be achieved by transferring either financial, performance, or 
construction risks from central to lower level DH units including private 
partners. Within the NHS, the poor condition of buildings might be rectified 
by empowering PCTs to delegate responsibility in procurement to private 
sector partners in their areas (DH 2001, 2005). Such approaches make the 
health system more responsive to local priorities especially if decisions on 
expenditure of public funds are taken to the lower levels where the needs 
are better understood (WHO 2000, Saltman et al 2007). Decentralization is 
therefore perceived to increase efficiency in the ways to deliver public 
functions (Saltman 2007).  
It is argued that apart from mobilising financial resources, decentralization 
may promote competition and innovation in health. According to the World 
Bank (2006), decentralising to private providers particularly carries 
benefits of the government accessing better skills and expertise needed 
for technical efficiency in service delivery. Allocative efficiency may be also 
achieved since recipients of the decentralised functions are expected to be 
specialists in those functions (Sharma 2006). Benefits accrue because the 
recipients are nearer and connected with the service-users compared to 
central government departments. This fits well with Milburn’s (2004b) view 
that by decentralising public buildings delivery through PPPs, previous UK 
governments aimed at: 
“(…) harnessing the resources and skills of the private sector to bring 
about improvements in services for the public – in a way that gets vital 
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additional investment into frontline services in the shortest possible time, 
consistent with prudent management of the public finance” (page 2). 
There is also the political argument that decentralization extends 
democratic control to local communities and health stakeholders (Mills & 
Vaughan 1990, Zwi & Mills 1995). It empowers them when they are 
prioritised for receiving enhanced authority and responsibility for health 
functions in their areas. This may explain recent moves to involve 
communities in public service delivery through the Localism Act 2011 
(House of Commons 2011). Yet within the NHS, critics doubt whether 
PPPs are able to increase opportunity for ordinary service-users to 
participate in decision-making about the governance of local services 
(Allen 2006, Peckham et al 2005).  
1.2.1.1.2 The risks   
A think-tank on health reforms - Partnerships for Health Reforms cautions 
that one of the risks in decentralising health provision concerns 
mismatches between decentralised responsibility and power to control and 
influence relevant activities (PHR 2002). In their view, decentralization 
arrangements lack evidence for effectiveness against their primary 
intentions because of the mismatches. Sharma (2006) and Pollit et al 
(1998) blame this on governments’ inertia. Although power and authority 
to make decisions over critical resources may be needed to support 
execution of the decentralised functions at local levels, there is 
government tendency to retain them at the centre. Pollit et al (1998) 
further argue that, whether decentralization is between government 
departments or through PPPs, local staff may lack sufficient discretion in 
processes for executing the decentralised functions. A related risk to arise 
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may be the suspicion that decentralization offloads government burden 
and accountability to local levels without offloading power to determine 
service delivery (Allen 2006, Savas 2000).  
There is concern that decentralization may be motivated by desire to 
conceal government debt (Rajasulochana and Dash 2010). Public 
accounts may not disclose debts that result from private sector financing 
of public service. The government owns such debts like in the case of NHS 
buildings procured through LIFT. The mortgage is repaid to the LiftCo 
risking. The arrangement is likely to distort public investment because the 
buildings are reflected on LiftCo not PCT balance sheets (Beck et al 2009).   
It is also possible that the government may choose to decentralize some 
functions as a means to gain control and influence over the independence 
and activities of the recipients. When not matched with adequate transfer 
of power and authority, failure to deliver at local levels might be used by 
the government to justify re-centralisation of governance of the functions 
previously decentralised. In light of the nature of benefits and risks of 
decentralization, the approaches need to be analysed to put into context 
how PPPs like LIFT may fit into the spectrum.   
1.2.2 Approaches to decentralization 
Strategies for transferring, authority and responsibility from higher to lower 
levels of government may involve horizontal and vertical decentralization 
(PHR 2002). Horizontal decentralization occurs when activities for service 
delivery are dispersed among organizational units that are at the same 
level. Within the NHS, it may mean the government spreading 
responsibility over specific health functions between the DH and local 
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authorities (DH 2012). By contrast, vertical decentralization involves 
dispersal of activities among units within the same organization. For the 
NHS, this may mean the DH spreading the roles and activities for health 
delivery between strategic health authorities, PCTs, foundation hospitals 
and mental health trusts. Activities that are decentralised may be related 
to human resources management, service planning, performance 
management, funding, or procurement of facilities.   
Analysts offer different perspectives in explaining the basis for 
decentralising health service delivery. Mills and Vaughan (1990) adopt a 
political perspective to explain it as promoting democratic control and 
citizenship. This involves giving communities and service-users roles in 
the governance of health services. The approach extends on Rondinelli’s 
(1983) administrative perspective that uses devolution, deconcentration 
and delegation concepts in explaining decentralization. Wolman (1990) 
identifies arrangements in the flow of public funds from higher to lower 
level government units to consider decentralization from economic and 
financial perspectives.  
The current research moves beyond the confines of these perspectives to 
include the different forms of PPPs emerging within health systems in the 
spectrum of decentralization. Other commentators including Milburn 
(2004a), Saltman et al (2007), and Atun (2007) think likewise. Milburn’s 
view is that PPPs used in procuring NHS buildings decentralise the funding 
and financing for local levels to improve service delivery. The current 
research sought to shed light on how key features of the conventional 
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approaches and those of LIFT mesh in explaining decentralization within 
the NHS.      
1.2.2.1 Political decentralization 
The underlying assumptions in political decentralization are that, decisions 
made through wider local participation are better informed, and more 
relevant to local priorities compared to when made by central political 
departments (Mills and Vaughan 1990, Pollit et al 1998). This may provide 
the health system with opportunities to improve the responsiveness of 
health activities to local needs (Cornwall and Gaventa 1999). Within the 
NHS, the PCTs are expected to understand and prioritise local interests 
and needs in the design and commissioning of services (DH 2001). To 
achieve this may require the presence of within-PCTs structures with a 
mandate to encourage effective engagement with communities in 
decisions about investments needed at local levels.  
Aside from strengthening democratic control, it is suggested that political 
decentralization may produce additional economic benefits such as 
eliminating potential standardisation in health related goods (Saltman et al 
2006). This in turn helps among other things, to achieve efficiency by 
reducing bureaucracy in service delivery and increasing patient choice 
needed to improve health outcomes. For these reasons, the present 
research sought to explore the extent to which decentralization through 
LIFT helped to achieve the pro-democracy assumptions underlying political 
decentralization.  
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1.2.2.2 Administrative decentralization 
Administrative decentralization is perceived to be effective at improving 
health service delivery. According to Pollit et al (1998), it prioritises 
redistribution of authority and critical resources for health to lower levels of 
government. Saltman and Busse (2002) explain that the improvements are 
products of operational staff adopting entrepreneurial approaches to their 
activities. They do this by changing to either devolve, or delegate, or 
privatise authority and responsibility over resources needed to perform 
selected health functions (Saltman et al 2007).    
Devolution 
Devolution involves streamlining bureaucracy through redistributing 
authority, decision-making, finance, management, and necessary powers 
to semi-autonomous government units (World Bank 2006, Pollit et al 
1998). Considering the wide range of the aspects redistributed, devolution 
might be the strongest form of administrative decentralization provided 
locales are allowed sufficient discretion. Discretion refers to freedom that 
the government accords to local staff in decisions about implementing the 
decentralised functions.  
In the 1990s, the DH reorganised the NHS by setting up self-governing 
foundation trust hospitals, strategic health authorities, and PCTs to take 
over roles previously performed by District Health Authorities (Stevens 
2004). This further devolved NHS activities in the sense that the new 
structures assumed accountability for delivery and local performance in 
health. On this basis, you could argue that LIFT represents additional 
structures designed to devolve planning and funding of buildings from the 
DH to the PCTs. In this case, devolution runs side-by-side with delegation 
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of delivery and part of the financing and management of buildings to 
LiftCos coordinated by the PCTs.  
In health, governments’ tendency to retain control over the essential 
aspects of service delivery may influence effectiveness of devolution (PHR 
2002). Sharma (2006) raises concern about staff at the frontline of public 
service being denied adequate freedom in making strategic decisions in 
matters that may be important to governance of functions devolved to 
them. Partly for this reason, devolution may suit only systems like in the 
UK where the individual countries wield power and freedom from control 
by central government over key decisions in health delivery (Saltman et al 
2007, Peckham et al 2005).       
Deconcentration 
Deconcentration also involves redistribution of authority, decision-making, 
finance, management, and powers to deliver public service to lower levels 
(Rondinelli 1983). Its major distinction from devolution is that the 
redistribution is to “lower government units” whereas devolution 
redistributes to “semi-autonomous government units”. With 
deconcentration an important problem could be uncertainty about the 
administrative aspects that the government redistribute to lower units 
(Pollit et al 1998). For a variety of reasons embedded in politics, the 
government may not precisely state the responsibilities redistributed, 
meaning inadequate discretion conferred to recipients of the decentralised 
activities.  
This may explain why some analysts consider deconcentration to be the 
weakest form of administrative decentralization (Saltman et al 2007). 
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Writing on the NHS, Allen (2006) and Klein (2007) argue that it was weak 
at improving effectiveness in service delivery. In their view, it merely 
shifted responsibility to the PCTs with the DH retaining authority for key 
decisions and control in financial matters. Stevens (2004) further argues 
that accountability within the NHS was offloaded to the PCTs and local 
stakeholders under the guise of promoting localism in service delivery. 
This influenced the current research to explore whether LIFT was free from 
problems in decentralising key procurement activities to PCTs.   
Delegation 
Within health systems, delegation involves transferring administrative 
responsibilities and decision-making over selected health functions to 
autonomous or semi-autonomous organizations outside the government’s 
immediate control (Saltman and Bankauskaite 2006, Bennett et al 1997). 
Through advocacy by international organizations like the World Bank 
(2006) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) (2008), health systems 
across the world have progressive delegation either directly or through 
working in PPPs. It makes delegation probably the fastest growing form of 
administrative decentralization in health.   
Within the NHS, the DH could be seen as delegating the financing, 
delivery, and management of healthcare buildings to private companies. 
This is done either directly in the case of PFI hospitals, or indirectly 
through PPP companies as with LIFT buildings. Delegation occurs with 
private for-profit and not for-profit providers including non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) having increased involvement in direct care and 
services delivery.   
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1.2.2.3 Economic decentralization 
Economic decentralization brings in market mechanisms to change the 
ways through which services are delivered, financed, or consumed 
(Wolman 1990, Bennett and Muraleedharan 2000). This is mainly done by 
government facilitating new players or state-owned organizations through 
reviewing legal frameworks that may have previously constrained 
competition in health activities. The World Bank (2006) argue that aside 
from removing government monopoly in resourcing and procurement, 
economic decentralization in health may promote competition resulting in 
increased efficiency, better quality of services, and improved patient 
experiences. Central to this argument is the belief that market 
mechanisms promote diversity that generates efficiency in the allocation of 
resources for health (DH 2010). Health systems are therefore 
recommended to consider involving non-governmental agents in 
delivering, owning, or managing selected health functions (WHO 2000). 
According to Normand (2011), this may facilitate access to better technical 
expertise in the business of service delivery.  
Therefore, the current research sought to understand the extent to which 
LIFT portrays benefits that are central to economic decentralization. There 
are concerns that involved PCT staff may be unfamiliar with market 
mechanisms yet this is important if they are to make LIFT effective in 
achieving the anticipated benefits (IPPR 2004, Broadbent et al 2003). PCT 
staff may need to be effective at making sure that the LiftCo and its 
contractors do not prioritise their private goals at the expense of the public. 
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It appears that economic decentralization in health generates controversy 
by challenging public opinion about how services should be delivered. 
Sanderson (2003) and Stevens (2004) argue that the public expects the 
DH to always retain custody of health delivery rather than delegate to 
private providers. The controversy is particularly intense where 
responsibility is transferred to private for-profit providers who may have 
competing motives (Saltman and Buse 2002). There is concern that 
private for-profit providers may over prioritise efficiency by cutting back on 
services perceived to be costly even though consumers consider them 
essential. Pollock and Price (2011) explain this as the consequence of 
privatisation promoted through economic decentralization. This is further 
discussed in context of the perceived risks of using PPPs within health 
(subsection 1.2.5.2.2.3 page 59). 
1.2.2.4 Financial decentralization 
Financial decentralization changes the ways in which funds for public 
service delivery flow from higher to lower levels of government (Wolman 
1990). It involves government departments at higher levels shifting the 
responsibility to raise or spend funds to their own units at lower levels. 
Others (e.g. Bennett et al 1997) understand it as transferring the 
responsibility to finance services from public to non-governmental 
organizations including private companies. Financial decentralization may 
therefore involve changes in either funding or financing of public service, 
or both.   
In context of decentralization, it is argued that making operational staff 
active participants in activities to raise and spend public funds may 
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increase their effectiveness in service delivery (Milburn 2004b, Mills and 
Vaughan 1990). Yet this approach to decentralization is characterised with 
some important risks. Writing on LIFT, Pollock and Price (2006) observe 
that the LiftCos tend to borrow private finance at higher rates than would 
have been done by the DH making LIFT an expensive procurement 
method for the involved PCTs.  
It is clear from examination of the different approaches to decentralization 
that LIFT is a hybrid of political, administrative, economic and financial 
decentralizations. Therefore, the present research does not anticipate 
benefits from being precise about what kind of decentralization LIFT 
represents. Its interest is in explaining how LIFT produces benefits and 
risks associated with political, administrative, economic and financial 
decentralization. This may shed light on whether the outcomes 
experienced in the case-study reflect managerial capabilities or effects of 
how LIFT is designed, or those of the different approaches to 
decentralization.   
1.2.3 Decentralization within the NHS 
Creation of the NHS was driven by desire to solve problems caused by 
fragmented organizational activities (Fraser 2009). It standardised 
governance and administratively centralised healthcare activities. Since 
then, decentralization through use of market mechanisms has been 
practiced ostensibly to improve NHS performance by involving players 
other than the DH.   
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1.2.3.1 Organizational and decentralization of governance 
A review of literature on decentralization highlights that the NHS 
experiences significant organizational decentralization (Atun 2007; 
Peckham et al 2005; Stevens 2004; DH 2005; Saltman et al 2007). In the 
1990s, for example, it experienced changes in the management of 
activities previously performed by regional health authorities and district 
health authorities (Saltman 2003). At that time, the number of regional 
authorities was reduced from 14 to eight in 1994 (Stationery Office 2002). 
Although their roles were increased, the moves may be construed for 
centralization or decentralization due to changes in numbers of the 
governance structures.    
The merging of district health authorities with family health services 
authorities created 481 primary care groups in 1996 (DH 2005). This may 
be evidence for organizational and governance decentralisation since the 
primary care groups were then reduced (centralisation) to 303 upon 
replacement by PCTs in 2000 (Saltman et al 2007). In terms of their role, 
the district health authorities and PCTs differed to an extent.  District health 
authorities did not run primary care per se. They only purchased services 
at local acute hospitals. In contrast, the PCTs commissioned primary and 
hospital care controlling 80% of NHS budget (Stevens 2004).        
Organizational and governance decentralization was then accomplished 
by re-organising and re-naming the regional health authorities into 28 
strategic health authorities in 2000 (DH 2005). The strategic health 
authorities were made larger by reducing their number from 28 to 10 in 
2006 while that of the PCTs was reduced from 303 to 152 (Saltman and 
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Bankauskaite 2006). The changes in numbers confirm organisational and 
governance centralisation regardless of what activities the organizations 
did.  
Organizational and governance decentralisation has been criticised on the 
grounds that they increased either the number of service providers or 
range of responsibilities without matching power for local staff to control 
NHS activities (Sanderson 2003, Allen 2006). Peckham et al (2005) argue 
that it increases administrative burden on the lower level NHS units 
thereby risking failure to deliver the decentralised functions. For this 
reason and in relation to LIFT; King’s Fund (2008) sees more benefits from 
the DH retaining authority in delivery, ownership and management of 
healthcare buildings than decentralizing the roles to the LiftCos.   
1.2.3.2 Economic and market-based decentralization 
On economic decentralization, the NHS has always had a fair 
representation of the private sector. Private providers have a role in 
general practice, supply of pharmaceuticals, equipment maintenance, and 
researching new technology. Thus, initiatives like commissioning private 
companies under LIFT to deliver and manage healthcare buildings might 
be explained in the context of deregulation of economic activities for new 
possibilities in procurement activities. The White Paper: “Working for 
Patients” (DH 1989) probably kick-started this by proposing a split between 
purchasers and providers in procuring NHS services. Although district 
health authorities continued as providers until 2000, the DH directed them 
to progressively purchase patient care from new self-governing NHS 
Trusts whose business practices were influenced by market mechanisms 
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(DH 1989, Klein 2001, Stevens 2004). The White Paper arguably provided 
the PCTs with a platform for employing internal markets mechanisms in 
providing and managing health.   
The concept of internal markets aimed at promoting competition within 
NHS organizations by discouraging centralised planning and procurement 
of services (Klein 2007). It introduced self-governing NHS Trusts with the 
expectation to streamline bureaucracy and encourage local planning and 
management of health activities (DH 1989). Stevens (2004) believes the 
objectives were achieved because the NHS Trusts received decentralised 
accountability for health functions from the DH. Further economic 
decentralization involved the DH delegating responsibility, decision-making 
and discretion on expenditure for health to the district health authorities 
and GP Fundholders (Allen 2006). The GP Fundholder concept would later 
reappear as Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) to substitute for the 
PCT role in primary care commissioning (DH 2010) 
Like the other types of decentralization previously discussed, economic 
and market-based decentralization is perceived to improve efficiency 
leading to better health outcomes (House of Commons 2012). The 
benefits are achieved by, among other ways, facilitating competition; 
accessing private sector skills; and passing accountability for health 
activities to local communities through involving them. You could argue 
that the DH applied market mechanisms by decentralising responsibility for 
financing estate improvement and management to private companies 
using LIFT. This is despite there being concern about possible mismatch 
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between what the public expects and how recipients of the decentralised 
activities may perform to meet the expectations (Sanderson 2003). 
Writing on PFI, Gaffney et al (1999b) contend that economic and market-
based decentralization risks increased cost because its centralised 
processes may delay activities. It is also argued that argue that market-
based initiatives show little evidence for effectiveness in delivering 
anticipated benefits in the NHS (Allen 2006, Klein 2007). The initiatives are 
characterised as driven by politics more than by their proven 
effectiveness.  
This research contends that LIFT involves decentralised decision-making 
by ensuring that operational staff is represented in the LiftCo board that 
approves local projects. The board comprises public and private sector 
members from diverse backgrounds and experience. It may mean that 
decision-making about health priorities within the PCTs is shared as 
opposed to being controlled by PCT staff alone. This influenced the 
research to explore whether LIFT conforms to the view that economic 
decentralization involving decision-making increases effectiveness in 
procurement activities (Bossert 1998, DH 2001). It is possible that changes 
in market factors may affect LIFT decisions. This makes it necessary to 
understand how LIFT activities are cushioned against possible adverse 
effects.  
1.2.4 Conceptual drivers of LIFT  
Many studies have provided explanations to understand what may drive 
new strategies in public service delivery (Duguid and Pawson 1998, World 
Bank 2006, Normand 2011, Stevens 2004, Powell 2000). Duguid and 
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Pawson (1998) indicate that changes in social, political and economic 
factors may force governments into experimenting with new strategies to 
keep public organizations relevant vis-à-vis their primary missions. The 
World Bank (2006) and WHO (2000) contend that health systems 
performance may be improved by deregulating the ways in which services 
are delivered. They put pressure on governments across the world to 
follow their advice.  
Normand (2011) indentifies new technology and increased patient 
expectations for quality and better health outcomes as the major driving 
factors within the NHS. The DH has a similar view. As a result, when 
defending the new Health and Social Care Act (DH 2012) they argued that 
it was driven by the NHS lagging behind other European countries in terms 
of healthcare technology and management responsiveness to patients. 
Their view is that involving non-governmental agents more in 
commissioning health functions may enable the NHS to catch up with other 
European health systems.      
Thus, the government may perceive New Public Management; “Third 
Way”; Localisms and public-private partnerships (Powell 2000, Nield 2002) 
as the ideas defining how public service should be delivered. The 
concepts advocate decentralization by replacing state monopoly with new 
possibilities perceived to increase efficiency in delivering quality and 
technologically relevant services. Figure 1.2 below explains how the 
perspectives may have influenced preferring LIFT as the method for 
procuring GP surgeries in the NHS. Thus, PPPs were probably viewed as 
the best strategy in satisfying objectives of the different perspectives.   
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Perspective    Driving Concept Strategy    Outcome 
New Public Management     Delegation 
Third Way     Privatisation  LIFT Program 
Localism     Partnerships  
Public-Private Partnership     Devolution  
Figure 1.2: Conceptualisation of LIFT programme 
 
1.2.4.1 New Public Management 
New public management denotes initiatives that seek to modernise or 
make public service delivery more cost-efficient (Hood 1991). Its 
implementation advocates private sector management techniques and 
market mechanisms to achieve success in government services. Public 
management analysts including Pollit et al (1998) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (2003) understand it as 
decentralization through organizational, structural or managerial changes 
to ways of delivering public functions. It involves splitting public 
bureaucracies into smaller agencies to facilitate competition with private 
companies (Pollit and Bouckaert 2000). In health, private companies may 
be incentivized to assume greater role in delivering services previously 
reserved for government departments. In relation to LIFT, there is evidence 
of the DH removing monopoly in procurement and management of GP 
surgeries in line with what New Public Management advocates. 
But some public management critics challenge New Public Management 
when applied in health. In the NHS is argued that the ideas prioritise 
market mechanisms and private business principles that may undermine 
instead of improving performance (Sanderson 2003, Pollock and Price 
2006). New Public Management principles are more or less similar to 
those of Localism and Third Way (Powell 2000). They re-assert community 
Decentralization 
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engagement by public agencies in order to collectively increase value in 
service delivery. Thus, it may be argued that the new thinking all redefine 
relations between public agencies and citizens in delivering public service. 
LIFT principles qualitatively differ from those driving private businesses in 
the sense that they closely mimic how New Public Management, Third 
Way and Localism thinking are operationalized.   
1.2.4.2 “Third Way” 
The “Third Way” ideology deregulated public service delivery through 
decentralising power and responsibility to involve new players including 
the private sector (Powell 2000). Its practice was consistent with economic 
decentralization in which market forces were encouraged where they were 
thought to be useful while control was retained where they were not.  
It appears that most drivers of new approaches to deliver public services 
that encourage PPPs such as LIFT to decentralise aspects of procuring 
healthcare buildings, resemble operationalization of the Third Way.  Within 
the NHS, elements of the ideology described in Table 1.1a were perceived 
to make the health system more responsive to changes in economic and 
financial environments (Sanderson 2003).     
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Table 1.1a: Dimensions of Third Way and connections to LIFT 
Delivery 
dimensions  
    Old Labour    The Third Way  New Right  
Approach    
Outcome 
Mixed economy 
of welfare 
Mode  
Citizenship 
Accountability 
Social 
expenditure 
 
Leveller 
Equality 
State 
                                  
Command & control 
Rights 
Central state / 
national 
 High 
 
Investor 
Inclusion 
Public / private civil 
society  
Co-
operation/partnership 
Both 
Both? 
Pragmatic  
Deregulator 
Inequality 
Private 
                  
Competition 
Responsibility 
Market / local 
Low 
 
          
Source: Adapted from Powell (2000) - Critical Social Policy 20; (1) page 42 
The ideology is important to the present research because its features 
provide the yardsticks against which to assess LIFT’s ability to generate 
benefits ascribed to deregulated public functions. To this end, the research 
sought to determine whether LIFT mechanisms promoted competition and 
associated benefits compared to traditional command approaches to 
procurement.  
Although the ideology emphasized increased private sector role, sensitivity 
associated with radical changes to NHS responsibilities restricted full-scale 
privatisation of the decentralised functions (Walsh et al 2000). This 
suggests that the ideology may have been considered an acceptable 
compromise between exclusive DH and private provisions of NHS services. 
Where possible, it would substitute communities in the forms of PPPs, 
housing associations and cooperatives for both the state and the market 
possibly giving rise to localism in decentralizing public service delivery.  
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1.2.4.3 Localism  
The Localism Act 2011 advocates decentralization for local authorities to 
have the authority and responsibility over public policy making and service 
delivery in their areas. Its logic is that empowered communities are able to 
improve service delivery by reflecting their individual preferences and 
circumstances through employing different ways to address them (Klein 
2003). This facilitates decentralization by removing standardised delivery 
processes influenced by central government.  
Sharma (2006) and Morgan (2001) view localism as a holistic approach to 
public service administration in the sense that it enables services within 
local areas to be joined-up with other economic activities. Within the NHS, 
King’s Fund (2008) argues that PCTs always wanted to integrate 
healthcare activities with other local economic programmes to achieve 
better health outcomes within their areas. For example, those that adopted 
LIFT hoped it would facilitate integration of activities at LIFT buildings with 
economic programmes within their areas.     
Although it became operational only in 2011, it would appear the Localism 
Act was merely to formalise existing practices. Some articles published 
before the Act explain potential disadvantages in stressing localism in 
service delivery (Bailey 2008, Allen 2006, Klein 2003, Saltman and 
Bankauskaite 2006). Referring to the NHS; the study by Allen (2006) 
stresses that localism partially devolved decision-making but control of 
critical policies was almost always retained by the DH. This may give rise 
to suspicion that the government recommended localism to avoid being 
accountable for some service outcomes (Stevens 2004). Yet some are 
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concerned that localism may be susceptible to central government 
interference (Saltman and Bankauskaite 2006). Klein (2003) explains the 
interference as influenced by communities’ lack of propensity to take part 
in making decisions about their local services.  
It is possible that substituting localism for a government role may risk 
neglect of some critical services. This happens where the recipients of the 
decentralised roles lack willingness to involve themselves in activities. Or 
they may lack skills and resources for sustaining the services. Exclusive 
reliance on localism may then create inequity or disparity in services due 
to differences in skills and resources between communities. So central 
government could provide insurance against the risks by retaining the role 
to redistribute resources between communities (Normand 2011). This may 
help the health system in translating the resources into healthcare 
activities that benefit patients.  
1.2.4.4 Public-private partnerships  
Another important paradigm for reforming public management involves 
incentivising to change the relationship between public agencies and the 
private sector in economic activities. Previously, public agencies 
monopolised the provision of public functions but world-wide they are now 
encouraged to work in partnership with the private sector in creating public 
value on citizenship lines (World Bank 2006). This has given rise to public-
private partnerships (PPPs) as one of the preferred strategies in improving 
performance and service delivery in the public sector. Like NPM, Third 
Way, and Localism discussed above, PPPs are conceptualised as a 
decentralisation strategy (Perrot 2006, Atun 2007).    
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1.2.4.5 Objectives of the drivers of LIFT  
Since the drivers of LIFT advocate replacing government monopoly in 
public service delivery, their key objectives (Table 1.1b may) may define 
how LIFT is expected to work. The objectives may be incentives that 
influence LIFT participants to generate specific outcomes. They are 
therefore important benchmarks in judging whether LIFT helps to solve 
procurement problems within the involved PCTs.  
  Table 1.1b: Key objectives of the drivers of LIFT  
Driving idea Pursued objectives  
New public 
management 
Professionalizing public service management by 
enhancing public agencies’ autonomy from central 
government control 
Decentralizing management authority by introducing 
new governance structures – e.g. boards of directors in 
public service delivery 
Stressing private sector management practices and use 
of market mechanisms to foster competition in service 
delivery  
Third Way Re-asserting citizenship and networks in public service 
governance to achieve outcomes otherwise missed 
through employing private sector management practices 
or simple market mechanisms  
Selective use of private sector management practices 
and market mechanisms where they are useful and 
public control where they are not 
Increased quality and responsiveness to service users 
by reducing bureaucracy that stifles service delivery 
Localism Joining-up public service delivery by decentralizing 
management authority to networks of local consumers 
Generating democratic authorisation to co-create public 
value and pass accountability for service outcomes to 
service users.   
Increasing quality of services by making public agencies 
more transparent and responsive to service users in 
their activities 
Re-asserting the role of public agencies gaining 
legitimacy by engaging service users as citizens in 
service delivery 
Public-private 
partnerships 
Foster competition and co-provision of services between 
public and private sectors using market mechanisms  
Stressing role of market mechanisms and private sector 
management practices to enhance efficiency gains in 
public service 
Maximising value-for-money through exploitation of 
private sector expertise and skills that prioritise 
efficiency in service provision 
Making the public sector more responsive to service 
user needs for increased quality and responsiveness to 
service users 
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It is apparent that important overlaps and parallels exist in how New Public 
Management, Third Way, Localism, and public-private partnerships are 
expected to work in decentralizing delivery public service. Their objectives 
concern: (i) promoting participation (ii), increasing diversity, (iii) enhancing 
efficiency and, (iv) making government agencies more responsive to 
service user needs. In relation to the present research, understanding how 
these objectives mesh with those of the DH is it is important because this 
may explain how LIFT outcomes come about.   
1.2.5 LIFT in context of public-private partnerships 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) divide opinion on whether they are the 
most appropriate to guide public management. This may be the result of 
differences in conceptualising PPPs and interpreting their underlying 
objectives.  
1.2.5.0 PPP concepts and definitions  
PPPs are conceptualised within decentralization because of their primary 
intention to delegate delivery of functions traditionally reserved for public 
institutions (Atun 2007). The reasons for adopting PPPs vary according to 
what aspects of service delivery the government may wish to reform. 
McKee et al (2006) identify desire to share investment opportunities, 
responsibilities, or risks and benefits within an economy as major reasons. 
They argue that the private sector has comparative advantages in 
procurement of some public functions. Therefore, the government and 
private providers are willing to work in partnership where they realise that 
each may benefit from specific strengths in some aspects of the 
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partnership. The benefits may be in either financing, or designing, or 
managing public functions.   
PPPs therefore tend to be rationalised on the grounds that they achieve 
greater value-for-money than would have been delivered through direct 
public procurement (Milburn 2004a). The benefits are produced not 
because either partner is more ingenious than the other. Instead, they 
result from symbiotic sharing of strengths plus complementarities in 
activities of the involved partners (World Bank 2006, McKee et al 2006). It 
is probably on this basis that the World Bank (2006) explains PPPs as 
formal collaboration in coordinating public and private expertise in 
economic activities. The explanation is consistent to decentralization 
stages described in Figure 1.2.1 (Atun 2007).  
 Figure 1.2.1: Conceptualising PPPs and decentralization  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Atun (2007): Chapter 14: page 247. In Saltman et al (Eds.) 2007  
Figure 1.2.1 describes how PPPs lie between “nationalisation” and “full 
privatisation” in public service delivery. They are created by government 
ceding some roles and retaining others. Under LIFT for example, the DH 
decentralises financing of buildings and accountability for performance 
and service outcomes while retaining the roles to regulate and monitor 
service delivery. Presumably, this is due to desire to ensure effective 
governance of public-private partnerships by facilitating redistribution of 
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resources to fund activities that the partnerships may not finance (Perrot 
2006). 
Within the NHS, the DH encourages PPPs on the argument that they help 
to improve efficiency through diversity and competition in service delivery 
(Milburn 2004b, DH 2010). This is despite that diversity and competition 
are sometimes criticised for fragmenting the NHS service providers (Fraser 
2009). Fragmentation risks difficulties in effective monitoring of activities. It 
also presents challenges to PCTs in coordinating to ensure that concerned 
PPPs deliver anticipated benefits.  
With LIFT, the roles retained at levels above the PCT boards possibly 
indicate what the DH perceives as significant in making it effective. For 
example, CHP retains an interest in intervening to regulate and monitor 
compliance with LIFT guidance while the SPBs monitor standards and 
quality of work delivered by the LiftCos. This could mean the DH uses CHP 
and SPBs in influencing decisions about, for example, where LIFT buildings 
are erected, their designs, or services that would be provided at the 
buildings. Such influence may unintentionally create tension especially if it 
were to be misinterpreted for interference with PCT activities and 
independence of the LiftCo.   
To an extent, effectiveness of PPPs is influenced by the motive that the 
private partners bring within the partnership (McKee et al 2006, Bennett at 
1997). On one hand, most governments lack financial resources, 
technology, and management expertise that are needed in providing better 
public services demanded by service-users. Their motive in initiating 
national PPPs is to benefit from accessing private sector resources and 
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management competences. On the other hand, private partners operating 
on for-profit basis are motivated by breaking into previously protected 
markets or safeguarding existing business.  
In health, Bennett et al (1997) argue that PPPs involving private for-profit 
companies are likely to be less effective in service delivery than those 
involving not for-profit organizations. Profit motive may influence the 
partners to overemphasize efficiency or prioritise cheaper healthcare 
activities at the expense of essential services. If they lack experience, they 
may be also prone to the influence of practices that are unrelated to health 
activities because of questionable commitment to public goals that PPPs 
are intended to deliver compared to not for-profit organizations (Bennett et 
al 1997, Perrot 2006). The present research partly explored the extent to 
which motive and other factors influenced LIFT activities and outcomes.  
1.2.5.1 The drivers of PPPs within the NHS  
It was observed that a considerable number of private companies in LIFT 
were getting involved in NHS activities for the first time (Beck et al 2009). 
The companies may be anticipating benefits that are different from what 
the DH intended through LIFT. If they are driven by intention to have a 
foothold in NHS estate market, they may risk activities undermining LIFT 
objectives.  
Large companies that take controlling equity in the LiftCo seek to make 
profit. In contrast, small businesses may be joining LIFT not so much for-
profit than to sustain their business practices and convenience of patients. 
McKee et al (2006) argue that small businesses are attracted into PPPs 
because they want to benefit from complementarities of activities rather 
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than profit. Others (e.g. Holmes et al 2006) argue that there is lack of proof 
that PPPs lead to improvements in performance and health outcomes. 
Despite this, PPPs are still considered integral to government strategies in 
procuring NHS services (Milburn 2004b). As to what drives GPs to join 
LIFT, may be the possibility that it enables those owning inappropriate 
premises to improve them without expensive private borrowing or the 
PCTs and LiftCo threatening their independence.     
It appears the drivers for decentralization previously discussed also 
explain increased use of PPPs within the NHS. Further, NHS patients are 
believed to have increased knowledge about healthcare technology 
(Normand 2011). It influences them in expecting and demanding access to 
better buildings that are furnished with relevant equipment (Milburn 2004b 
DH 2010). Significant number of the patients is ready to change their areas 
of residence by relocating to where their healthcare priorities are met 
(King’s Fund 2002). Thus, changes within the NHS are necessitated by the 
need to reform the way health activities are delivered, and how resources 
are provided to make the NHS appropriately responsive in context of 
shrinking budgets for public services (DH 2010).     
To this end, there has been a gradual reduction in DH role favouring PPPs 
to deliver selected NHS services. This involves extending incentives 
previously restricted to independent GPs for private companies to finance, 
or manage, or commission NHS services (DH 2010, 2005, 2001). To an 
extent, the different brands of localism pursued steer the NHS towards 
perpetuating PPPs in activities previously reserved for the DH (Klein 2003, 
Allen 2006, Bailey 2008, DH 2012). The benefits and risks generated may 
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provide the context in understanding what the PCTs implementing LIFT 
might experience.   
1.2.5.2 Perceived benefits and risks of PPPs  
Commentators on PPPs applied within health systems provide important 
perspectives to understanding the benefits and risks. Bennett and 
Muraleedharan (2000) identify the surrounding legal frameworks as a 
major determinant of PPPs’ ability to deliver benefits. This is because the 
frameworks specify individual partners’ obligations as well as the rewards 
and sanctions that may be imposed on failure to deliver. Legal frameworks 
therefore provide public sector staff with the necessary protection in 
investing effort and resources in economic activities led by private sector.  
Further, they facilitate capacity in monitoring the PPP’s critical activities 
provided the staff feel sufficiently empowered in enforcing them. With LIFT, 
this may mean that its ability to deliver the expected benefits is influenced 
by adequacy of the strategic partnering agreement and ways in which it is 
interpreted and enforced by PCT staff. Since the strategic partnering 
agreement is the legal framework governing LIFT activities, the present 
research explored how its contents protected or empowered PCT staff in 
their activities.  
McKee et al (2007) identify the interactive effects between economic 
factors and mechanisms through which a given PPP is expected to be 
implemented as more important than legal frameworks and staff capacity 
in generating benefits and risks. They argue that changes in economic 
situations alter the environment surrounding PPPs and outcomes that are 
produced. Some expected benefits may be missed, or those that are 
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apparent may become risks. The present research sought to explain LIFT 
by exploring economic influences on its activities and outcomes in line with 
RE principles that guided its conduct.   
1.2.5.2.1 The benefits 
Various commentators describe how economic factors and the 
mechanisms through which PPPs are implemented may interact to 
produce a range of outcomes (Boyle & Harrison 2000, Renda and 
Schrefler 2006, Perrot 2006, World Bank 2006, Milburn 2004b, McKee et 
al 2007). Perrot (2006) argues that PPPs for healthcare delivery help in 
improving the quality of services leading to better patient experiences. 
Renda and Schrefler (2006) explain this as the result of private partners 
using their skills and expertise in prioritising quality regardless of whether 
the partnership is for providing care or procuring services and buildings. 
They do so to remain competitive and get retained in the partnership. 
Within the NHS, King’s Fund (2008) and McKee et al (2007) identify timely 
delivery of high quality buildings when they are needed as important 
benefits. 
There is also the general view that PPPs facilitate improvements in 
management of risks related to health service delivery (World Bank 2006, 
Perrot 2006). They are designed to ensure that between the public and 
private sector organizations, the one with capability to reduce particular 
risks is supported in managing them. Hence claims that PPPs are 
generally better than the DH at reducing costs in procuring NHS buildings 
(Milburn 2004b) 
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Within the European Union, member countries are discouraged from 
borrowing to finance public service because the cost of private borrowing 
may be too high (Perrot 2006). Such moratoriums may obviously limit 
national budgets for health services. Therefore there may be benefits in 
transferring the financing of important elements for health to PPPs (Perrot 
2006, WHO 2008) as done in procuring estate in the NHS through LIFT. 
According to the DH (2001), improvement of GP surgeries was previously 
neglected due to inadequate budgets for public service. LIFT was then 
conceived as an effective way for facilitating continuity in investment by 
financing improvements leaving the DH to fund the non-immediate risks 
such as repaying interest on private sector finance. Since PPPs facilitate 
access to a variety of private sector resources and better technology, the 
World Bank (2006) argues that the cost of borrowing may be outweighed 
by benefits. Their reasoning is that PPP management has expertise and 
ability to reduce operational overheads through flexible procurement 
methods.   
Within the NHS, there may be benefits in the DH using LIFT to relinquish 
responsibility for unpredictable risks in cost and delivery time of buildings 
to LiftCos. King’s Fund (2008) indicates that LIFT has the ability to deliver 
quality buildings despite the unpredictability of these procurement risks. 
Other benefits may derive from transferring risks linked to appropriateness 
and continuous availability of buildings for use by care providers from the 
PCTs to LiftCos. This may also imply that the LiftCos assume a significant 
proportion of the residual value risk of LIFT buildings at the end of 
contracts. These are some of the issues that this research sought to 
explore to understand how LIFT transferred them from the PCTs to the 
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LiftCo; and whether it has the mechanisms to ensure the LiftCo respected 
the obligations.       
It is argued that PPPs to deliver health services facilitate increased 
competition, patient choice, and innovation (McKee et al 2006, Normand 
2011, WHO 2008, Perrot 2006, Milburn 2004a, DH 2012). The DH (2012) 
stresses that embracing competition and innovation within the NHS 
enhances opportunities for providing services that are responsive to 
changes in technology and patient needs. So PPPs may be reflecting DH 
desire for a responsive health system achieved by changes to 
administrative, economic or financial arrangements. This made it important 
for the present research to explore whether and how LIFT generated 
benefits of competition and innovation within the NHS.  
1.2.5.2.2 The risks       
The contrasting explanations about effects of PPPs in health could be 
evidence for uncertainty about what risks governments may wish to 
transfer or share, or how they expect to benefit through PPPs. Uncertainty 
arises because some risks may be too complex to clearly define for 
understanding by either the concerned partners or those expected to 
monitor the PPP. With LIFT, for example, LiftCos are delegated 
responsibility to mobilise capital for buildings but there is no guidance on 
the sources, borrowing levels and interest rates. The process generates 
inefficiency when the LiftCos borrow from expensive sources that affect 
PCTs liquidity through high interest repayments. This is in addition to risks 
of failure of market mechanisms upon which PPP activities are based 
(Sloan and Hsieh 2012). Market failure implicating risks in PPPs concern 
57 
 
externalities, asymmetric information, and unintended privatisation of 
healthcare functions. 
1.2.5.2.2.1 Externalities  
 Externalities are the negative and positive effects of economic decisions 
made without considering other people’s welfare (Sloan and Hsieh 2012). 
They happen because concerned people are excluded in making 
economic decisions about the PPP. In the real world, concern is raised 
about the negative rather than the positive effects of some economic 
decisions. With LIFT for example, an important negative effect could be the 
displacement of GPs that are not involved. This may happen if they feel 
that their business is threatened by new LIFT buildings. They may relocate 
elsewhere – a scenario that Hammett (1991) refers to as gentrification – 
and inconvenience patients. The disadvantages to patients may include 
having to follow their displaced GPs in order to remain connected with 
them at the new sites. 
A positive externality in this case could be that LIFT buildings may produce 
spill over benefits for groups of people that were not considered initially in 
planning individual schemes. They may provide opportunities for other 
social activities not necessarily related to health but benefiting the local 
communities. The presence of better healthcare buildings may regenerate 
and increase the value of properties in the neighbourhood. This research 
enquired about the negative and positive externalities generated by LIFT 
buildings. Informants commented on how the buildings leaked benefits to 
consumers from outside the case-studied PCTs or beneficiary groups not 
initially targeted.   
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1.2.5.2.2.2 Asymmetric information 
Some of the risks in PPPs for health may derive from problems of some 
participants having superior information about the relevant elements of the 
PPP compared to others (Perrot 2006, Sloan and Hsieh 2012). It produces 
inefficient markets when information that is needed for decision making 
within the PPP is not accessed on equal terms by all parties involved. With 
LIFT, for example, DH officials promoting it, private shareholders in the 
LiftCo, or local SPBs may know more about its critical contexts and 
mechanisms than each other. PCT staff and those at the LiftCo may be 
privy to some critical information about LIFT unknown to the other key 
participants like the GPs and contractors at the buildings. Asymmetric 
information may therefore risk adverse selection of who to partner with as 
well as moral hazards in activities of those involved (WHO 2000).  
LiftCo staff that are more informed than PCT managers may try to take 
advantage of the PCTs’ inferior knowledge about economic activities. They 
may pressurise PCTs that are not in optimal economic situations into 
projects that may not be worthwhile hoping that the DH will keep on 
bankrolling the PCTs. They may also not engage with PCTs that are in 
optimal economic situations since such PCTs are less inclined to use LIFT 
in developing their buildings. This means that economic decisions may be 
to an extent shaped by the information held by LiftCos or PCTs involved.    
Moral hazards may be exacerbated when partners behave in ways that 
take advantage of one party’s inferior knowledge about the critical 
elements of the concerned PPP (WHO 2000). With LIFT, this may mean 
that once contracts are signed, the concerned PCTs or LiftCos may seek 
to reap benefits by imposing extraordinary demands on each other where 
59 
 
they suspect the other party to be less informed about their obligations. Or 
the LiftCo may increase income by influencing its less informed clients to 
pay for services that have no obvious benefits for them. 
1.2.5.2.2.3 Privatisation of health functions  
The effect of the negative externalities and asymmetric information 
associated with PPPs ultimately leads to the criticism that they risk 
privatisation of health functions (Savas 2000, Pollock 2007, Fitzsimmons 
et al 2009, Pollock and Price 2011). It is argued that decisions that 
incentivise private involvement tend to ignore PPPs’ potential negative 
externalities or asymmetric information or both. This drags health systems 
into privatisation because decisions would have prioritised the private 
partners’ interests more than those of the public in economic activities 
(Savas 2000, Pollock 2007). This viewpoint is somewhat the result of 
promoting a broad definition for privatisation as involving any ideas that 
reduce government role in favour of the private sector in health activities 
or the ownership of assets for healthcare (Savas 2000).    
This is a broad definition that other analysts believe should be accepted 
provided it recognises that some functions passed for delivery by the 
private sector may only reduce government role in one activity while 
increasing in another (Saltman et al 2007, Atun 2007, World Bank 2006).  
Using LIFT as an example, reducing DH role in procuring and managing 
PCT buildings in favour of the LiftCo may actually increase government 
regulation through new structures such as CHP and the SPBs that 
supervise LIFT activities. This may explain why some argue that in public 
policy context, privatisation is not merely involving the private sector. 
Instead, it should be understood as the actual transfer of assets and 
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responsibilities for health activities from the government to private sector 
(Saltman et al 2007). The transfer may be through outright sale or some 
other arrangements to relinquish the government assets and responsibility 
for the function for which the assets were previously employed (World 
Bank 2006). For that reason, Atun (2007) and Saltman et al (2007) 
conceptualise PPPs as a distinct stage with different benefits and risks in 
the nationalisation-privatisation continuum (Figure 1.2.1, page 49).   
The narrow definition proposed by Starr (1988) and Saltman et al (2007) 
understands privatisation as withdrawal of public assets, functions and 
institutions from the government to private sector. This definition is the one 
used in this thesis to argue that LIFT only deregulates financing without 
shifting the role to procure healthcare buildings from the DH to private 
sector. Therefore, under the narrow definition, LIFT represents economic 
decentralization rather than privatisation. This is because the public assets 
transferred within LIFT are still employed to provide healthcare buildings 
used by the PCTs but managed by the LiftCo (DH/PfH 2003). When 
considered together with the broad definition, LIFT could be viewed as a 
hybrid of administrative and economic decentralizations. Its 
implementation transfers authority and responsibility to administer PCT 
buildings to the LiftCo that is simultaneously given role in economic 
activities to deliver related services.  
According to Saltman (2003), private partners’ willingness to join PPPs is 
more about their interest to benefit from the partnership than being 
committed to the public sector goals. They may have different motive and 
different benefits anticipated from the PPP arrangement (Perrot 2006). It is 
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therefore possible that their economic behaviours influence some of the 
risks associated with PPPs especially those related to privatised health 
functions. Commenting on PFI, Barretta and Ruggiero (2008) indicate that 
some PFI companies tended to avoid taking full share of their allocated 
risks. Renda and Schrefler (2006) criticise the private partners for 
overemphasizing efficiency by allocating resources to cheaper activities of 
the PPPs. Maybe they are prone to problems driving them into 
safeguarding their organisational and financial interests.   
Those responsible for monitoring PPPs may face challenges in reducing 
the risks. They may either lack knowledge about what attracted the private 
partners in the first place, or they may be uncertain about the 
competences brought into the partnership. This compromises the 
responsible authorities’ ability to work out effective mechanisms for 
minimising adverse activities within the PPPs. At the end, the public sector 
risk missing some of the benefits anticipated (Gaffney et al 1999c).    
1.2.5.3 Approaches to implementing PPPs 
There are different approaches to implementing PPPs for public service 
delivery. Some approaches may generate challenges when adopted in 
health (Perrot 2006, Renda and Schrefler 2006, McKee et al 2006). 
McKee et al (2006) remind us that local staff that have role to monitor the 
relevant activities may have difficulties if they lack the necessary capacity 
and technical know-how to handle complex PPP models.  Usually, the 
public sector hopes to bring in new competences through PPPs but finds it 
must also invest in capacity building to provide local staff with the 
necessary competences. This might not be a major problem in developed 
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economies where well developed private institutions are more likely to 
produce benefits than risks in delivery of some public functions using 
complex PPP models. Some models described in Table 1.2 below may 
require local staff to appropriately adapt to changes in governance or 
routines required for them to improve performance (Renda & Schrefler 
2006). 
Table 1.2: - Description of the different PPP models and their risk sharing  
Models Description Types of risk shared or transferred 
Operate and 
maintain 
Government contracts private 
partners to operate and maintain 
publicly owned facilities. 
Private partners take performance risk 
and revenue generated. Government 
takes risks to invest and fund services.  
Service 
provision 
contract 
Government contracts private 
partners to provide agreed services 
at public facilities. 
Private partner is paid for only services 
provided. Government procures and 
manages the facilities.  
Lease-
purchase  
Private partners are contracted to 
deliver facilities for leasing and later 
sell to the government. 
Private partners bear risks to invest, 
deliver and finance. Government takes 
demand risk plus purchase of facility.  
Build-operate-
transfer   
Government contracts partners to 
deliver and operate a public facility 
for a period before transferring it to 
the government.     
Private partners bear investment, parts 
of financial, performance and 
commercial risks. Government takes 
management and parts of financial and 
commercial risks (e.g. rent).  
Design-build-
finance-
operate  
Government gives specifications 
and contracts partners to design, 
build, finance, own and operate a 
public facility without obligation to 
pass ownership to government   
Private partners take investment, 
construction and performance risks. 
Government takes operational and 
demand risks or parts of financial risks 
as tenant of the private partners. 
 
Source: Adaptation of European Parliament IP/A/IMCO/NT/2006-3  
McKee et al (2006) argue that a number of PFI hospitals within the NHS 
have schematic features that reflect the build-operate-transfer and design-
build-finance-operate models. Aside from the risks transferred or shared, 
the different models can be distinguished by considering how they handle 
the ownership of facilities. The lease-purchase; build-operate-transfer; and 
design-build-finance-operate models differ in their handling of the 
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ownership of partnership facilities. But they have more or less similar 
arrangements for managing the risks. The lease-purchase model obligates 
the government to purchase facilities from the partnership after a given 
period. Under the build-operate-transfer model, the private partners should 
transfer facilities to government ownership after a given period. Both 
contrast the design-build-finance-operate model where no obligation exists 
to pass the ownership to government whether through purchase or 
transfer arrangements.  
Under most PPP arrangements, central governments tend to retain risks of 
funding or purchasing the major activities (Perrot 2006). The private 
partners may be provided with capital grants to deliver the desired 
functions. Government then pays agreed fees for using the facilities that 
may also be managed by the private partners. Most PPPs within health 
systems are perceived to be costly in terms of money, disruptions, and 
staff morale (Wall 2007, Normand 2011, King’s Fund 2008).  
With reference to the NHS, (Wall 2007) indicates that local managers 
might be frustrated by being excluded from initial negotiations for PPPs. 
The same applies if they do not feel supported in monitoring PPP activities 
and engaging them may help in making the planning process more 
effective (Wall 2007). Local managers may, for example, influence 
decisions about when to use PPPs, and the choice of their role. Their local 
placement makes them better than central officials in deciding what risks 
to transfer or retain in healthcare because they are the ones that manage 
the relevant activities. If the planning process excludes them, risks of 
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increased cost and disruptions may arise where the changes are of high 
magnitude (King’s Fund 2008).  
1.2.6 PPPs within the NHS 
There is a general perception that PPPs enable accessing capital and new 
competences needed to increase efficiency and quality in NHS activities 
(Milburn 2004a, DH 2010). As a result, successive governments have 
encouraged use of PPPs in delegating authority and decision-making 
about procurement, ownership and management of NHS activities (Atun 
2007, DH 2012). It gave rise to PFI in the 1990s from which LIFT was an 
offshoot in 2000. The new Health and Social Care Act 2012 is arguably 
underpinned by desire to involve non-governmental providers more in NHS 
activities.    
1.2.6.1 The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
The PFI involved private companies taking controlling equity and long-term 
contracts to deliver public infrastructure. Initially, its implementation was 
limited to transport, communication and NHS hospitals (Boyle and Harrison 
2000, Beck et al 2009). Despite being criticised as privatisation by the 
back-door (Gaffney et al 1999a, Sussex 2003), its retention by successive 
governments replaced Treasury funding of public infrastructure. It is 
argued that in 2000, PFI accounted for 85% of the financing of NHS capital 
investments (Sussex (2003).   
Under PFI, the organizations bidding for procurement of public sector 
functions were encouraged to create “special purpose vehicle” partnership 
companies. Within the NHS, the companies would then lead in delivery and 
operationalizing PFI hospitals (DH/PfH 2003). Payments for use of the 
65 
 
hospitals by the beneficiary NHS Trusts were directed to the companies and 
spread over 30-year periods. This means that PFI decentralised 
procurement of NHS hospitals by delegating responsibility for relevant 
functions to private companies.  
The PFI’s ability to increase investment within the NHS has been 
questioned (Boyle and Harrison 2000). But it may be pertinent to 
appreciate that the companies had no role to assess demand for hospital 
accommodation as the NHS Trusts retained this. They were only invited by 
the Trusts to design, finance, build and operate the hospitals. Possibly, 
some Trusts experienced reduced liquidity due to high charges for using 
PFI buildings. If this restricted them in developing more facilities, then PFI 
could be said to have caused reduction in investment.  The DH officials 
that promoted PFI (e.g. Milburn 2004b) argue that like other PPP models, it 
was effective at mobilising capital for modernising NHS hospitals.  
But other commentators think otherwise. Renda and Schrefler (2006) 
argue that utility derived from benefits of PPPs may be missed where 
private partners lack preparedness for taking full responsibility for risks 
allocated to them. Gaffney et al (1999b) explain that PFI procurement was 
expensive because NHS Trusts were charged high rents for below 
standards hospitals. Most analysts including Boyle and Harrison (2000) 
and Pollock et al (2005) think this was because private providers avoided 
taking full responsibility for financial risks that were allocated to them. In 
their view, PFI failed to deliver value-for-money in procurement of NHS 
hospitals. Given that LIFT is an offshoot of PFI, the present research 
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sought to examine whether it produced value-for-money and other 
anticipated improvements in procurement. 
1.2.6.2   Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT) 
Within the NHS, LIFT was designed for improving the conditions at primary 
care buildings. The DH regularly provided independent GPs with grants 
used side-by-side with individual bank loans to develop their private 
surgeries. Yet despite providing the grants and introducing PFI, they admit 
that investment in upgrading GP surgeries had been neglected (DH 2001). 
Maybe the cost involved was perceived to be too small to generate profit 
that would attract investors in PFI into developing GP surgeries.  
GP surgeries therefore remained inappropriate for modern care in a 
number of ways. Most of them were rundown because their small sizes 
made them susceptible to problems of congestion (DH 2001). Others were 
either converted residential houses or were located above shops making 
them not fit for their purpose (King’s Fund 2008). LIFT would facilitate 
PCTs in accessing private sector resources needed to put in place better 
GP surgeries. The DH had hoped the capital would be mobilised from local 
private investors lacking the capacity for participating in bigger PFI projects 
(DH/PfH 2003, Beck et al 2009).  
LIFT and PFI have similar objectives to increase value-for-money in 
procuring public sector facilities. But they employ different mechanisms to 
achieve the objectives. LIFT requires the PCTs and private financiers to 
create LIFT companies (LiftCos) along the lines of special vehicle 
partnership companies that previously led PFI activities. The companies 
differ in that LiftCos are PPP companies whereas special vehicle 
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companies under PFI were exclusively private. Their roles are similar in 
the sense of coordinating procurement activities including mobilising the 
money needed to finance delivery and maintenance of the buildings. With 
LIFT, local PCTs are eventually left to focus on activities to provide care 
using buildings that are rented from the LiftCos. The relationship is similar 
to what Hospital Trusts were to special vehicle companies under PFI.  
It is argued that LIFT was designed in a way that helps PCTs in avoiding 
problems previously experienced in implementing PFI projects (Beck et al 
2009). For example, PCTs implementing LIFT are represented in the LiftCo 
boards to make sure that their interests are prioritised in the decisions. 
Under PFI, the special vehicle companies’ boards were made up of private 
investors likely to overlook NHS interests in their decisions. You could 
therefore argue that with LIFT, the DH decentralizes by delegating the 
financing of buildings to LiftCos while also using itself and the PCTs as 
shareholders in the LiftCo. This may allow them to exert influence and 
control over the LiftCos’ decisions to ensure that they are not 
counterproductive to LIFT objectives.   
LIFT differs from PFI in two important ways. First, LIFT lets the DH to use 
public funds and assets to acquire partnership equity in LiftCos whereas 
with PFI, equity was exclusively private owned. Second, LIFT contracts 
give the LiftCos exclusive rights to developing future buildings within PCTs 
whereas PFI was only an obligation about one building not future 
investments.  
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1.2.6.2.1 The drivers of LIFT  
The drivers of PPPs discussed in subsection 1.2.5.1 (page 51) apply but 
the contexts differ from those that influenced LIFT’s adoption.  The major 
drivers of LIFT within the NHS chiefly concerned: shift in ideology for public 
service delivery; population growth; condition of pre-existing surgeries; 
and increased expectations by service-users.       
1.2.6.2.1.1 Ideological shift 
It was probably New Labour government that redefined the ideological 
framework under which reform of health service delivery was to be 
achieved (Powell 2000). They shifted from the old form of DH monopoly 
role to encourage PPPs in NHS capital funding and management by giving:  
“...more freedom for providers to innovate and improve services in 
response to the needs and decisions of patients, GPs and commissioners. 
(...); a continuing role for PCT direct provision; more opportunities for 
voluntary sector, social enterprise and private sector providers where they 
can help deliver better services with better value-for-money” (DH 2006a: 
pages 6 and 25). 
The ideas that influenced LIFT’s adoption feature prominently in a number 
of NHS strategic documents as part of a wider reform agenda (DH 2000, 
DH 2001, DH 2006b, DH 2007). 
1.2.6.2.1.2 Population growth 
The PCTs that pioneered LIFT were characterised by GP surgeries 
perceived to be unsuitable for meeting the healthcare demands of a 
growing population (DH 2001). Old buildings in inner city areas tend to 
attract high numbers of people because they are potentially cheaper for 
residential and commercial purposes (Fitzpatrick & Jacobson 2002). 
Regeneration of the areas fuels population growth by attracting high 
numbers of working people and residents who may demand for 
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appropriate buildings and services (Hamnett 1991). In health, LIFT was 
earmarked for inner city areas deprived of suitable healthcare buildings. 
Health authorities in such areas felt hard pressed to adopt it to make their 
buildings suitable for offering services demanded by the population.  
1.2.6.2.1.3 Condition of pre-existing GP surgeries 
Another important driver of LIFT was the poor conditions at GP surgeries. 
There was concern that pre-existing surgeries were either too old, or not 
built for purpose, or not adaptable for provision of modern care (DH 2001). 
At that time, the DH argued that: 80% of national primary care buildings 
were below the recommended size; only 40% were built for their purpose; 
and 50% were conversions of either residential houses or shops (DH 
2001). This presented challenges in modernising the buildings without 
disadvantages of cost to the PCTs. Further, most of the buildings were 
rented from private landlords less interested in adapting them for suitability 
to GP activities.  
LIFT was intended to address these problems by delivering new buildings 
designed specifically for primary care. Or it would refurbish old ones to 
make them adaptable to what GPs needed to offer modern care. The 
quality of buildings might be sustained since their management and 
maintenance would be done by the LiftCos that owned them. It was also 
anticipated that LIFT would reduce the scattering of surgeries by bringing a 
number of GPs to operate at same premises together with complementary 
service providers such as pharmacies (DH 2001, NHS London 2007b). The 
arrangement would offer convenience to patients and improve the 
coordination of services to reduce administrative overheads within PCTs. 
The researcher believed the arrangement to be centralisation that may 
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carry some risks. Hence examination of whether it did not risk 
disconnecting and inconveniencing patients through having to travel to 
their preferred GPs.      
1.2.6.2.1.4 Increased expectations by service-users  
The strategic document “Our Health, Our Care, Our Say” (DH 2006b), 
presented the case of NHS patients preferring to receive care nearer their 
homes compared to hospitals. Since LIFT prioritised upgrading of local 
healthcare buildings the DH probably considered it appropriate for shifting 
“(...) resources and activity from acute to local settings in direct response 
to patient feedback” (DH 2006b page 148). It was clear from patient 
feedback that they expected increased quality in terms of appropriateness 
of technology and convenience with which they received care (Milburn 
2004b). 
With LIFT, the major issues may be that patients desire access to better 
services at appropriate buildings that offer convenience of opening for 
extended hours nearer their homes. A study conducted by King’s Fund 
(2002) also warned that patients contemplated changing their residential 
areas to relocate to PCTs whose health services were able to meet their 
expectations. Possibly, the DH officials chose to stick with LIFT upon 
realising that it may deliver better buildings with them showing rather than 
spurning economic inclusivity in distributing resources for health.  
1.2.6.2.1.5 Improvements in technology 
Behind all the drivers may be advances in healthcare technology forcing 
the DH into trying new possibilities to change routines within the NHS. 
Coiera (2003) reminds us that technology may shift patient expectations 
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and preference of ways through which to receive care. The ripple effects 
may involve healthcare providers changing ways through which to satisfy 
the changes in patient expectations and preferences. Within the NHS, 
increased portability in health information may mean that patients now 
know more about the relevant and optional treatment methods for their 
problems. This puts GPs under pressure to require buildings that are 
appropriately designed and equipped for providing the type of care 
expected. To a greater or lesser extent; technology impacting on the NHS’ 
vision, patient expectations, and GPs’ desire to retain competitive 
advantages in care provision probably forced experimentation with LIFT.  
1.2.6.2.2 Expected benefits from LIFT  
LIFT involves different participants but the major ones are the PCTs, the 
LiftCos, local investors in the LiftCo, primary care providers, and 
contractors at LIFT buildings. Each of these participating groups has its 
own set of expected benefits. Because the PCTs are the principal 
beneficiaries, this discussion prioritises what they are expected to realise 
from using LIFT. In the process, the benefits and risks of PPPs (subsection 
1.2.5.2 page 53) plus endorsement and criticism of LIFT (subsection 
1.2.6.2.4 page 85) are recognised.  
In light of the discussed drivers of LIFT, it was expected that the PCTs 
using LIFT would benefit by having new and innovative ways to procure, 
equip and maintain their buildings (DH/PfH 2003). They get opportunity for 
improving the condition of GP surgeries and gain when new ideas from 
LiftCos substitute for poor value existing DH led procurement.  
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Further, LIFT would increase PCT efficiency in procurement and 
subsequent management of the surgeries (DH 2001, DH/PfH 2003). This is 
achieved by replacing old inadaptable buildings with those built for 
purpose. GPs using better equipment in modernised buildings would be 
able to practice to their full potential. Since LIFT was expected to bring a 
number of GPs and complementary providers to work under one roof, the 
PCTs would benefit through reduced overheads associated with 
coordinating scattered providers (Fitzsimmons et al 2009).  
Possibly, the disbenefits of centralised service provision could in effect 
reverse benefits of decentralized financing and planning. Prior to LIFT, 
there was concern that private landlords would rather collect rent than 
spend money on adapting their buildings to suite use that is desired by 
GPs (DH 2001). Under LIFT, the LiftCo takes responsibility to maintain the 
buildings and risk losing rent if important facilities are not used due to lack 
of maintenance. This means that PCTs may benefit from reducing 
perverse incentives by private landlords.  
Another expectation was that the PCTs would increase their capacities in 
delivering care that is consistent with patient demand. This is because 
LIFT was expected to increase the stock of new buildings and provide 
supporting management activities to leave GPs concentrating on their core 
activities of providing patient care. The PCTs’ worry about sustainability of 
the gained capacity might be reduced because the risk is partly transferred 
to the LiftCo. More so since the LiftCo would seek to ensure availability of 
facilities for regular use to avoid losing rent.  
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The PCTs use LIFT because they want improved surgeries to support 
patients in receiving care in community settings (DH 2006b). They benefit 
when patients increase their utilization of LIFT buildings and in the long-
run, it could be an efficient option compared to using hospitals in providing 
primary care. However, the downside could be that increased utilization of 
LIFT buildings may reduce activities at hospitals. Given staff numbers and 
the nature of equipment at hospitals, prolonged downtime due to reduced 
activities risk increased unit cost of healthcare for the NHS.    
1.2.6.2.3 Key LIFT features needing evaluation  
Evaluations are carried out for different purposes (Stufflebeam & Webster 
1980, IPPR 2002, Pawson 2006). They may aim at either relating 
programme outcomes to objectives (IPPR 2002) or at providing an 
accurate accounting of outcomes to programme participants (Stufflebeam 
& Webster 1980). Therefore, their timing may be at the end of programme 
lives or at some other predetermined milestones. An ongoing programme 
can be evaluated to identify and assess potential costs and benefits 
impacting its implementation activities (Pawson 2006). From these views, 
it appears that evaluations seek to identify and prioritise particular features 
to investigate about a programme depending on desired outcome for a 
given study. They give the different groups of people involved chance to 
explain how programme activities influence the outcomes observed. In this 
research, Pawson’s (2006) approach to evaluations is adopted to 
recognise LIFT as an ongoing programme. 
The research sought to identify and assess potential effects of LIFT 
features ranging from its governance arrangements and structures to 
economic and financial activities. The LIFT Prospectus (DH 2001) and the 
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Strategic Partnering Agreement (DH/PfH 2003) describe among other 
issues: (i) LIFT constituents (Figure 1.3); (ii) LIFT contexts and 
mechanisms; and (iii) procedure in implementing LIFT. These are the key 
features in LIFT prioritised for evaluation because the information around 
them may provide relevant answers to the research questions.   
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    Figure 1.3: LIFT constituents - descriptions in documents 
1.2.6.2.3.1 LIFT constituents 
LIFT is designed to revolve around the LiftCo through its interaction with 
the private financers, the SPB and involved PCTs to make the strategic 
partnering agreement operational. The LiftCo mobilises capital and is 
accountable to the SPB on issues of leasing buildings to the PCTs and 
GPs. Therefore, how LIFT constituents interact may produce outcomes that 
may help in explaining and understanding how LIFT works within the case-
study. The fact that private equity holders and banks have controlling 
equity possibly put the LiftCo under pressure to prioritise their interests 
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over those of the PCTs. As a context, it influences the mechanisms used 
by the LiftCo (e.g. having different incentives) in assuming effective 
leadership towards LIFT outcomes. This makes it important to assess how 
the distribution of equity between LIFT constituents may influence some 
outcomes.   
1.2.6.2.3.1.1 Distribution of equity in the LiftCo 
Sixty percent (60%) share of equity in the LiftCo is controlled by private 
investors. The DH holds 20% through CHP which is its investment arm 
promoting PPPs within the NHS. The remaining 20% of the equity is either 
held fully by the PCTs or may be shared depending on contribution of local 
stakeholders that the PCTs invite to participate in LIFT. This distribution of 
equity essentially means the LiftCo is controlled by the private investors. It 
is argued that the private sector may have less bureaucracy in making 
procurement decisions compared to the government (DH/PfH 2003, Beck 
et al 2009). Giving private investors control over the LiftCo may therefore 
speed up LIFT activities than were the PCTs to lead in procurement of the 
desired buildings. The present research sought to understand in what 
ways equity distribution influenced LIFT activities and outcomes.   
1.2.6.2.3.1.2 Role of the individual LIFT constituents 
Describing the constituents’ role may help in assessing LIFT’s performance 
vis-à-vis meeting its objectives. LIFT decentralises decisions about critical 
procurement activities from the DH to the PCTs and the LiftCo through CHP 
and the SPBs. Evaluating role of these elements is therefore important in 
understanding how LIFT works.    
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The DH retains influence in LIFT through its ownership of CHP that was 
given the role to promote PPPs within the NHS when Partnerships for 
Health (PfH) ceased to exist in 2007 (DH 2007). CHP controls 20% share 
of equity in the LiftCo and encourages stakeholders to join PCTs in 
acquiring part of the remaining 20% equity share in their local LiftCos. 
Therefore, CHP is expected to offer the PCTs and local investors with 
administrative or technical support needed for them to benefit from 
participating in LIFT.   
At the local level, the SPB provides strategic and technical support that 
may be needed for the PCTs and LiftCo in addressing contents of the 
strategic partnering agreement that governs LIFT (DH/PfH 2003). The SPB 
comprises representatives of shareholders in the LiftCo including one 
recommended by the LiftCo board (DH/PfH 2003). Although the SPB is at 
local level, its composition appears to favour the LiftCo than PCT interests 
yet its mandate is to supervise the LiftCo for compliance with LIFT 
objectives. It is expected to periodically review local SSDPs to ensure that 
proposed LIFT projects originate from agreements with the PCTs (DH 2001, 
DH/PfH 2003). It would appear that the DH recommended SPBs as a 
means for facilitating exchange of ideas and reconciling PCT and LiftCo 
interests and expectations in LIFT. The SPB and PCT relationship does not 
alter the strategic role of existing PCT boards. PCT boards still influence 
decisions about LIFT within their areas. This may mean that the different 
LIFT constituents have the dilemma of whose decisions between the SPB 
and PCT boards to prioritise, making it necessary to assess effects of the 
SPB on PCTs and LiftCo activities. 
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The LiftCo has leadership role in translating contents of the local SSDPs 
into the desired buildings. Although the LiftCo’s activities are supervised 
by the local SPB, it is managed by an independent board of directors. But 
that board’s membership has more private than public sector 
representatives presumably to reflect equity distribution in the LiftCo. The 
strategic partnering agreement governing LIFT (DH/PfH 2003) underlines 
the LiftCo’s influence by stipulating that PCT representatives may be 
changed subject to notifying the LiftCo.   
The LiftCo’s core role is to deliver and ensure continuous availability of 
buildings to the tenants. Encouraging the LiftCos in identifying investment 
opportunities within their areas mean giving them role in developing 
SSDPs from which LIFT buildings are derived (LIFT LOBI 2008). The LiftCo 
is also expected to help the PCTs in negotiating and recruiting tenants at 
LIFT buildings (DH/PfH 2003). Although giving the LiftCo such extended 
roles may improve LIFT activities, it may risk making the PCTs lenient with 
the LiftCo in imposing penalties for poor performance. Provisions exist for 
the PCTs to withhold rent if the LiftCo fails to make the buildings available 
due to lack of appropriate maintenance (DH/PfH 2003). Yet it appears that 
despite being landlord to the PCTs, the LiftCo is assuming more roles 
previously reserved for its clients. Hence the current research’s interest in 
evaluating influence of these changes in landlord–client relationship on 
LIFT outcomes.   
1.2.6.2.3.2 LIFT contexts and mechanisms 
The relationship between role of the bodies constituting LIFT and their 
activities gives importance to evaluating LIFT contexts and mechanisms. 
LIFT constituents require specific contexts and mechanisms for them to 
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deliver its objectives. The different sets of contexts and mechanisms that 
the DH perceived to help LIFT in producing the expected benefits provided 
the constituents comply can be identified in the guidance. The contexts 
and mechanisms would work in combination to influence the benefits.  
1.2.6.2.3.2.1 LIFT contexts 
Contexts are the social, economic and cultural conditions under which LIFT 
activities are carried out. They define how LIFT employs resources such as 
money, materials, land, and skills and expertise needed by the PCTs in 
providing conditions that are conducive to improving GP surgeries (DH 
2001, DH/PfH 2003). This study considers contexts under which LIFT 
activities are carried out as important, rather than simply assessing 
whether LIFT is able to achieve its objectives. Its conduct prioritises 
accounting for external socio-economic and cultural factors exerting on 
LIFT participants to affect its ability and the nature of outcomes produced.  
Potentially, the participants also provide individual contexts that may 
facilitate or constrain LIFT. For example, priorities of the SPBs, and how 
the PCTs and GPs using LIFT buildings may prefer to work, are contextual 
considerations that to an extent influence how LIFT objectives are met. 
The conditions under which LIFT objectives are met may inadvertently 
benefit one constituent or groups more than the other. Pollock and Price 
(2006) argue that LIFT contexts tend to facilitate more benefits for the 
private sector than public sector constituents. This may be due to the 
private sector LIFT constituents imposing the conditions under which its 
activities are carried out.  
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1.2.6.2.3.2.2 LIFT mechanisms 
Mechanisms are the opportunities and ideas which are introduced through 
LIFT. They involve how the resources for LIFT are used to deliver the 
desired buildings and related benefits. It is argued that LIFT has 
mechanisms like new management competences and arrangements that 
help the PCTs in managing risks in procuring improved buildings (DH 2001, 
DH/PfH 2003). Mechanisms are therefore relevant in explaining how LIFT 
outcomes come about. They take LIFT’s internal factors that exert on its 
constituents into account in explaining what may influence LIFT’s ability 
and the nature of its outcomes. Individually, the groups involved in LIFT 
may have internal facilitating or constraining factors. 
For example, the strategic partnering agreement stipulation that LIFT 
buildings are translation of the SSDPs developed by the PCTs may be 
considered a context (DH/PfH 2003). How the LiftCo may go about to 
ensure that the buildings are delivered along the provided specifications 
embodies LIFT mechanisms.  LIFT contracts such as the lease-plus 
agreement governing the PCTs’ use of LIFT buildings have legalities that 
force the partners to meet their obligations (DH/PfH 2003). How the 
partners respect the contracts and go about to meet their obligations are 
some of the mechanisms that to an extent influence LIFT outcomes. The 
mechanisms may inadvertently benefit one constituent or group of 
participants more than the other. Fitzsimmons et al (2009) and Pollock and 
Price (2006), for example, argue that legality of LIFT contracts prevents 
PCTs from using other procurement methods. They also prohibit using 
developers other than their LiftCo thereby missing on potential benefits of 
competition.  
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1.2.6.2.3.3 Procedure in implementing LIFT  
The series of activities followed by LIFT constituents under given contexts 
and using specific mechanisms are important because they influence 
progress against LIFT objectives. The procedure in implementing LIFT 
involves issues that are rooted on: choosing the land for LIFT buildings; 
agreeing on contracts; planning the projects; and operationalizing new 
buildings.  
 1.2.6.2.3.3.1 Choice of land for LIFT buildings  
The issues concerning the land on which to develop LIFT buildings are 
addressed in the Lease-Plus Agreement guidance (DH/PfH 2003). Initially, 
LIFT buildings were to be developed on land owned by the LiftCo. The 
arrangement is called the Land Purchased Agreement model to recognise 
that the LiftCo purchased the land from either the private sector or the 
government (DH/PfH 2003). Maybe the private banks that finance LIFT 
prefer this model for giving them more income from owning the land while 
allowing them freehold of Title Deeds to the buildings as collateral for their 
finance.  
In contrast, most PCTs using LIFT prefer to develop the buildings on 
existing government owned sites (DH/PfH 2003). This arrangement is 
referred to as the Land Retained Agreement model. They probably prefer 
the model for two reasons. First, they may perceive the sites to be still 
offering convenient patient access than moving to new ones. Second, the 
sites could be deemed to have abundant land for bigger and adaptable 
buildings needed to consolidate services by bringing more providers 
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together. LIFT then replaces the old buildings with new ones making the 
LiftCo a licensee of the PCTs that retain ownership of the land.   
Under the land retained agreement model, the LiftCo cannot dispose of 
LIFT buildings unilaterally not withstanding that it carries risks associated 
with their delivery and ownership. The LiftCo is also required to adjust its 
rent charges to reflect that the land is owned by the PCT; meaning rent at 
such buildings should be cheaper than at those delivered under the land 
purchased model. Private investors in the LiftCo prefer outright purchase 
of the land on which to erect buildings in order to maximise income from 
unrestricted rent charges. 
Whether under the alternative models, it may be an effect of choice of land 
for LIFT buildings that Treasury now expects the PCTs to reflect them in 
their balance sheets (Fitzsimmons et al 2009). This is notwithstanding that 
the same buildings may be also accounted for in the LiftCo’s books. 
Initially, the PCTs were not obliged to account for LIFT buildings in their 
balance sheets on the understanding that they were owned by the LiftCo 
whether through the land purchased or land retained model.  
1.2.6.2.3.3.2  Contractual agreements  
LIFT implementation is backed by the strategic partnering agreement and 
the lease-plus agreement drawn prior to rolling out LIFT projects (DH/PfH 
2003). The agreements are contractual agreements that spell out the 
rights, responsibilities, and deliverables of participants in LIFT. They are 
designed to dissuade the participants from activities that may be 
counterproductive to LIFT. Kings’ Fund (2008) argues that the agreements 
may deter progress if the mechanisms for their enforcement are perversely 
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applied by one party. It is recommended for LIFT participants to embrace 
renegotiations on some aspects of the contracts should circumstances 
preventing other parties from meeting their obligations arise (DH/PfH 
2003). This may enable the participants in mutually benefiting from LIFT. 
The present research sought to assess whether and how LIFT contracts 
are enforced help the involved PCTs in their procurement activities.   
1.2.6.2.3.3.3  Planning LIFT schemes  
There is need to understand whether the process for planning LIFT 
schemes gives priority to PCT interests and circumstances. This is 
important because of the DH’s (2001) recommendation that LIFT buildings 
be derived from SSDPs developed by the PCT through consultation with 
their communities. Since translation of the contents of the SSDPs is led by 
the LiftCo, true aspirations of the PCTs may be at risk of not being 
reflected in the way LIFT buildings are designed and constructed. The 
LiftCo and its contractors have incentive to change some specifications of 
the SSDPs when designing or constructing the buildings where they feel 
that timely delivery is risked by inputs that are not readily available.  
Whether intentionally or not LIFT standardises the planning of NHS 
buildings. Standardised planning through LIFT is believed to relieve GPs of 
the worry to develop their own surgeries leaving them with ample time for 
direct patient care (DH 2001). But the problem is that it risks planning 
buildings according to individual circumstances and priorities of the PCTs. 
This makes it important to understand whether and how the ways in which 
LIFT schemes are planned help the PCTs and GPs in increasing capacities 
to improve the quality of buildings as demanded by patients. 
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Among other things, it is important to know whether the people involved in 
operationalizing LIFT are clear about the guidance for translating the 
SSDPs’ contents into building specifications and what the different 
participants are expected to deliver. The knowledge may be used by the 
concerned staff in influencing effective planning of LIFT schemes. 
Otherwise there could be explanations on how lack of it affects them in 
discharging their planning responsibilities.   
It is possible that PCT staff and the LiftCo may lack prior agreement about 
critical primary care issues to be addressed within a PCT. In such cases, 
LIFT’s strengths may be unclear as the preferred procurement method vis-
à-vis the issues to be addressed. Thus there is the need to evaluate the 
quality and respect accorded by the LiftCo to contributions by the PCTs in 
planning LIFT buildings. Some analysts criticise LiftCos for giving the PCTs 
neither opportunity for effective contributions nor room for choice in 
planning the schemes (Beck et al 2009). But LIFT schemes are expected 
to be driven by consensus between LiftCo and PCTs (DH/PfH 2003),  
Concern has been raised that ordinary service-users within the NHS are 
rarely consulted in planning local services on the pretext that they lack 
propensity to contribute (Klein 2007, Allen 2006). Maybe this is why, in 
context of LIFT, the Infrastructure Planning Commission recommends 
public scrutiny for proposed LIFT schemes prior to construction (DH 
2006a). They probably want to ensure that LIFT schemes are in line with 
public interests that may have been missed in the SSDPs developed by the 
PCTs. If any proposed LIFT scheme fails to pass such public scrutiny, the 
LiftCo is required to revise the proposal to reflect the objections. It 
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underlines the importance of knowing about institutions whose influence is 
considered most in decisions for planning LIFT schemes.  
1.2.6.2.3.3.4  Operationalisation of LIFT schemes  
Schedule 17 Part 1 of the strategic partnering agreement governing LIFT 
describes the activities followed in operationalizing LIFT schemes (DH/PfH 
2003 page 191). It emphasizes strategies that facilitate linking health and 
social care activities to improve health outcomes within PCTs. For 
example, there are recommendations for involving local communities in 
activities to deliver and utilize LIFT buildings. This enables the PCTs in 
extending the impact of LIFT buildings beyond the health system (DH/PfH 
2003). It is therefore important to know whether operationalisation of LIFT 
schemes takes into account the features of national and local level 
arrangements for improving health and social care.  
According to the DH (2001), “development of LIFT will create a major new 
opportunity and significant expansion of the existing market” (page 27), to 
increase the number of active participants in primary care. This suggests 
that the philosophy behind LIFT is to generate business opportunities for 
local groups of investors and service providers not directly involved in 
activities to provide healthcare. It is important to understand whether the 
LiftCo prioritises employing local contractors in construction and supplying 
maintenance services. The guidance’s silence on the monitoring 
mechanisms raises the possibility of more established contractors from 
outside the LIFT areas being hired at the expense of the local ones despite 
LIFT being sold as promoting local participation in procurement.   
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One of the challenges faced by the LiftCo and PCTs could be that 
contractors and service suppliers have different motives in doing business 
with LIFT. It may present problems for the LiftCo in assessing the 
contractors in order to hire those that are connected with LIFT objectives 
for effectiveness in procurement. LIFT guidance has no provisions for the 
LiftCo in consulting or involving the PCTs or tenants at the buildings prior 
to hiring of building contractors and service suppliers. Neither is it clear 
whether the PCTs and tenants can control or influence the contractors 
where performance may be below the expected standards. These are 
some of the issues needing evaluation since they affect progress in LIFT.   
1.2.6.2.4 Endorsements and Criticisms of LIFT 
In context of the benefits and risks associated with PPPs applied in health, 
LIFT has been endorsed and criticised in a number of ways. King’s Fund 
(2008) argues that LIFT has the ability to deliver buildings on time when 
they are needed. According to the National Audit Office (NAO) (2005), LIFT 
is a more cost-effective strategy than DH led procurement. In support of 
this view, the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment 
(CABE) (2008) explains that LIFT’s mechanisms have the ability to harness 
private sector skills and expertise that help in saving time and cost in 
procuring the desired buildings. There is also the view that private 
developers that are involved in LIFT have the ability to substitute between 
construction inputs without risking the quality of buildings (King’s Fund 
2008). This makes LIFT buildings a step improvement on pre-existing GP 
surgeries and the buildings’ bigger size and regular maintenance mean 
that patient experience within PCTs is increased (King’s Fund 2008, CABE 
2008, NAO 2005, Beck et al 2009). 
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According to Wall (2007) and the NAO (2005), LIFT brings improvements in 
technology demanded by patients. The technology comes in forms of 
innovative ways in resourcing as well as stocking LIFT buildings with 
appropriate equipment and other facilities for patient comfort and safety. 
Beck et al (2009) argue that LIFT facilitates modernisation of GP surgeries 
through instigating stakeholder involvement in planning for their delivery.   
But some mechanisms through which the above benefits are delivered 
provide bases for the criticisms levelled against LIFT. Because LIFT 
involves private sector leadership, it may be perceived as not conforming 
to the public expectation for DH responsibility in procuring NHS buildings. 
Pollock and Price (2006) criticise LIFT for privatising components of NHS 
functions because it encourages enhanced role of private for-profit 
companies within the NHS. Because LiftCos operate for-profit, giving them 
leadership in LIFT has adverse effects on the PCTs. It is argued that the 
LiftCos are prone to economic rationalism that influences them to make 
savings by cutting costs or neglecting essential services at LIFT buildings 
(Pollock and Price 2006, Aldred 2008). Or the LiftCos may choose to 
minimise maintenance efforts, or surcharge the tenants for services 
provided at LIFT buildings in order to save money for repaying the 
financing banks (Fitzsimmons et al 2009).   
LIFT has also been criticised for reducing competition and standardising 
procurement of buildings within PCTs. Aldred (2008) explains that 
exclusive rights given to the LiftCos in developing future buildings make 
the LIFT areas geographical monopolies. It risks locking PCTs into LIFT 
deals that may no longer be appropriate for addressing local priorities. 
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Other analysts (e.g. Fitzsimmons et al 2009) argue that LiftCos may be 
tempted to export standardised building designs across PCTs in order to 
avoid architectural and designing costs. This undermines innovation that is 
needed to deliver buildings that reflect local priorities. Thus, restrictions on 
competition and standardised procurement (Aldred 2008, Fitzsimmons et 
al 2009) governed with prescriptive guidance may cause the PCTs to miss 
on the benefits that are claimed to derive from LIFT. Wall (2007) explains 
that the benefits may be missed through PCTs being restricted in finding 
creative ways to address local problems. For example, inflexible guidance 
prevents PCTs from renegotiating elements in LIFT contracts when they 
need appropriate response to changes in circumstances.       
Unison, the health trade union and the British Medical Association (BMA) 
also expressed concerns about LIFT.  Unison’s (2003) concern was about 
the risk of LIFT influencing involved PCTs and GPs to reduce health worker 
numbers, or saving money by revising their conditions of service. Initially, 
the BMA (2008) believed that the DH was coercing GPs to take part in LIFT 
schemes. Consequently, they regarded LIFT as designed to usurp the 
independence of GPs. These views suggest that apart from economic and 
financial grounded criticisms, there are also behavioural issues blamed on 
LIFT. For example, threats to staff tenure, reduction in staff morale, and 
erosion of cooperative relations between the DH and independent GPs 
may be behavioural factors blamed on LIFT. 
It may explain why some analysts within the NHS (e.g. King’s Fund 2008 
and McKee et al 2006) believe that patient experiences may be increased 
through investing to change behavioural issues in how GPs relate with the 
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DH than in new buildings. King’s Fund (2008) suggests that effective 
strategies to increase patient experience should consider redirecting more 
resources towards strengthening collaboration plus sharing of information 
between the PCTs and GPs than to new buildings. LIFT may be in 
conformity with the proposal to increase investment in healthcare 
technology (McKee et al 2006) in order to increase patient experience in 
primary care. The current research explores ways in which collaboration 
between LIFT participants, their exchange of information on LIFT and 
technology influenced progress on LIFT objectives.    
1.2.6.2.5 Rationale for LIFT within the case-study  
The need to invest in primary care buildings was primarily determined by 
functionality of the existing stock. Within the case-study, the poor condition 
of GP surgeries prevented patients from accessing quality health services 
(Fitzpatrick and Jacobson 2002). An important problem was that the 
buildings were mostly adapted residential houses expensive to modify into 
purposeful healthcare buildings. Therefore the agenda to make primary 
care buildings more functional made the case-study a suitable candidate 
for LIFT (DH 2001, 2006). LIFT was anticipated to bring together a variety 
of providers in order to integrate primary care by working under one roof 
(DH 2006b). Within NHS London, LIFT has now been linked with the 
proposed polyclinic concept to the extent that some polyclinics within the 
case-study are in fact located in LIFT buildings (NHS London 2007a) 
Modernising GP surgeries is important because they influence patients’ 
first impressions about the quality of NHS services. Within the boroughs 
covered by this case-study, redevelopment of a local hospital was 
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observed to make the residents feel valued by the health authorities 
(King’s Fund 2002). The investment influenced the residents that had 
contemplated relocating to other boroughs to postpone their desire.  
This, together with perceived level of deprivation within the areas, may 
explain why the case-studied PCTs volunteered to pioneer LIFT schemes. 
The Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) that measure deprivation 
experienced in communities rank east London boroughs low out of 326 
boroughs across England. Data from the Corporate Research Unit (2011) 
at PCT-2 show that the boroughs (Brh-1and Brh-2) in which the case-
studied PCTs are located rank 1st and 3rd respectively for widespread 
deprivation. Widespread deprivation is one of the factors that influenced 
DH authorities in initiating LIFT (DH 2001). The authorities then 
recommended its adoption by the affected PCTs wishing to improve their 
facilities. The levels of deprivation in boroughs where the case-studied 
PCTs are located do not significantly vary from those of neighbouring 
ones. For example, Brh-3 and Brh-4 rank 2nd and 13th respectively for the 
extent in widespread deprivation described in Table 1.3.      
  Table 1.3: National ranking in deprivation: four boroughs in east London (2010)  
Source: PCT-2 Corporate Research Unit (2011)  
Other factors that may have made the case-study area a suitable 
candidate for LIFT could be the problems of shorter life expectancy and 
higher maternal mortality experienced within the PCTs compared to others 
Measure of deprivation Ranking out of 326 boroughs 
Brh-1 Brh-2 Brh-3 Brh-4 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) score 2 7 3 15 
Average IMD rank 1 3 2 7 
Extent in widespread deprivation 1 3 2 13 
Local concentration of deprivation 49 38 51 62 
Income scale 15 10 8 32 
Employment scale 30 38 32 54 
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in London (Fitzpatrick and Jacobson 2002). Since up to 60% of residents 
in the case-study belong to ethnic minority groups (NHS 2009), the PCTs 
may be facing challenges in developing buildings that consider differences 
in needs caused by diversity in ethnicity. It was hoped that LIFT would be a 
means to solve part of these problems by delivering buildings that not only 
reflect priorities of local residents but also facilitate monitoring of GPs to 
ensure that they contribute by offering convenience to patients through 
opening their surgeries for extended hours. The NHS (2009) reports that 
by 2008, 81% of the GPs working in PCT-1 and 97% of those in PCT-2 
opened their surgeries for extended hours compared to London average of 
79%. The current research investigated whether this performance was 
attributed to LIFT alone or other activities within the PCTs.  
1.2.6.2.6 Importance of the current research  
The current research was employed to develop an understanding of LIFT 
and what it meant from the perspectives of people involved and affected 
by its implementation. Its major focus was on investigating the contexts 
and mechanisms through which LIFT is implemented and their related 
outcomes rather than evaluating LIFT buildings, meaning the interest was 
more in LIFT process than outputs. The answers to the research questions 
were developed through identifying how LIFT contexts and mechanisms 
interacted to produce the anticipated outcomes in procurement not merely 
confirming the presence of buildings. Slow pace in developing LIFT 
buildings within the case-study suggests that the elements central to LIFT 
could be in some ways constraining activities.  
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LIFT promoters argue that it facilitates value-for-money in procurement 
(DH/PfH 2003). This is achieved through the LiftCos prioritising efficient 
and innovative ways to deliver affordable and sustainable buildings for the 
PCTs compared to government led procurement. But some analysts argue 
that differences in approaches to service delivery between the involved 
public and private partners may affect its ability in achieving the expected 
outcomes (Beck et al 2009). This researcher believed that operational staff 
at the frontline of LIFT activities were the best arbiters for how and why its 
contexts and mechanisms interacted to produce the observed outcomes. 
Therefore, the research used reflections on personal experiences by 
selected informants involved and affected by LIFT to assess whether it 
aligned the PCTs and LiftCo expectations. Informants provided insights 
into the risks, strengths, and weaknesses of contexts and mechanisms 
which may influence policy and practice for the PCTs working to improve 
their buildings using LIFT. 
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SECTION 2: METHODOLOGY 
The Methodology section comprises six subsections explaining conceptual 
and practical issues addressed in fulfilling the research. Subsection 2.1 
discusses alternative evaluation approaches considered initially. 
Subsection 2.2 discusses the research design by considering the merits of 
an embedded case-study (Yin 2009) in relation to this research. A detailed 
explanation of the embedded elements or units of analysis was provided in 
subsection 1.1.5.3 (page 6).     
Subsection 2.3 discusses the data collection methods. The methods’ 
individual strengths and fitness to address the research questions are 
discussed, and practical activities done in conducting: documentary 
reviews; in-depth interviews; and tours of LIFT buildings are explained. An 
overview of the methods and how they mapped onto the research 
questions is provided followed by an explanation of the fieldwork process.  
Subsection 2.4 deals with analysis of the data. It discusses the approach 
taken, evidence extraction and coding, and how realist evaluation 
principles were used in interpreting the evidence. Subsection 2.5 explains 
the research ethics including those pertaining to its clearance, data 
collection, data analysis and interpretation, and ensuring objectivity of the 
findings. Subsection 2.6 explains the research timeline.    
2.1 Conceptual Framework for the Evaluation 
This subsection discusses the different possible approaches to 
evaluations which were considered as frameworks to guide the research. 
From the many approaches proposed by Donaldson (2007) and 
Stufflebeam & Webster (1980) for use in qualitative studies, only the 
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decision-oriented, consumer-oriented, and client-centred approaches may 
be considered appropriate. They are process models of evaluations 
interested in assessing programme outcomes from the perspectives of 
their initiators (decision-oriented), consumers, or programme clients 
(Donaldson 2007). In addition, the Realist Evaluation (RE) approach 
proposed by Pawson and Tilley (2001) was listed for consideration. RE is 
also interested in measuring programme outcomes but gives importance 
to explaining causation between processes and outcomes than looking at 
the outcomes in isolation. In this subsection, each approach’s strengths 
and weaknesses are considered, and the pertinent details for preferring 
the chosen RE approach are explained.  
2.1.1 Alternative approaches to the evaluation 
An important factor for the choice of approach to an evaluation is whether 
a programme is ongoing or has reached its end of life (IPPR 2002, Pawson 
and Tilley 2004). The IPPR (2002) argue that most evaluations seek to 
confirm whether a programme achieved its objectives at the end of its life. 
But it is also argued that evaluations may seek to provide understanding 
about how a programme’s processes facilitate or constrain progress 
(Pawson and Tilley 2004). The current research prioritised evaluation 
approaches whose epistemologies are rooted in explaining LIFT’s 
operational issues as an ongoing programme. It preferred approaches with 
the ability to identify and extract practical evidence about LIFT as opposed 
to those that would assess it based on idealistic presuppositions of the DH 
officials alone. Hence contexts and mechanisms that underpin LIFT’s 
effectiveness in meeting its objectives were to be validated by the views of 
staff executing the schemes as opposed to DH officials who designed it.    
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The observations that LIFT involved complex contexts and mechanisms 
(Aldred 2006, Beck et al 2009) suggest that an approach may be limited in 
identifying major issues for LIFT if it is exclusively used in the evaluation. In 
such cases, mixed approaches are recommended because they augment 
each other and may help in understanding a researched programme from 
different perspectives thereby enhancing credibility and external validity of 
the research findings (Creswell 2002, Chase 2005). Hence the choice of 
the evaluation approach in this research was influenced by their perceived 
epistemology and objectivity in generating knowledge about LIFT.    
It has been argued that different evaluation approaches have variable 
utility in eliciting critical information needed for understanding a 
programme (Donaldson 2007, Pawson 2004, Chen and Rossi 1983). 
Donaldson (2007) argues that some approaches may promote existing 
positive or negative perceptions about a programme at the expense of its 
actual value. Some approaches also risk inconsistencies where in one 
instance they may reveal the actual value of a programme yet in the other, 
the same approaches may fail to reveal the features that those affected 
may want to see prioritised in a programme. For example, Chen and Rossi 
(1983) argue that randomised control experiments are evaluation 
approaches that can provide specific answers in healthcare yet they can 
have the weakness of ignoring theory based explanations for how a 
programme works. Taking this into account, the choice of the approach for 
the current research was made from a menu of four, namely (i) decision-
oriented, (ii) consumer-oriented, (iii) client-centred, and (iv) realist 
evaluation (Table 2.1). The chosen approach would facilitate analysis of 
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the merits and demerits of LIFT based on objective experiences of the 
involved operational staff.    
Table 2.1 explains the bases on which the alternatives were screened for 
suitability to the research. The column on “Knowledge base” indicates 
which perspective the individual approach was perceived to emphasise in 
generating evidence. The important strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach in relation to addressing the research questions are indicated in 
the last column.    
Table 2.1: Screening suitability of approaches to the research   
Approach Knowledge base Strengths (S) & Weaknesses (W) 
 
Decision-
oriented 
 
Emphasizes views of 
public sector officials 
who initiated LIFT in 
getting evidence for 
answers to the 
research questions.  
(S) – May justify the decision to initiate LIFT. The 
findings would influence improvements in policy 
planning (Donaldson 2007).  
(W) – Risks using the research to defend LIFT. The 
findings may be biased by officials / policy-makers 
(Stufflebeam & Webster 1980). 
 
 
Consumer-
oriented 
 
 
Prioritises consumer 
satisfaction with LIFT 
in getting evidence for 
answers to the 
research questions.  
(S) – May judge relative merits of options to LIFT 
using independent views. The findings may help in 
protecting consumers from LIFT’s ineffectiveness 
(IPPR 2002) 
(W) – emphasis on consumer views means the 
findings may not help staff that execute LIFT 
schemes in improving their activities (Pawson & 
Tilley 2004). 
Client-
centred 
Prioritises views of 
PCT staff, GPs and 
centre administrators 
served by LIFT. 
(S) – Provides understanding of how LIFT clients 
value its activities.  
(W) – The findings may be susceptible to bias of the 
clients and risk external credibility (Donaldson 
2007) 
 
Realist 
evaluation 
 
Considers views of 
major stakeholders in 
order to develop a 
holistic understanding 
of LIFT. 
(S) – Examines LIFT’s features in varying contexts 
and from the views of major stakeholders and staff 
involved in executing LIFT schemes (Pawson & 
Tilley 1997).  
(W) – Lack of discrete boundaries risks consensus 
on what to or what not to focus on in the evaluation 
(Marchal et al 2010). 
 
In choosing which evaluation approach to use, importance was given to 
ability in facilitating explanations about process of LIFT. The issues 
considered in screening the competing approaches are explained below.  
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2.1.1.1 Decision-oriented approach 
The decision-oriented evaluation approach is so called because it 
prioritises giving initiators of a programme under investigation opportunity 
to reflect on their decision to introduce it (Donaldson 2007). With LIFT, this 
can be a major strength in the sense that DH officials are able to clarify 
how they expected it to work. Insight gleaned from perceptions of DH 
officials may help in explaining discrepancies between what was expected 
and what is actually experienced in implementing LIFT. This helps in 
clarifying accountability for critical decisions in LIFT between the officials 
and operational staff within the PCTs. Such knowledge may help to 
influence improvements in policy and practice by DH officials presiding 
over LIFT guidance.   
However, a major limitation of the approach could be the risk of biased 
information especially as DH officials behind LIFT may be tempted to 
defend their own decisions and blame LIFT’s problems on operational 
staff. It explains why from the onset, the current research did not focus on 
public sector officials including those at the DH. The interest was in giving 
the operational staff directly involved in LIFT opportunity to highlight how 
its process affected their efforts in solving problems in procuring improved 
buildings. These were the essential aspects of LIFT that this research 
needed to disclose. Yet the decision-oriented approach risked 
emphasizing perhaps political issues than effects of LIFT process on local 
activities. 
2.1.1.2 Consumer-oriented approach 
The consumer-oriented evaluation approach is considered one of the 
strongest evaluation approaches because it seeks to emphasize views 
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that consumers hold about a programme (Sanderson 2003, Stufflebeam 
and Webster 1980). Sanderson (2003) argues that focusing on consumer 
perceptions helps in generating knowledge about how ordinary people that 
use the services value a programme being investigated. In this research, 
the consumer-oriented approach means giving service-users opportunity 
to indicate the consequences of LIFT on their experiences in patronising 
GP surgeries. It is argued that research findings deriving from consumer-
oriented approach may help the service-users in making wiser choices 
about where to get care (IPPR 2002). Thus, the findings from this research 
may facilitate the case-studied PCTs in choosing best procurement options 
that may affect patient experiences especially if they know about service-
user priorities.  
But there are two reasons why focusing on service-users may be a wrong 
approach for LIFT. First, LIFT may not directly affect patient care given that 
the remit is to deliver and maintain buildings and not providing care. It is 
likely that patients within the NHS are more interested in experiencing 
better services and health outcomes than complex processes in procuring 
healthcare buildings. Second, LIFT processes may be complex for patients 
to understand and influence any changes. Patients may endorse LIFT 
based on perceived improvements at the buildings but may ignore how it 
could reduce funding of non-LIFT surgeries within PCTs. Further, the 
current research interest was in examining contexts and mechanisms 
through which LIFT buildings are delivered. This means that using the 
consumer-oriented approach may not help in generating answers to the 
research questions.   
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Nevertheless, certain strengths of the consumer-oriented approach were 
adopted to influence the research conduct. For example, conduct of 
interviews allowed informants to reflect on what they thought were service-
users’ experience at LIFT buildings compared to previous buildings and 
those outside LIFT. Tours at LIFT buildings also observed service areas 
that are perceived as priorities in improving patient experience.   
2.1.1.3 Client-centred approach 
The client-centred evaluation approach emphasizes views of institutions 
and people served by a programme (Donaldson 2007, Stufflebeam & 
Webster 1980). Donaldson (2007) argues that the approach generates 
research findings that can be used in improving some aspects of the 
programme. In relation to LIFT, the PCTs as the principal tenants at LIFT 
buildings are the clients to the LiftCo. The GPs, pharmacists and other 
primary care providers are invited by the PCTs to occupy LIFT buildings 
meaning they are clients to the PCTs. In some instances the GPs may be 
direct clients to the LiftCo provided their buildings are developed without 
PCT involvement. The current research captured PCT staff and GPs’ 
experiences of LIFT as clients and sub-clients of the LiftCo. In light of the 
research questions, their involvement allowed them to identify what they 
thought helped them make LIFT more effective. The researcher believed 
that it was the LiftCo’s clients rather than the public sector officials and 
service-users that often asked questions about the issues that the current 
research attempted to address. The client-oriented approach’s strength 
therefore resides in facilitating PCT staff and the GPs in learning from their 
own experience in deciding improvement strategies although it may be 
questionable whether they have autonomy to do so in LIFT’s governance.  
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There may be legal and political restrictions that deny PCT staff and GPs 
the independence to implement modifications to LIFT guidance. It means 
that evaluating LIFT from the clients’ perspective alone may fail to 
adequately improve its implementation especially if those involved are 
motivated to withhold information that they may feel reflects on them badly 
as clients. Or they may create tension if they choose to apportion 
problems to the LiftCo because they want to regain control over aspects of 
procuring healthcare buildings in their areas. The discussion indicates an 
important difference between the consumer-oriented and client-centred 
approaches. The consumer-oriented approach concerns ordinary people 
that get health services at LIFT buildings and how they perceive LIFT’s 
effects on their experience. The client-centred approach focuses on 
relations between the LiftCo and PCTs or GPs using LIFT buildings.   
2.1.1.4 Realist evaluation (RE) approach 
The RE may be viewed as a mixed approach for integrating different 
knowledge bases into one to develop a complete understanding of 
programmes under investigation (Pawson 2006, Marchal et al 2010). In 
the current research, for example, it can incorporate main strengths of the 
decision-oriented, consumer-oriented, and client-centred approaches. The 
current research was client-centred but it was recognized that strict 
adherence to client-centred principles risked missing important knowledge 
about LIFT that might be concealed from the clients or are hidden by LIFT’s 
fuzzy boundaries in its implementation. 
 The RE approach was viewed as appropriate in this case to capture the 
perspectives of public sector officials and operational staff. Documentary 
analysis provided access to public sector official perceptions. The people 
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interviewed were or represented the LiftCo’s clients. Their responses 
interpreted LIFT by explaining how its guidance designed by officials at the 
DH affected them in discharging their responsibilities for improving service-
user experience within the PCTs. Through using RE principles, the 
research was able to reconcile official perceptions and client experiences 
with LIFT without having to interview officials at the DH officials and 
service-users at LIFT buildings. The details of RE principles and usage in 
addressing specific needs of this research are explained below.   
2.1.2 RE principles and usage  
The RE is a theory based evaluation approach whose primary aim is to 
test the theory that may have informed the initiating of a programme 
(Pawson and Tilley 1997). Pawson (2006) contends that RE assesses 
programme outcomes by identifying major and minor contexts and 
mechanisms that affect production of outcomes. It gives importance to 
using realism in generating knowledge by explaining how contexts and 
mechanisms interact to generate outcomes. This research argues that in 
context of decentralisation, New Public Management; Third Way; 
Localism; and public-private partnerships perspectives to public service 
delivery influenced the development of LIFT within the NHS (subsection 
1.2.4 page 40). The RE approach appropriately offered flexibility and 
prioritised realism in explaining effects of multiple factors that exert on the 
concepts. How the concepts are expected to work are incentives that may 
influence LIFT contexts and mechanisms. For example, PCT staff were 
able to identify and explain how LIFT supported them in their activities. 
This possibly alerted DH officials about how staff perceived LIFT in varying 
contexts.    
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2.1.2.1 Appropriateness for the current research 
Proponents of the RE approach argue that it facilitates serious scrutiny of 
programme contexts and mechanisms to understand how their interaction 
may impact the expected outcomes (Pawson 2006, Sayer 2000, and Kazi 
2003). The current research generated answers to the research questions 
by investigating the contextual factors perceived necessary for LIFT to 
improve procurement of buildings. The major mechanisms through which 
LIFT activities produced the changes in procurement were also 
investigated and the outcomes that follow the contexts and mechanisms 
explored. Developing the answers to the research questions therefore 
encompassed explaining the interactive effects of contrasting economic, 
social and financial influences within the NHS. And this fitted well with 
Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) argument that RE helps in examining:  
“...which social and cultural resources are necessary to sustain changes” 
(page 85) within a programme.  
The RE approach made it possible to trace and analyse the cause and 
effect relations between LIFT objectives, contexts, mechanisms and 
activities (social and cultural factors). The analysis framework (Table 2.13 
page 147) that was used mapped RE principles onto the research 
questions to identify factors that influenced LIFT’s intended and 
unintended outcomes benefiting the different participating groups.  
2.1.2.2 Definition of the terms used in RE   
Adherents of the RE approach propose explaining programmes by 
examining and matching their relevant contexts and mechanisms to the 
outcomes produced (Pawson 2006, Marchal et al 2010). They argued that 
contextual factors combine with mechanisms to influence outcomes. So 
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contexts, mechanisms, and outcomes are terms central to usage of the RE 
approach. In relation to this research, there are possibilities that LIFT 
encounters variation in conditions in which it produces outcomes; and 
some conditions facilitate while the others inhibit expected outcomes.   
2.1.2.2.1 Context (C) 
 The term context describes the social, economic and cultural conditions 
within which a programme is implemented (Pawson 2006). The conditions 
are external to a programme and can facilitate or constrain it in producing 
the expected changes, meaning ideal contexts are conducive for bringing 
about desired improvements. In relation to LIFT, LiftCos are invited to only 
develop local GP surgeries provided concerned PCTs prioritise increased 
stock of better ones within their areas. The PCTs influence local GPs in 
valuing quality in their activities, and entice them into considering using 
LIFT buildings. Since they invest for profit, equity holders always expect 
their LiftCos to employ profit maximising strategies in delivery and 
management of LIFT buildings. The scenarios mean that conditions where: 
“PCTs prioritise increased stock of better buildings”; or “there is 
collaborative working relationship between PCTs and GPs” to support LIFT; 
or “LiftCos are hard pressed to protect equity holders’ interests” are 
examples of LIFT contexts. The first may be an economic context within 
the PCTs. The second may be a social context for how PCTs and GPs 
relate in working. The third may be cultural context related to how for-profit 
companies are expected to operate. These contextual factors exist even 
without LIFT yet they may facilitate or inhibit its progress.   
The extent to which LIFT buildings are used may be an important context 
for LIFT. For example, increased utilisation of LIFT buildings by service-
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users may be conducive for sustaining LIFT provided they are conveniently 
located for service-users and GPs have willingness to operate from the 
buildings. LIFT may be constrained if GPs are unwilling to relocate at LIFT 
buildings or the buildings are located away from public transport. This 
leads to low patient utilization and the buildings could be viewed as white 
elephants. LIFT contexts are therefore defined by how economic 
conditions and interpersonal and social factors interplay to affect LIFT 
activities.   
2.1.2.2.2 Mechanism (M)  
Programme mechanisms are opportunities and ideas that are introduced 
through a programme (Pawson 2006). They are like in a “black box” 
because they cannot be seen yet they are aspects that may force a 
programme to produce observed outcomes. Unlike contexts that are 
conditions surrounding programme activities, mechanisms are features 
internal to programmes. Pawson and Tilley (1997) use the analogy of a 
clock to explain how mechanisms work. The elements that make a clock 
function are concealed within the clock just as mechanisms through which 
programme outcomes are produced are within the programmes. If the 
influencing features are within programme environments, then they are 
become contexts (Marchal et al 2010). LIFT works by accessing private 
sector capital for procuring public sector buildings and using private sector 
skills and expertise in post-delivery management of the buildings. 
Therefore, ability in “accessing private sector capital” and “using private 
sector skills and expertise” are examples of LIFT mechanisms. The first 
mechanism may be viewed as opportunity introduced through LIFT in 
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procurement of PCT buildings, and the second mechanism indicates new 
ideas introduced through LIFT in management of the buildings.    
This research sought to distinguish ideas that run alongside LIFT from LIFT 
mechanisms. For example, “community engagement”; “regeneration of 
local areas”; and “upgrading health informatics at buildings” are ideas 
applied within the NHS to run alongside LIFT. The ideas are distinct from 
LIFT mechanisms because they are also applied in non-LIFT areas. They 
only become LIFT mechanisms provided their expected outcomes are 
affected by LIFT.  For example, installation of health informatics equipment 
at LIFT buildings is the responsibility of PCTs and GPs. But the buildings’ 
designs may obstruct the PCTs and GPs in installing appropriate 
equipment. This research explored informant perceptions about how other 
health activities within their areas were influenced by LIFT to understand 
some of its mechanisms.     
2.1.2.2.3 Outcome (O) 
Outcomes refer to effects experienced due to programme mechanisms 
employed in specific contexts (Pawson 2006, Byng 2005). In essence they 
are consequences that logically flow from the interaction between contexts 
and mechanisms. Thus, outcomes reflect expected benefits as much as 
they do unexpected and unwanted effects due to real-world changes in 
contexts and mechanisms experienced by programmes. In relation to LIFT, 
this could mean that evolving contexts and mechanisms may cause its 
outcomes to either positively or negatively deviate from the expected 
result. Hence Pawson and Tilley’s (2004) caution that RE requires 
practitioners to appreciate that programme outcomes follow variations in 
contexts and mechanisms. 
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Examples of positive LIFT outcomes that could result from changes in 
contexts and mechanisms may include PCTs having an increased stock of 
modernised healthcare buildings. Or they may realise increased efficiency 
in procurement due to LiftCo skills and competences. Possible negative 
outcomes may include increased scepticism about LIFT among PCT staff if 
they feel that their priorities are not being addressed. This may create 
tension between PCT staff and the LiftCo. Some changes in contexts and 
mechanisms may result in reduced discretion over LIFT procedures by 
PCT staff. Others may increase procurement costs affecting PCT liquidity.  
The RE principles facilitated interrogating informants towards revealing 
LIFT’s unexpected outcomes. Some positive yet unexpected, and negative 
outcomes may be not obvious to people unacquainted with LIFT. The 
researcher believed that operational staff within PCTs were the right 
people to provide information needed for answers to the research 
questions. Their personal experience with LIFT would reveal some of its 
concealed aspects provided they were asked the right questions.    
2.1.2.2.4 Context-mechanism-outcome (CMO) configuration 
The term CMO configuration describes how contexts and mechanisms 
interrelate and arrange themselves in ways that influence particular 
programme outcomes (Pawson and Tilley 2004, Sayer 2000). It suggests 
a symbiotic relationship between contexts and mechanisms because 
neither can cause a programme to produce outcomes on its own. Pawson 
and Tilley (2004) explain CMO configurations as the elements that when 
considered together define how a programmes may be understood to work 
from the perspective of those involved; a process they refer to as 
programme theory testing.  
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When this scheme is applied to LIFT, the CMO configurations may be 
identified by making sense out of the ways its contexts and mechanisms 
interrelate to influence outcomes. For example, when “GPs recognise the 
importance of quality buildings” (context) in increasing patient experience, 
there may be readiness to accept LIFT provided the GPs perceive it as 
having the ability to “access private sector capital” and  “skills and 
competences” (mechanisms) required to procure “fit for purpose buildings” 
(outcome) demanded by patients.  
Like with other programmes, the CMO configurations in LIFT may be better 
understood by analysing the cause and effect relations of its contexts and 
mechanisms. This may be a robust approach to consistency in evidence 
about the actual merits and demerits of LIFT. It also help in clarifying how 
the different groups of institutions and people constituting LIFT interact to 
cause it to produce different outcomes that differently benefit them.  
2.1.2.2.5 Middle Range Theory 
Adherents of RE principles argue that the middle range theory helps in 
specifying the theory that may have driven the introduction of a 
programme (Pawson and Tilley 1997, Byng 2005 Pawson 2006, Marchal 
et al 2010). It explains how a programme is expected to work and how it is 
understood based on the contexts, mechanisms, and outcome 
combinations (CMO configurations) observed by the different groups of 
people involved and affected. Pawson (2006) recommends that the views 
of programme designers and participants be sought in developing and 
validating the CMO configurations before making them central to the 
middle range theory. Yet other analysts (e.g. Byng 2005) argue that 
circumstances may obstruct researchers from seeking the views of 
107 
 
programme designers and in such cases, analysis of official documents 
may substitute for designers in developing the CMO configurations 
constituting the middle range theory. Because contexts and mechanisms 
evolve with time, it may be necessary to account for changes in outcomes 
that may be experienced. Thus, the middle range theory recognises that 
agreement about how a programme operates is transitional and marked 
by changes in contexts and mechanisms (Pawson 2006, Byng 2005).  
The initial CMO configurations that the current research defined as central 
to the theory explaining LIFT were derived from documentary analyses, 
meaning they were based on perspectives of public sector officials that 
designed LIFT. Byng (2005) advises that official documents may substitute 
for people’s past or current experiences in validating theories researchers 
may choose to base their studies on. The advice apply where challenges 
including cost and time constraints, as was the case in this research, 
make preliminary fieldwork not feasible. This research was based on 
decentralization as the theory to study LIFT. The documents analysed 
needed to provide an account of decentralization features that the public 
sector officials perceived would benefit the PCTs by adopting LIFT in 
procuring buildings. Those features in decentralization were then 
emphasized in the middle range theory about LIFT developed by the 
researcher at beginning of the research. 
The initial explanation for LIFT was developed from analysis of mainly the 
“NHS LIFT Strategic Partnering Agreement Version 5 (DH/PfH 2003) and 
“LIFT Prospectus” (DH 2001) documents. Schedule 17 Part 1 of the 
strategic partnering guidance (page 187) and the LIFT Prospectus (page 
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24) identify and describe how the different groups of participants would 
benefit from assuming roles in LIFT. The PCTs, GPs and investors in local 
LiftCos are identified as principal beneficiaries. The PCTs are expected to 
benefit through getting support in procuring better buildings needed in 
improving the quality of care and patient experiences when GPs take 
tenancy at LIFT buildings. The private investors would benefit from 
guaranteed income across a portfolio of properties within the PCTs. 
Eventually; LIFT is expected to reduce procurement cost within PCTs 
through the LiftCos spreading their capital sourcing between multiple 
investors or financiers and service suppliers at LIFT buildings.  
In context of decentralization, it may suggest that for LIFT to work as 
anticipated by DH officials, the PCTs may among other things require 
discretion for them to be able to assess LIFT as the appropriate option for 
procuring the desired buildings. The discretion may extend to the PCTs 
influencing decisions about LIFT’s critical activities. The CMO 
configurations described in the analysed documents suggest LIFT as 
decentralised decision-making in financing and management of 
uncertainty in the procurement and governance of primary care buildings. 
The decentralization is from the DH to the PCTs, the LiftCo, GPs and local 
stakeholders. It influenced the researcher to state LIFT’s initial middle 
range theory as follows:   
PCTs that implement effective LIFT schemes deployed decentralised 
structures which support staff in influencing long-term risk management in 
procurement of healthcare buildings. They prefer LIFT because it is the 
convenient and effective option in financing and maintenance of the 
desired buildings. Activities to execute LIFT schemes stimulate 
participatory decision-making, information sharing and openness between 
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PCT staff, LiftCo staff, GPs using LIFT buildings and local stakeholders 
and contractors providing service at the buildings. LIFT activities ensure 
that the LiftCo assumes higher proportion of risks associated with 
procurement and management of buildings compared to the PCTs. The 
LiftCo is familiar with, and responsive to priorities of the PCTs. Its good 
working relations with the PCTs promote collaboration in increasing 
patient experiences when they are attracted by improved conditions at 
LIFT buildings. 
The researcher believed that the above explanation captured major ideas 
and opportunities through which DH officials anticipated would allow the 
PCTs to benefit from decentralized procurement of GP surgeries. Aside 
from identifying decentralization as the concept along which to assess 
LIFT’s effectiveness, the middle range theory indicates what kind of data 
was needed to generate answers to the research questions. Perceptions 
of the research informants were analysed for them to either confirm or 
refute or clarify whether LIFT embodies major indicators for 
decentralization described in the middle range theory. So decentralization 
was the current research’s primary unit of analysis.  
This was important because official documents may characterise LIFT as 
decentralising the important aspects in procurement yet in practice some 
government departments (e.g. the DH or Treasury) may retain significant 
authority and responsibility over important decisions. Analytic frameworks 
on decentralization were used to test practices in LIFT. Bossert (1998), for 
example, argues that effective decentralization involves allowing 
operational staff enhanced freedom in decisions about important functions 
like financing, governance, or service arrangements. These aspects were 
assessed to understand the extent to which informants thought they are 
practiced under LIFT in light of the initial middle range theory.   
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2.2 The research design 
This research is designed around a descriptive embedded case-study. Yin 
(2009) argues that descriptive embedded case-studies are a robust means 
to consistency in evidence due to their ability in integrating different kinds 
of data from different sources into a single analytical approach. In the 
current research, the design enables integrating different data types about 
LIFT to understand it better as decentralization strategy. It integrates data 
sourced at PCTs, the LiftCo, and LIFT buildings about LIFT contexts and 
mechanisms and provided by the different staff categories to understand 
how they are supported in their activities in LIFT. As previously discussed 
in subsection 1.1.5.3 (page 6) which provided the rationale for constructing 
an embedded case-study, decentralization theory, the PCTs, LiftCo and 
LIFT buildings and the different categories of staff interviewed constitute 
the units of analysis central to the present research.    
One of the reasons for preferring this design was that relative stability of 
the context within a small case-study would facilitate effective investigation 
on experience of LIFT’s contexts and mechanisms. This is despite the 
problem that the design could risk focusing on experiences within the 
case-study at the expense of the wider context of east London or London. 
A moderating factor could be that as pioneers of LIFT, the case-studied 
PCTs together with the LiftCo should now provide rich information and 
experience to share from some of their oldest LIFT buildings. This implies 
that although generalisability of the findings needs consideration, it may 
not be a major limitation of the present research. 
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2.3 The Methods 
This research employed three data collection methods including 
documentary review, in-depth interviews and tours of LIFT buildings. The 
case for using mixed methods is discussed in subsection 2.3.1. 
Subsection 2.3.2 discusses the documentary review method by 
highlighting the hierarchy of LIFT documents, their sources and criteria 
used in selecting which documents to review. The in-depth interview 
method is discussed in subsection 2.3.3 where usefulness of the method 
for the current research is highlighted and sampling of informants at the 
PCTs, LiftCo and LIFT buildings is explained. The tours of LIFT buildings 
are considered in subsection 2.3.4 to indicate the essential service areas 
that were observed.   
2.3.1 Case for using mixed-methods   
The use of mixed methods and triangulation is important in developing a 
deeper understanding of a research’s critical elements (Creswell 2002). 
Aside from increasing breadth and depth, using mixed methods may 
provide corroborative evidence of the information gathered within a case-
study compared to relying on a single method. Yin (2009) contends that 
the different units of analysis characterising case-studies may mean that 
they need different methods to access evidence pertaining to them. The 
current research therefore used documentary reviews, in-depth interviews 
and tours of LIFT buildings in collecting the data because one method 
alone risked capturing insufficient evidence about experiences at the 
different levels investigated.    
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For example, documentary review facilitated understanding how officials at 
the DH expected operational staff in LIFT to comply with the range of 
guidance. A potential limitation in documentary review may be that official 
documents fail to articulate experiences within the PCTs or at the LiftCo. 
The method may fail to provide complete evidence about LIFT unless used 
in conjunction with interviews with the affected staff. The use of in-depth 
interviews had the advantage of reaching operational staff (at the PCTs, 
LiftCo and LIFT buildings) to share experience and their perceptions about 
LIFT. Yet if used alone, the method may overlook important data needed to 
understand LIFT. Appropriate information about conditions at LIFT 
buildings, (e.g. patient waiting areas and consultation rooms) is better 
captured by means of direct observations than by interviews. This made it 
necessary to organise tours for observing conditions on areas likely to be 
overlooked in interviews yet important indicators for LIFT’s performance.  
Mixing the methods facilitated combining evidence that emerged in the 
course of the research to develop the overall picture of LIFT. For example, 
the official belief portrayed in LIFT guidance was that LIFT improves 
management of risks in procuring buildings. Interviews with staff involved 
in LIFT was a way for them to validate the beliefs presupposed in LIFT 
guidance so that conclusions about them are drawn based on experiences 
and perceptions of these informants. The use of mixed-methods is 
therefore methodological triangulation that may help in exposing 
programme factors that may be hidden yet affecting outcomes (O’Byrne 
2007). Some analysts including Fitzsimmons et al (2009) and Beck et al 
(2009) argue that LIFT guidance and networks involved are complex and 
hide their effect on LIFT outcomes. Therefore, a mixed-methods design 
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may excavate for analysis some of the hidden factors in LIFT. This could 
reduce potential deficits in evidence about the influential contexts and 
mechanisms in developing a complete understanding of LIFT.     
It was also clear that neither documentary review nor in-depth interviews 
alone could provide sufficient evidence for the current research. 
Documentary review alone risks prioritising DH officials’ perspectives in 
explaining LIFT yet the research did not give the officials opportunity to 
elaborate on their documented expectations from LIFT. Time and cost 
constraints influenced exclusion of the public sector officials in favour of 
operational staff at PCTs, LiftCo, and LIFT buildings. Combining the three 
data collection methods prevented this research from prioritising public 
sector officials, or the views of informants or the researcher’s own 
interpretations of what was observed. A mixed-methods design offered the 
benefit of methodological synergy important in producing complete 
answers to the research questions. 
2.3.2 Documentary review 
LIFT features needing evaluation were at first identified through reviewing 
LIFT guidance. The major features were then used in extracting evidence 
from other LIFT documents and prioritised in topic guides that were used in 
conducting interviews. This subsection explains the processes for 
searching for the documents, screening to identify those for focused 
analysis, and how the evidence was extracted, coded and analysed for 
answers the research questions.    
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2.3.2.1 Hierarchy of documentary evidence 
Scott (1990) defines a document as any written text that records and 
explains the intentions or what is understood about a phenomenon. In 
contrast, literature is explained as abstraction and critical analysis of 
issues that may be missing from documents (Scott 1990). This distinction 
was relevant to the current research in two ways namely: identifying the 
different types of documents to consider for analysis; and potential 
sources of helpful documents.  
One of the ways used in identifying documents for analysis considered 
their origins. Most LIFT documents originated from government 
departments and their agents. The main publishers included the DH, 
Community Health Partnerships (CHP), the NHS, House of Commons, and 
the NAO. In this research, publications from these organizations are 
referred to as official documents to acknowledge that their contents reflect 
the views of the office bearers at these public sector organizations and 
departments. The officials were the ones that made the decision to 
introduce LIFT. They produce a range of materials such as LIFT guidance, 
contractual material, minutes of meetings, and departmental briefs seeking 
to promote the programme.  
A related hierarchical approach in identifying the documents revealed that 
LIFT documents are produced at national and local levels. Nationally 
produced documents are intended to provide guidance in LIFT in the 
country and not in specific geographical areas. The majority of national 
LIFT documents are written by public sector officials at the DH, CHP, the 
NHS, House of Commons, and the NAO. At the local level, PCT staff as 
agents of the DH and the NHS produce documents that address LIFT 
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issues specific to their PCTs.  Since the PCTs are expected to comply with 
LIFT guidance decided at the national level, it gives their staff the status of 
operational staff as opposed to officials at national level. LIFT documents 
produced by PCT staff tend to be restricted to business cases for LIFT 
schemes or, minutes of PCT boards or management team meetings 
reflecting on LIFT activities in their areas.     
Recognizing that LIFT is a PPP arrangement, it made sense to also 
consider LIFT documents originating from organizations other than the 
government departments and their agents. The main non-governmental 
organizations producing nationally relevant LIFT documents include the 
British Medical Association (BMA), National Pharmacists Association 
(NPA), the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE), 
and King’s Fund. Publications by the BMA and NPA primarily seek to 
protect the interests of GPs and pharmacists that may respectively choose 
to take part in LIFT. Local businesses and investors with interests in LIFT is 
a national level lobbying group for private sector as opposed to 
government interests in LIFT.  
Among the major non-governmental organizations publishing on LIFT, only 
the health think-tank, King’s Fund and CABE produce documents that do 
not patronise particular groups of participants in LIFT. Private documents 
produced at local level were obtained at the LiftCo. Because of occasional 
overlap between LIFT documents and literature, publications by the non-
governmental organizations were, notwithstanding Scott’s (1990) 
definition, analysed in contexts of documents and literature.  
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2.3.2.2 Sources of LIFT documents  
The sources and variety of LIFT documents are limited possibly because 
LIFT could be a fairly recent initiative. If the sources and diversity of 
documentation reflect this, representativeness of documents selected for 
focused analysis may not be considered a major issue. But it was not 
possible to review other documents that were presumed to contain 
important evidence. For example, agendas and minutes of the LiftCo 
Board meetings, LIFT contracts, and tender documents are important yet 
public access to these documents is restricted due to attached sensitivity. 
Where possible, like in the case of LIFT contracts and tender documents, 
templates were reviewed to get the picture of what the actual documents 
may contain.  In searching for the documents to analyse, the leads to 
potential sources and types of LIFT documents with contents likely to 
provide answers to the research questions were provided through asking 
strategic questions described in Table 2.2 below. 
Table 2.2: Documentary search questions  
Search question asked Examples of sources and documents identified 
1. What are the likely sources 
of LIFT documents? 
Public and private organizations: DH, CHP, NHS, 
PCTs, House of Commons, PPP Forum, BMA, and 
LiftCo. 
 
2. What are LIFT’s major 
features? 
Those described in: Standard Strategic Partnering 
Agreement – Version 5 (2003), LIFT contracts, LIFT 
structure, & LIFT Prospectus (2001).  
3. Which institutions have 
researched LIFT- with what 
findings? 
The National Audit Office (NAO), Unison, King’s 
Fund, DH, CABE, House of Commons 
4. What are the origins of LIFT 
and how is it defined? 
NHS Plan 2000, NHS-LIFT Prospectus (2001), 
Business Case Approval (2005) guidance, Strategic 
partnering agreement Version 5 (2003) 
5. What are the guiding 
presuppositions of LIFT? 
Described in Strategic partnering agreement version 
5 (2003) and LIFT Prospectus (2001) 
6. What are the political & 
economic perspectives to 
LIFT? 
Publications from: Unison, King’s Fund, NAO, local 
businesses in LIFT, and Institute of Public Policy 
research (IPPR). 
7. What major debates 
surround LIFT? 
 
Value-for-money, risk management, stakeholder 
involvement, efficiency, increased quality, 
competition in procurement, increasing patient 
experience.  
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Search questions numbers 1 and 3 identified that LIFT documents could 
be obtained from government departments and non-governmental 
organizations. The actual documents identified are described in 
subsections 2.3.2.2.1 to 2.3.2.2.4. The documents produced at the DH and 
CHP contain information about LIFT’s major features, its origins and 
guiding presuppositions as asked in search questions 2, 4, & 5. The 
search questions number 6 and 7 identified non-governmental 
organizations as sources of documents containing analytical perspectives 
to the major debates surrounding LIFT. The official documents especially 
those originating from the DH and CHP do not sufficiently articulate about 
LIFT’s contestable aspects like its surrounding political and economic 
perspectives and debate. It underlines the challenges faced by the 
researcher in accessing and extracting relevant evidence from LIFT 
documents. This may restrict this research from claiming to have covered 
all hidden explanations for LIFT despite analysing a range of documents 
obtained from different organizations.   
2.3.2.2.1 Department of Health (DH) 
The list of LIFT documents obtained at the DH is described in Table 2.3 
below. Most of the documents including those published between 2001 
and 2003 can be downloaded in printable format by accessing the 
Archives page of the DH website. The DH facilitates easy access and no 
restrictions on its publications.  
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Table 2.3: National / Official documents retrieved at DH  
Document (Year) 
 About NHS LIFT (NHSLIFT/DH 4000519) 
 Business case approval guidance for PCTs with existing Local Improvement 
Finance Trusts (2009) 
 DH: NHS and Pharmacy (2005) 
 DH: Listing of All LIFT Projects - Progress to date (2008) 
 DH: White Paper 2010: Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS (2010) 
 Guidance for PCTs on taking shareholding in a local LIFT Company 
 Guidance: Strategic Partnering Agreement (2006) 
 Guidance for Enabling Funds for LIFT (2008) 
 Health Reforms in England: update and commissioning framework (2006 
 LIFT Prospectus (2001) Modernising Primary Care in the NHS (2001) 
 NHS Plan 2000 
 NHS Lease Plus Agreement Guidance for GPs (2003) 
 NHS: Working separately together: A guidebook for successful partnering 
between organisations within the NHS: Resource Guide 12 of The 
Commissioning Friend for PCTs (2003) 
 NHS LIFT Business Case Approval Guidelines - Establishing a LIFT company 
(2005) 
 NHS LIFT: Frequently asked Questions (2007) 
 Our Health, Our Care, Our Say: A new direction for community services: Health 
and Social care working in partnership (2006) 
 SDO Project: The Role and effectiveness of PPPs (NHS LIFT) in the 
development of enhanced primary care premises and services (2009)  
 
The DH site http://www.dh.gov.uk/ contains a range of publications. These 
include survey and statistical reports, and descriptions of circulars and 
legislation. Most of the relevant documents like White Papers, LIFT 
Guidance and NHS Plans were retrieved from its Publications, 
Communications and Archives pages. The Publications page contains 
documents produced within the last 12 months. The Communications 
page contains documents, circulars and letters up to three years old. 
Some documents can be retrieved from both Publications and 
Communication pages. It is also possible to use the links provided on 
these to retrieve other related documents from the NHS website. 
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Publications used as reference in retrieved documents were directly 
searched from the Internet if they were not listed on the DH website.   
2.3.2.2.2 Community Health Partnerships (CHP) 
Unlike the DH that archives diverse materials on health services, CHP 
dedicates its website http://www.communityhealthpartnerships.co.uk/ to 
exclusive archiving of LIFT documents. The documents listed on CHP 
website concern general information on LIFT, various guidance including 
standard contracts and checklists used by local staff in ensuring 
compliance with guidance to achieve value-for-money in procurement. The 
relevant documents retrieved from CHP website are listed in Table 2.4.  
Table 2.4: National / Official documents retrieved at CHP 
Document (Year) 
 Accounting Guidance for LIFT (2006). At: 
http://www.doh.gov.uk/nhslift/pdf/accounts) 
 General information on NHS LIFT (2003) 
 Guidance: Strategic Services Development Planning (2003) 
 Guidance for New LIFT Projects (2005) 
 Guidance: LIFT Communication Tool Kit (2005 
 Guidance: LIFT Programme and Project management (2005) 
 Guidelines for operationalizing LIFT Express Projects (2005). At: 
http://www.doh.gov.uk/nhslift/pdf) 
 Guidance: NHS LIFT Lease Plus Agreement Guidelines for GPs (2006) 
 Guidance for use of Enabling Funds (2008) 
 New Guidance on approval of investment in NHS LIFT (2005). At: 
http://www.doh.gov.uk/nhslift/pdf) 
 NHS-LIFT: Operational Phase Guidelines (Transfer of PCT Estate) (2003) 
 NHS LIFT Starter Pack (2002) 
 Interactive Guide to Partnerships and Financing (2005) 
 Innovation and Value-for-money in LIFT (2003) 
 Standard Contractual Documents (2003) 
 
CHP’s website offered convenience to the current research in two ways. 
First, exclusively archiving LIFT documents meant that most retrieved 
documents were either relevant for analysis or for contributing evidence in 
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some other ways. Second, the website is linked to that of the DH, which 
was convenient for downloading and cross-checking to ensure that 
important documents transferred between the websites were reached.  
For example, LIFT documents produced by PCTs after 2009 and LIFT 
Express documents are listed on CHP website. But it is only possible to 
download them through the DH website using links provided on CHP 
pages. Although CHP succeeded Partnerships UK in leading LIFT 
activities, its website does not list the earlier documents like LIFT 
Prospectus. Instead, most are archived and accessed at the DH using the 
“Library Search” link.  But for LIFT contracts and tender documents, only 
their templates were available. The detailed documents are considered 
rather sensitive for disclosure to the public.  
2.3.2.2.3 Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) 
The number of LIFT documents produced within PCTs depends on 
intensity in developing LIFT buildings. When the current research began in 
2008, LIFT buildings involved in this case-study were already open for 
patients for at least two years. Thus, agendas and minutes of PCT boards 
and management meetings contained few items on LIFT. That the minutes 
of PCT boards meetings are kept online for only one year further limited 
the number of relevant documents to review. But through searching the 
Archives pages of the involved PCTs, a number of documents addressing 
some aspects of LIFT and dated from 2006 were retrieved. As described in 
Table 2.5 below, most of the documents retrieved at the PCTs were 
minutes of PCT boards meetings although some Annual Reports, a 
Strategic Services Development Plan (SSDP), and a Business Case for a 
proposed project were also analysed.   
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Table 2.5: Local / Official documents retrieved at PCTs  
Source Documents 
PCT-1  Annual Reports 2006 – 10 
 Board meeting: agenda and minutes 05/12/2006 
 Board meeting: agenda and minutes 16/01/2007 
 Board meeting: agenda and minutes 15/052007 
 Board meeting: agenda and minutes 18/09/2007 
 Board meeting: agenda and minutes 15/01/2008 
 Strategic Services Development Plan 2008 – 17: Better 
Services, Better Health 
 PCT-2  Annual reports 2003 – 2005 
 Board meeting: agenda and minutes 19/01/2006* 
 Board meeting: agenda and minutes 20/04/2007* 
 Board meeting: agenda and minutes 21/05/2008 
 Board meeting: agenda and minutes 13/11/2008 
 Board meeting: agenda and minutes 09/12/2008 
 Board meetings: agenda and minutes 2009 - 10  
 (...) Centre Business Case Proposal (2010) 
 
At PCT-1, the agendas and minutes of board meetings addressing LIFT 
were on its website (www.PCT-1.nhs.uk/documents/corporate/board-
papers/) listing board meetings. The meetings were held between the end 
of 2006 and the beginning of 2008. The annual reports were listed on 
(www.PCT-1.nhs.uk/documents/corporate/publications/AnnualReport/) 
together with other corporate documents.  
The agendas and minutes of board meetings at PCT-2 were retrieved on 
www.PCT-2.nhs.uk/about-us/who-we-are/PCT-2-board-meetings/. Only two 
meetings held on 19/01/2006 and 20/04/2007 contained issues on LIFT. 
Three out of seven annual reports (2003, 2004 and 2005) listed on: 
www.PCT-2.nhs.uk/publications/corporate-publications/) reported on LIFT.    
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2.3.2.2.4 Other sources of documents  
Besides the DH, CHP and the PCTs, additional documents were obtained 
from other public sector and non-governmental sources including 
professional representative associations. The public sector organizations 
whose documents were analysed in this case included the House of 
Commons, National Audit Office (NAO) and Treasury. The non-
governmental sources that contributed documents included the King’s 
Fund, CABE, PPP Forum and local businesses with investment in LIFT.   
Professional representative association whose publications were analysed 
included the BMA and Unison. The BMA’s publications on LIFT are directed 
at its membership (GPs) participating in LIFT. Unison is a health worker 
trade union. Its publications are therefore directed at professional groups 
that likely to be affected by LIFT. The publications from the BMA and 
Unison provided the researcher with insight into possible discrepancies 
between the DH officials and health professionals’ perspectives to LIFT.  
As previously hinted, there were occasional overlaps between LIFT 
documents and literature, and publications retrieved from PPP Forum’s 
website www.pppforum.com/documents/ were also analysed as literature. 
Table 2.6 lists the documents retrieved from other sources. Other 
miscellaneous yet informative documents were also provided by 
colleagues. 
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Table 2.6: Documents retrieved at other sources 
Source: Document 
 BMA General Operational Staff Committee and Partnerships for Health (PfH): 
Lease Plus guide for GP surgeries (2003) 
 BMA: Guidance for GPs: NHS LIFT - Local Improvement Finance Trust (England 
only) (2001) 
 Commission of Architecture and the Built Environment: Assessing design quality 
in LIFT primary care buildings (2005) 
 European Parliament: DG Internal Policies of the Union: Public-Private 
Partnerships: Models and Trends in the European Union (2006). 
 House of Commons: Research Paper 01/117: The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
(2001) 
 King's Fund. Claiming the health divide. London (2002) 
 King’s Fund: Under One Roof: Will polyclinics deliver integrated care? (2008). 
 King’s Fund / LSE: Investing in health buildings: public-private partnerships (2000) 
 Local businesses with interests in LIFT (LIFT LOBI): Submission to the DH 
consultation on Business Case Approval Guidance for PCTs with existing LIFTs 
(2008) 
 National Audit Office:  Innovation in the NHS (2005) 
 National Pharmaceutical Association: understanding primary care strategy: a 
resource for PCT pharmacy advisers (2003) 
 PFI Newsletter (July 2005) 
 PPP Forum Conference Speech: Allan Milburn (2004): The future of PPPs 
 Treasury Office: PFI Meeting the Challenge (2000) 
 Unison Report: LIFT: What you need to know and what you need to ask: A 
briefing for non experts (2005). 
 Unison: Primary Care Reforms Glossary (2007) 
 
2.3.2.3 Screening of the documents  
Whenever possible, the documents were saved in the Endnote library that 
was created for their management.  The documents were screened to 
identify the ones relevant for focused analysis. Those identified were then 
uploaded for storage and management in NVivo software that was used in 
their analysis.  
The screening process revealed that Annual Reports and minutes of PCT 
boards meetings from 2007 to 2010 contained little information on LIFT. 
This may be explained by reduced momentum in developing new LIFT 
projects within the case-study. With such documents, only the pages 
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addressing LIFT were identified, copied and uploaded onto NVivo for 
analysis. The strategy saves time compared to reading through whole 
documents.  
It was considered not feasible to predetermine the number of documents 
to analyse since the list of available LIFT documents is unknown. Some 
analysts like Scott (1990) argue that when analysing documents, 
relevance of contents and credibility of the producers vis-à-vis the 
research questions may matter more than quantity analysed. There is the 
confidence that the current research analysed different types of 
documents that addressed different aspects of LIFT from the perspectives 
of various organizations with interests in it.   
The elements that were believed to provide answers to the research 
questions involved LIFT contexts, mechanisms and expected outcomes; 
and these were addressed in the selected documents. Despite providing 
context about LIFT, generic PPP documents were not considered for 
analysis because they did not focus on LIFT. Similarly, those concerned 
with care provision within PCTs were excluded as such activities were not 
within LIFT’s remit.   
The screening attempted at avoiding exclusive analysis of documents 
produced by the DH because they are intended to promote LIFT. It 
explains why, for example, those produced by organizations like CHP, the 
BMA, NAO and Unison were selected for analysis. Such documents were 
likely to shed light on LIFT ideas not articulated in most official documents. 
Some organizations tended to paste executive summaries of LIFT 
documents separately from the main documents on their websites. A 
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decision was taken to prefer the full documents over executive summaries 
in the analysis. Table 2.7 lists the documents that were prioritised for 
focused analysis. 
Table 2.7: LIFT documents prioritised for analysis 
Documents analysed 
 BMA: Guidance for GPs: NHS LIFT - England only (2001) 
 DH / CHP: Business case approval guidance for PCTs with existing LIFTs (2009) 
 DH / CHP: Guidance for use of Enabling Funds (2008) 
 DH / CHP: NHS LIFT: Lease Plus Agreement Guidelines for GPs (2006) 
 DH: Guidance Strategic Services Development Planning (SSDP) (2003) 
 DH: Guidance SSDP (2005) 
 DH: Guidance: LIFT Programme and Project Management (2005) 
 DH: Guidance for PCTs on taking shareholding in a local LIFT company (2002) 
 DH: Implications of commissioning a patient-led NHS LIFT (2005)  
 DH: New Guidance on approval of investment in NHS LIFT (2008) 
 DH: NHS LIFT Business Case Approval Process – Establishing a LIFT Company 
Version 7 (2005) 
 DH: NHS LIFT Prospectus: Modernising Primary Care in the NHS (2001) 
 DH: NHS LIFT Starter Pack (2002) 
 DH: NHS-LIFT: Operational Phase Guidelines 
 DH: NHS LIFT and Pharmacy (2005) 
 DH / Treasury: Guidance: Accounting for LIFT (2006) 
 King's Fund: Claiming the health divide. London (2002) 
 King’s Fund: Under One Roof: Will polyclinics deliver integrated care? (2008) 
 LIFTLOBI: Business Case Approval Guidance for PCTs with existing LIFTs (2008) 
 National Audit Office:  Innovation in the NHS (2005) 
 National Pharmacists Association: understanding primary care strategy: a 
resource for PCT pharmacy advisers (2003) 
 PCT-1: Annual Reports 2002 - 10 
 PCT-1 Board meeting: Agenda and Minutes 05/12/2006 
 PCT-1 Board meeting: Agenda and Minutes 16/01/2007 
 PCT-1 Board meeting: Agenda and Minutes 15/052007 
 PCT-1 Board meeting: Agenda and Minutes 18/09/2007 
 PCT-1 Board meeting: Agenda and Minutes 15/01/2008 
 PCT-1 SSDP 2008 – 17: Better Services, Better Health 
 PCT-2: Annual Reports 2003 - 2006 
 PCT-2: B-4 Maintenance Logbook and Records  
 PCT-2: B-4 Room utilisation booking schedule  
 PCT-2: (...) Business Case Proposal (2010) 
 PCT-2: Board meeting: agenda and minutes 19/01/2006 
 PCT-2: Board meeting: agenda and minutes 20/04/2007 
 PfH/DH: NHS LIFT Strategic Partnering Agreement Version 5 (2003)   
 Unison: LIFT, What you need to know and what you need to ask (2003)  
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The documents that were finally selected for focused analysis originated 
from different organizations distributed between the public and private 
sectors. They addressed different aspects of LIFT perceived to help 
specific groups of participants in discharging their responsibilities. 
Sourcing the documents widely helped in bridging gaps in evidence likely 
to arise from over dependence on official documents that may have failed 
in articulating about contestable aspects of LIFT. No time limits were 
imposed on publication of documents due to desire for understanding how 
LIFT has evolved since its launch.  
An important reason for selecting documents from as early as 2001 was 
that they contained the original LIFT guidance. While the core ethos of LIFT 
may not have changed significantly, it remains important to explain why 
and how it has benefited from any revisions to resolve possible partialities 
within some documents. For example, the BMA’s concern that GPs 
involved with LIFT needed to have their independence protected from the 
DH and PCTs’ influence contrasts with the DH’s view that the GPs are 
partners whose interests should mesh those of the local PCTs.  
2.3.3 In-depth interviews 
This research selected the in-depth interview as the second method for 
data collection. This subsection discusses the method’s usefulness to the 
current research and explains how the informants were sampled and the 
challenges faced in organising the interviews.  
2.3.3.1 Usefulness of in-depth interviews 
The interview method was considered to be an effective technique in 
eliciting the views of operational staff at the PCTs and those at the LiftCo 
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and LIFT buildings. Because they are directly involved in LIFT, the 
researcher felt that the staff would be experts in providing information 
about LIFT.  Creswell (2002), Mack et al (2005) and O’Byrne (2007) 
contend that in-depth interviews facilitate capturing perspectives of the 
people directly involved in a programme. Researchers using the method 
have opportunity to probe and seek clarifications on aspect of a 
phenomenon under investigation to develop an in-depth understanding of 
how those involved may relate to it. In this research, it was felt that asking 
the right people the right question would enable them in explaining how 
aspects of LIFT contexts and mechanisms prioritised in the interview topic 
guides affected them in discharging their responsibilities. The relevant 
answers to the research questions might then be generated using 
informants’ personal experiences in explaining LIFT.    
Mack et al (2005) state that interviews may facilitate discussion of 
sensitive aspects about programmes that some people may be reluctant to 
discuss in groups. Some analysts including Beck et al (2009) argue that 
controversial aspects in LIFT obstruct some staff within PCTs from 
discussing it openly. They are concerned about possible backlash if 
perceived as critical of LIFT.  In light of this, the interview method was 
considered appropriate for the present research. It may provide the 
opportunity for informants to articulate the contestable aspects of LIFT 
from personal experience especially as the interviews were conducted 
with one person at a time. The benefits of collecting data through in-depth 
interviews in this research are explained in Table 2.8 below.  
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Table 2.8: Appropriateness of in-depth interviews 
Purpose served How it was achieved in the research  
Learning about perceptions 
held about LIFT.  
Knowledge about LIFT was derived from informants’ 
individual perceptions and experience and not the official 
story. 
Allowing informants to share 
personal perceptions and 
experiences with LIFT. 
Informants freely expressed themselves. They indicated 
how they preferred to procure desired buildings and 
questioned the wisdom behind some LIFT guidance.  
Gaining insight into how 
informants evaluated LIFT. 
Informants drawn at PCTs, LiftCo and LIFT buildings 
indicated contextual factors and mechanisms perceived 
to facilitate or constrain LIFT and staff in discharging 
their responsibilities. 
Addressing some of the 
controversial aspects of LIFT 
Informants freely expressed criticisms and indicated 
contestable aspects of LIFT.    
          
The interview method facilitated informants in freely expressing criticisms 
and their different opinions about whether LIFT’s various contextual factors 
and mechanisms helped them in discharging their responsibilities. This 
was made possible by conducting the interviews with one person at a 
time. It is unlikely that any other method would have uncovered such 
sentiments from those directly responsible for implementing LIFT. 
2.3.3.2 Sampling of informants 
The informants prioritised for interviews were those considered to be 
directly involved and affected by LIFT. This restricted the sampling to PCT 
staff and those at the LiftCo and LIFT buildings. It was felt that the 
categories of staff at the operational level potentially held evidence 
relevant to the research questions. Such evidence involved their actual 
experiences in operationalizing LIFT schemes. This approach to sampling 
fitted well with purposive sampling that Creswell et al (2004) advocate for 
saving time within case-studies. The informants were pre-selected using 
criteria that they would be able to: represent the public and private sector 
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views on LIFT in their positions as PCT managers, LiftCo executive, GPs, 
and centre administrators. They would also have experience and active 
involvement in LIFT activities.   
Although the PCT programme managers and centre administrators shared 
personal perceptions and experiences of LIFT, their views may be 
construed to prioritise the public sector interests in LIFT. The same applies 
to the GPs especially those that coordinated delivery of the individual 
buildings because they assume the agency of the PCTs in doing so. 
Investors in the LiftCo were not considered for interviews because their 
role is in financing and not directly involved in planning and 
operationalizing LIFT schemes. This role is delegated to the LiftCo. The 
views of the LiftCo CEO were sought at personal level and on behalf of the 
private sector participants including the financiers and different contractors 
that are hired to construct and supply post delivery services at LIFT 
buildings.   
The desire to reach as many informants as possible meant that no fixed 
sample size was determined prior to the interviews. To this end, the 
researcher was flexible to substitute deputies or other experienced staff for 
unavailable primary informants where necessary. For example, a clinical 
officer substituted for a GP at B-4 in PCT-2 whereas an accountant 
substituted for the finance director at the same PCT. This provided the 
researcher with a picture of the extent to which information on LIFT was 
shared between the different staff. Eventually, 25 informants drawn from 
the LiftCo, the PCTs, and LIFT buildings were interviewed.   
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Table 2.9: Descriptions of informants and interview schedule 
Informant description LiftCo PCT-1 PCT-2 When interviewed 
Chief Executive Officer 1   November 2009 
December 2009 
GP / Primary Care 
Coordinator   
 1 1 PCT-1: Oct – Nov 2009 
PCT-2: July - Aug 2010 
Strategy & Regeneration 
/ Public Health 
 1 1 PCT-1: Oct – Nov 2009 
PCT-2: July - Aug 2010 
Clinical Governance    1 1 PCT-1: Oct – Nov 2009 
PCT-2: July - Aug 2010 
Commissioning   1 1 PCT-1: Oct – Nov 2009 
PCT-2: July - Aug 2010 
Communications 
Director 
 1 1 PCT-1: Oct – Nov 2009 
PCT-2: July - Aug 2010 
Estate & Facilities    1 1 PCT-1: Oct – Nov 2009 
PCT-2: July - Aug 2010 
Finance    1 2 PCT-1: Oct – Nov 2009 
PCT-2: July - Aug 2010 
Centre Administrators   2  
1 
1 
PCT-1: August 2010 
PCT-2: September 2010 
 PCT-3: October 2010 
GPs at LIFT buildings  3 2 May – June 2011 
Total Informants (25) 1 12 12 October 2009 – June 2011 
 
The first batch of interviews in October 2009 involved staff at PCT-1 and 
the LiftCo. The second batch took place between July and August 2010 
involving staff at PCT-2. Interviews with centre administrators were done in 
October 2010. The GPs at LIFT buildings were interviewed between May 
and June 2011. The spacing of interview batches underlines the 
challenges faced in securing interviews with the informants especially the 
GPs. 
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2.3.3.2.1 Sampling at the LiftCo 
At the LiftCo, the CEO was the only one eligible because the company is 
manned by himself and the personal assistant. It would have been helpful 
if there were more staff to provide more perspectives to LIFT at the LiftCo. 
To this end, a suggestion to interview the LiftCo board chairman involved 
with this particular LiftCo from the beginning was made. Although it may 
have helped in understanding how the LiftCo may have evolved over time, 
the suggestion was not pursued. The reason was that the research 
focused at the operational rather than the policy-making level where the 
chairman was considered to be. The CEO was interviewed twice after the 
first interview was interrupted by his other commitments and each 
interview took up to 80 minutes.  
2.3.3.2.2 Sampling at the PCTs 
At the PCTs, all programme managers were considered eligible for 
interviews to understand how LIFT affected them in their activities.  Where 
the managers were not available due other commitments, their deputies 
were used as substitutes provided they met the criteria for inclusion, 
especially those of experience and active involvement in LIFT. Fifteen 
informants drawn from different categories of managers were interviewed 
between the two PCTs.   
2.3.3.2.3 Sampling at LIFT buildings 
At LIFT buildings, only the GPs and centre administrators were considered 
eligible. Except one, each LIFT building had a Lead GP previously 
delegated responsibility by the PCTs in planning and ultimate delivery of 
the individual building. The centre administrators are PCT employees 
responsible for handling LIFT issues arising at the buildings. Their role 
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provides linkages between the PCTs, the LiftCo and care providers based 
at their buildings. For these reasons the GPs and centre administrators 
were considered to be important for the research. The GPs may have their 
own practice administrators that are restricted to facilitating clinical 
activities of the concerned GPs. Such staff and the rest at the buildings 
were not involved with the research because their duties may be outside 
LIFT. Although other primary care providers like retail pharmacies use LIFT 
buildings, the GPs were made central to the research because LIFT was 
primarily initiated to improve GP surgeries than pharmacies.  
One of the main stated intentions of LIFT was to improve patient 
experiences in getting care. The DH (2011) argue that condition of the pre-
existing GP surgeries obstructed patients from accessing modern and 
integrated healthcare services. It may have been helpful to give patients 
the opportunity to indicate whether LIFT supported them in increasing their 
experience in accessing healthcare services than before. But patients 
were not involved for the reasons that focus of the research was on 
operational level (Figure 1.0 page 9) not care provision where patients get 
the experience.   
Initially, it was intended to involve patient liaison officers that monitor 
patient experiences at NHS healthcare buildings. Their views were 
considered to be a reasonable substitute for patient interviews. 
Unfortunately, no positions for patient liaison officers existed at LIFT 
buildings, at least within the case-study. This may not significantly affect 
the research for the important reason that its primary interest was in 
understanding effectiveness of contexts and mechanisms used to deliver 
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LIFT buildings as opposed to care provision activities within the PCTs. This 
underlined the appropriateness of GPs and centre administrators that 
directly monitored these aspects of LIFT in providing information needed 
for answers to the research questions compared to either patients or 
patient liaison officers.   
2.3.3.3 Interview Topic Guides  
The researcher used the major aspects of LIFT that were identified during 
documentary analyses as the framework to design the interview topic 
guides. The aspects identified defined the contexts and mechanisms 
through which LIFT schemes were to be delivered from the perspectives of 
officials at the DH. Therefore, the researcher decided to generate the 
answers to the research questions by examining the CMO configurations in 
LIFT based on the views of the local staff directly involved in activities to 
operationalise LIFT. The interview topic guides (Appendix 1.0 page 321) 
were therefore aligned to the research questions and gave informants the 
opportunity to reflect on CMO configurations encountered in 
operationalizing LIFT. This involved them sharing their individual 
perceptions and experiences on whether and how the contexts, 
mechanisms and outcomes recommended in LIFT guidance supported 
their own effort in achieving the expected outcomes.  
Although different staff categories were interviewed, the researcher did not 
design different sets of topic guides to suit the different categories. 
Instead, the topic guides were used for all staff categories and informants 
whether at the PCTs, LiftCo or LIFT buildings were asked similar questions. 
This enabled the researcher to gather evidence on similar issues in LIFT 
from different staff categories. For example, the estate and facilities 
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directors, GPs, centre administrators and LiftCo CEO all commented and 
emphasized different issues on costs incurred at LIFT buildings. This could 
not have been achieved if the questions were reserved for one staff 
category, say the estate and facilities directors or finance directors only. 
The use of standardised topic guides also helped in testing the level of 
involvement and extent to which information of LIFT was known between 
the different staff categories.   
2.3.3.3.1 Part 1 of the topic guides 
The research sought to determine informants’ perceptions of the primary 
care problems existing within their PCT areas. For PCT staff, how they 
understand the need for improvement may have influence on decisions to 
adopt LIFT. With the GPs, this may affect the choice to involve themselves 
in LIFT. The informants were expected to show that they understood, 
among other things, the main objectives that LIFT sought to address, its 
appropriateness and strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis the tasks to be 
accomplished and the options considered before LIFT was adopted.  
The questions here attempted at determining the benchmarks against 
which to assess progress achieved within the PCTs through asking about 
what informants believed were the issues that LIFT was intended to 
address. There was an assumption that strong sentiments for or against 
LIFT may exist among the informants to make it necessary to test how LIFT 
was understood. The interviews gave informants opportunity to interpret 
the contexts and mechanisms recommended in LIFT to indicate best ways 
that they thought the issues in procuring the desired buildings could be 
addressed.  
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2.3.3.3.2 Part 2 of the topic guides 
Initial analysis of the documents revealed that LIFT guidance was intended 
to give the PCTs leads to technical support that may be needed in 
implementing LIFT. Due to changes in contexts surrounding LIFT, the PCTs 
may be faced with challenges that affect their ability to implement LIFT 
effectively. In their justification for using LIFT procurement, the DH (2001) 
argues that: 
“The process of negotiating and procuring new buildings is currently 
complex and time-consuming whichever route is used. Many GPs find this 
a necessary but unproductive use of their time and energy” (page 23).  
The perspective of the DH officials is that LIFT provides operational staff 
with technical support needed in dealing with challenges faced in 
procuring buildings. Part 2 of the topic guides was therefore designed to 
have three subsections where among other things, the first subsection 
asked about the forms of internal (within PCT) and external support that 
the informants thought they received to progress with LIFT, the 
organizations with influential roles, and those that authorised what aspects 
of LIFT and how they did so. Asking about these issues helped in 
developing an understanding of the existing support mechanisms and how 
they influenced progress in activities leading to construction and 
successful delivery of individual LIFT buildings within the case-study.  
Within Part 2, the second subsection asked about LIFT projects completed 
and outstanding, time taken to deliver individual buildings, how the 
buildings were financed, and the organizations that promoted the financing 
packages. The researcher expected that within a decentralised 
procurement strategy, and in light of the DH’s perception of LIFT quoted 
above, major participants like programme managers, GPs and centre 
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administrators interviewed would be conversant with the financing 
packages used and time taken to deliver their buildings. The questions 
helped in reconciling LIFT objectives, support provided, and 
accomplishment of targets within the case-study.  
The current research sought to evaluate how activities between PCT staff 
and the LiftCo presented challenges that influenced progress against LIFT 
outcomes. This is because of some analysts’ (e.g. Beck et al 2009) 
recognition that lacking skills in managing PPPs presented challenges for 
PCT staff in making LIFT effective. Therefore, within Part 2 of the topic 
guides, the third subsection asked about how the LiftCo hired the different 
contractors involved in LIFT, the guidance followed in hiring the 
contractors, and discretion that the informants thought they were allowed 
in varying LIFT guidance according to local needs. The informants 
reflected on how and in what ways activities by the DH and its agents like 
CHP and locally based SPBs, and those working through the LiftCo 
supported local effort towards LIFT objectives. The questions helped in 
developing an understanding of where to attribute any problems in LIFT 
between its guidance and management activities at the operational level.   
2.3.3.3.3 Part 3 of the topic guides 
In the process of documentary analysis, it became apparent that success 
with LIFT depended on the PCTs and LiftCo adhering to their obligations. It 
raised the need to understand how staff at the PCTs and LiftCo went about 
with their commitments to LIFT and ensured that they delivered their 
obligations. Pursuant to this, Part 3 of the topic guides was designed to 
have four subsections seeking to understand the decision-making 
processes and the LiftCo’s role in solving procurement problems within 
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PCTs. The first subsection asked informants to specify centrality of the 
LiftCo’s remit to the PCTs’ needs. Informants were further asked to relate 
between their LiftCo’s skills sets and perceived quality of LIFT buildings. 
Since the LiftCo’s activities revolve around specifications in the strategic 
partnering agreement, lease-plus agreement, and on facilitating the 
utilization of LIFT buildings, the contexts and mechanisms involved may 
either facilitate, or hinder progress against LIFT objectives. Or they may 
influence unexpected or unwanted outcomes within the PCTs. Thus, aside 
from helping to understand whether what the LiftCo was expected to 
deliver was clearly defined so that performance could be assessed on the 
basis of stated rather than implied targets, responses to the questions 
provided pointers to how informants interpreted quality and improvement 
in procurement through LIFT.  
Because it is argued in the guidance (DH 2001, DH/PfH 2003) that using 
LIFT facilitates the PCTs in increasing efficiency through transferring risks 
in procurement to the LiftCo, the second subsection asked informants to 
identify procurement services and commercial activities that were 
transferred from the public sector to the LiftCo. Informant responses 
helped in confirming whether and how LIFT effectively transferred risks 
given the DH officials’ claims. 
The third subsection investigated whether LIFT’s achievements were 
assessed formally within the PCTs. Informants were asked to comment on 
whether and how any economic effectiveness analyses of LIFT buildings 
were done, and how they thought the LiftCo influenced synergy and 
stakeholder engagement in delivering LIFT buildings. Their responses 
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helped in understanding whether LIFT increased capacity in procurement 
within the PCTs. The fourth subsection sought indications about whether 
the pattern of changes in healthcare within the PCTs was attributed to 
LIFT. This helped in understanding LIFT’s wider impact including whether 
LIFT buildings had a multiplier effect on investment within the PCTs areas.  
2.3.3.4 Conduct of the interviews 
At the PCTs, interviews were arranged by personal assistants to the 
contact directors. Those with the centre administrators were arranged from 
the LiftCo. The researcher arranged those with the GPs. All interviews 
were conducted face-to-face to give informants opportunity to share their 
individual perceptions and experience with the information sought. All the 
questions on the topic guides were addressed to all informants and the 
interviews were completed at one sitting. The informants had the freedom 
and appeared comfortable in expressing opinion including their lack of 
knowledge about the issues discussed although some especially those at 
the PCTs seemed at first to be cautious in expressing their opinion. This 
disproved the initial fear that the informants may be uncomfortable with the 
discussions due to likely sensitivity attached to some aspects of LIFT.    
Some PCT managers and lead GPs believed that they had ethical 
responsibility to criticise aspects of LIFT that may be inappropriate for their 
activities. This presented challenges for the researcher in ensuring that 
informants especially those motivated to portray LIFT favourably or 
negatively did not influence what topics to discuss at the expense of the 
topic guides during the interviews. All questions prioritised in the topic 
guides were addressed and the entire interviews were tape recorded. Part 
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of the data analysis and interpretation involved distinguishing the facts 
from opinions.  
The duration of interviews varied according to how informants were 
involved with LIFT activities. The average time per interview was 70 
minutes but took longer with the GP/primary care coordinators, estate and 
facilities directors, the lead GPs and the LiftCo CEO. The interviews with 
directors for communication and corporate affairs averaged 45 minutes 
and may suggest that the departments are less involved in LIFT.  
Tape recording the interviews facilitated the cross-checking of responses 
to ensure that potential distortions were avoided during transcription. 
Transcription done within 48 hours of every interview served as early 
stage analysis to make sense out of the data. It also helped in relating the 
interview responses to the research questions. For security, all the taped 
records were stored as password protected uploads onto a desk top 
computer.  
2.3.4 Tours of LIFT buildings 
The research used observations as the third method for data collection. 
Given the DH’s (2001) argument that the development of LIFT was 
influenced by poor condition of primary care buildings, the observation 
method was considered to be an effective technique in cross-checking the 
improvements achieved. Among other concerns, pre-existing buildings 
were blamed for risking patient congestion due their small sizes, 
inconveniencing patients by not being co-located with a pharmacies and 
important social services, and not sustaining quality services due to poor 
maintenance (DH 2001). Officials at the DH (DH/PfH 2003) stated that 
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almost half the facilities in inner city areas were not fit for purpose because 
they adapted residential buildings that potentially restricted physical 
access by the disabled patients. The researcher considered tours as a 
helpful approach to assessing whether and how LIFT buildings were a step 
improvement in solving these problems.  
2.3.4.1 How the buildings were chosen  
At the time of the research, the case-studied PCTs had seven operational 
LIFT buildings. It was decided to involve only the buildings where 
significant maintenance work would neither inhibit the tours nor obstruct 
their outlook. The buildings needed to provide a range of services as 
opposed to walk-in centres that may be too small to adequately inform the 
research. At least one building was chosen from each PCT. For 
convenience of the research, it was decided that the buildings to be toured 
would also offer the GPs and administrators needed for interviews.    
With guidance from the LiftCo that knew about situations at LIFT buildings, 
including the GPs and centre administrators with sufficient experience of 
LIFT, only three buildings between PCT-1 and PCT-2 were considered to 
meet the inclusion criteria. Since two of these were in PCT-1, it raised the 
concern that the selection favoured the experiences of PCT-1 than PCT-2. 
The concern was addressed by involving a LIFT building from a 
neighbouring PCT even though that PCT was not a participant in the case-
study. That building is owned by the LiftCo case-studied meaning its 
involvement may not distort the findings. The distribution of the buildings 
eventually case-studied is shown below.  
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Table 2.10: LIFT buildings selected for the research 
Responsible PCT Number involved Building code 
PCT-1 2 B-1 & B-2 
PCT-2 1 B-4 
PCT-3 1 B-3 
Total  4  
The codes given to the buildings follow the order in which the tours were 
made, meaning B-1 in PCT-1 was toured first followed by B-2. The third 
tour involved B-3 in neighbouring PCT-3 and B-4 located in PCT-2 was 
toured last.   
2.3.4.2 Features observed at the buildings  
The pre-existing GP surgeries were criticised for being small and cramped, 
poorly maintained, and too scattered for delivering improved and 
integrated primary care (DH 2001, DH/PfH 2003). This research involved 
tours in order to observe whether features at LIFT buildings showed 
evidence for increasing patient experiences by removing obstacles to 
accessing better services at improved buildings. Hence prioritising 
features within the service areas described in Table 2.11.   
Table 2.11: Features observed at LIFT buildings 
Service area Features observed and performance indicators  
                   
External area  
Entrance directions; parking spaces; condition of walkways; 
external outlook; lighting; access for wheelchairs; potential hazards; 
and proximity to by public transport.   
                
Reception area 
Manning arrangements at the receptions; facilitation of patient flow; 
confidentiality for patients; staff security; availability of phoning 
facilities for patients; and internal lighting. 
                     
Waiting area 
Waiting area’s size in relation to congestion; space to manoeuvre 
wheelchairs and children’s pushchairs; access to toilets; signposts 
for the GPs; clarity of information displays and patient calling.  
                
Treatment rooms 
Room sizes in relation to types of care; equipment including for 
heating and cooling fixtures; patient privacy; and whether rooms are 
shared or GP have their own room.   
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Service area Features observed and performance indicators  
Staff facilities Staff resting facilities, socialisation (e.g. prayer) and refreshment 
rooms; working area space in relation to congestion control.     
                
Buildings’ comfort  
The buildings’ heating, cooling, ventilation, lighting, and furniture; 
general finishes that indicate quality; levels of internal & external 
noise impacting on patient comfort.   
 
LIFT buildings were intended to be delivered in context of regeneration of 
infrastructure in deprived areas (DH/PfH 2003). Investigating their external 
condition like the outlook, safety of the walkways and potential hazards 
helps in understanding whether LIFT improved on previous problems. The 
external condition at the buildings may be also the basis on which patients 
develop impressions about how they are valued by the health authorities. 
There was interest in observing whether LIFT complied with the DH’s 
desire to bring primary care “nearer home” in line with patient preferences 
expressed in Our Health, Our Care, Our Say (DH 2006b).   
The decision to observe condition of the reception and waiting areas was 
influenced by the finding from documentary analysis that the old surgeries 
experienced patient congestion. Officials at the DH (DH 2001) argued that 
due to their small sizes against a background of increased demand for 
services, most GP surgeries were cramped and restricted physical access 
by disabled patients that used wheelchairs and pushchairs. Through 
observing the reception and waiting areas, you could determine whether 
their conditions promoted patient circulation to reduce congestion and 
potential dilapidation of fixtures. Patient experience is also enhanced by 
the general comfort that the buildings may offer. Hence, among other 
things, checking condition of the heating, cooling and internal and external 
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noise impacting on patients using LIFT buildings. The observations helped 
in understanding whether LIFT buildings were designed to reflect the 
aspirations of the PCTs. Where some GPs required significant 
modifications to their buildings, you could argue that the LiftCo had failed 
in its interpretation to design and deliver buildings along specifications in 
the SSDPs.  
2.3.4.3 Conduct of the tours  
All tours were done in the company of centre administrators considered 
appropriate to explain circumstances of the features observed in the 
different service areas. Their escort facilitated easier access to the service 
areas and helped in minimising disruptions especially at the treatment 
rooms. The conditions in the consultation rooms were observed at the time 
of interviewing the GPs with the concerned GPs rather than the centre 
administrators explaining circumstances of the features observed. The 
nature of the service areas prioritised for the tours meant that no 
distortions were risked by the centre administrators giving access to only 
the features that favourably portrayed LIFT.  
Aside from the service areas described in Table 2.11, observations were 
made to check if the buildings had specific arrangements for the security 
and health and safety of staff and patients. For example, condition of 
alarms for emergencies and burglary, and where applicable, arrangements 
for the storage of staff and patient personal belongings and for hazardous 
substances used at the buildings were observed. The duration of tours 
averaged 60 minutes per building. 
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2.3.5 Alignment of the methods to research questions 
As portrayed in subsection 2.3, this research used a mixed-methods 
research design comprising documentary reviews, in-depth interviews, 
and tours at LIFT buildings. The methods were aligned to the research 
questions (subsection 1.1.3 page 3) to generate the relevant answers. 
Table 2.12 shows how the methods were each aligned to the research 
questions. 
Table 2.12: Alignment of the methods to the research questions 
Research method used Research questions addressed 
Documentary reviews (i)  
In-depth interviews (ii), (iii) and (iv) 
Tours of LIFT buildings (ii), (iii) and (iv) 
  
The first research question sought to understand the beneficiaries of LIFT 
and outcomes through which they were expected to benefit from the 
perspectives of DH officials who wrote LIFT guidance. The answers were 
obtained through documentary analysis. The second research question 
investigated factors that operational staff perceived to facilitate and/or 
constrain them towards LIFT objectives within their PCT areas. The fourth 
question investigated factors within the case-study that informants 
perceived could help them in discharging their responsibilities. The third 
research question was about what could be learnt from the case-study 
experiences to inform future schemes and other PCTs implementing LIFT. 
The answers to research questions number (ii), (iii) and (iv) were obtained 
through in-depth interviews and observations on tours at LIFT buildings 
cross-checked against those obtained through documentary analysis.  
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2.3.6 Fieldwork process 
This subsection explains the researcher’s practical activities done to 
obtain access to the case-study. The access was needed to collect data 
through the interviews and tours at LIFT buildings. The process of getting 
documentary evidence has already been explained in subsection 2.3.2.2 
(page 116).      
2.3.6.1 Access at the PCTs 
In the company of the academic supervisors, the researcher arranged 
meetings to introduce the research to the contact directors at PCT-1 and 
PCT-2. The objective was to inform them about the purpose of the 
research, its proposed methods, inviting participation of the PCT managers 
and agreeing on the interview schedule. The existing research and other 
relations between the PCTs and university facilitated obtaining written 
agreements supporting this research. All programme managers at the 
PCTs were eligible for interviews. A schedule for data collection was used 
by the personal assistants to the contact directors in confirming the timing 
for interviews with programme managers who agreed to be interviewed at 
each PCT. Introducing the research prior to fieldwork helped in clarifying 
questions and concerns that the informants may have had over discussing 
perceived sensitive aspects of LIFT. As a result, those that agreed to be 
interviewed appeared comfortable about it and were able to share 
information and documents that they believed to contain relevant evidence 
on LIFT within their PCT areas.   
2.3.6.2 Access at the LiftCo 
Recognising that past research (e.g. Pollock et al 2006) criticised some 
aspects of LIFT, there was concern that the LiftCo may be unwilling to 
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support the current research. There was the need to persuade the LiftCo 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to support the research as a neutral 
academic exercise rather than a fault finding on the LiftCo. This was 
achieved by clarifying the purpose of the research, its proposed methods 
and inviting the LiftCo’s participation at a meeting with the CEO. The LiftCo 
expressed commitment to facilitate the research and provided written 
agreement to this effect.      
2.3.6.3 Access at LIFT buildings 
The LIFT buildings included in the research were identified by the LiftCo 
based on convenience that the buildings offered for progress with the 
research and staff experience with LIFT. The researcher did not formally 
introduce the research at the buildings as done at the PCTs and the LiftCo. 
This was done by the LiftCo despite the centre administrators and GPs to 
be interviewed being PCT employees and independent operators 
respectively. The interviews with centre administrators were coordinated 
by the LiftCo CEO’s personal assistant and the researcher coordinated 
those with the GPs.   
2.4 Data Analysis  
The issues pertaining to data analysis are discussed in three subsections. 
Subsection 2.4.1 explains approach to the analysis. Subsection 2.4.2 
explains how documentary evidence, interview transcripts and observation 
notes were extracted and coded in NVivo. How the RE principles were 
applied in data interpretation is explained in subsection 2.4.3.  
  
147 
 
2.4.1 Approach to the analysis  
The challenge in data analysis was in deciding which data to prioritise out 
of the large amounts collected. The collected data was in some cases 
broad and indicated good, neutral and occasionally negative experience of 
LIFT. The idea was to neither accept nor reject the collected evidence at 
face value. Doing so risked prioritising the perspectives of certain 
individuals or group of informants over those of the others in explaining 
LIFT. A balanced explanation needed the evidence to be localised to 
understand the actual experiences within the case-study by distinguishing 
the facts from informant opinions by means of an analysis framework 
designed to analyse documentary notes and interview transcripts.  
2.4.1.1 Analysis framework 
The analysis framework in Table 2.13 helped in identifying and describing 
risks, challenges, and factors that the informants perceived to cause LIFT 
outcomes experienced in their areas. It facilitated in tracing the cause and 
effect relations between LIFT objectives, contexts, and mechanisms. RE 
principles were then mapped onto the emerging relations to provide 
answers to the research questions.  
Table 2.13: Analysis framework for cause-effect relations in LIFT  
LIFT features Verifiable Indicators Means of verification Assumptions 
 
Objectives  
Descriptions of how 
LIFT helps PCTs to 
improve buildings 
Information provided 
in official documents  
Major LIFT 
documents are in 
public domain 
 
Contexts  
Specific  conditions 
in LIFT that made 
PCTs effective  
Review documents 
and interview 
responses to identify 
factors that promote 
or hinder LIFT 
There are past LIFT 
reviews to learn from. 
Stable environment 
exists within PCTs.  
Mechanisms  The ways or 
activities through 
which the resources 
for LIFT are used to 
make PCTs effective 
in procuring 
buildings.  
Review documents 
and interview 
feedback to identify 
inputs and activities 
used towards LIFT 
objectives 
There are past 
reviews to learn from. 
Stable environment 
exists within PCTs. 
There is continuity in 
flow of funds to 
support PCT efforts. 
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LIFT features Verifiable Indicators Means of verification Assumptions 
 
Inputs  
Resources (money, 
skills and expertise) 
and ideas needed to 
implement LIFT. 
Reviewing documents 
and feedback from 
interviewees  
There is continuity in 
flow of funds and 
PCT support for 
LIFT.  
 
Outcomes  
Reported effects of 
context, mechanism, 
inputs and activities 
on LIFT’s goal. 
Using RE principles to 
interpret interviewee 
feedback on LIFT 
features. 
External environment 
is stable enough to 
attribute local 
outcomes to LIFT   
 
The analysis framework helped in making sense of the data to develop 
knowledge about LIFT’s most influential contexts and mechanisms plus 
some of its hidden effects from informants’ perspectives. LIFT works by 
providing contexts and mechanisms conducive for helping PCTs in 
improving procurement of their buildings. The evidence about how the 
contexts and mechanisms contributed to improvements in procurement 
within the case-study was verified through analyses of documents and 
informant feedback. RE principles were then applied in interpreting the 
outcomes to get relevant answers to the research questions. 
Interpretations of the outcomes were done under variable assumptions 
that the researcher made for each LIFT feature being analysed.     
The advantages of the analysis framework were twofold. First, it facilitated 
exploring to understand causality between specific LIFT contexts, 
mechanisms, and operational problems experienced within the case-
study. Second, evidence about how, why, and under what conditions LIFT 
produced specific outcomes was derived from actual experiences of the 
different categories of informants involved. This is described in Tables 3.5 
(page 176) to 3.13 (page 205).  
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2.4.2 Evidence extraction and coding 
The documents prioritised for analysis (Table 2.7 page 125), interview 
transcripts, and notes on observations at LIFT buildings were managed 
and analysed using NVivo 9.0. Occasionally, some documents (e.g. 
Annual Reports) were too huge for uploading onto NVivo in which cases 
only sections with the relevant information were copied and uploaded as 
MS Word files. The uploaded materials had large amounts of textual data 
likely to present challenges in analysis if handled manually. NVivo offered 
the advantage of having the capacity to store, and efficiency to analyse 
many documents including interview transcripts. It also facilitated a 
systematic approach to coding complex and broad issues from several 
documents obtained from a variety of sources for analysis without having 
to create numerous files. Within NVivo, it was possible to retrieve the data 
for analyses and manipulation needed in linking between ideas that 
emerged during data interpretation.      
Data extraction focused on identifying issues that provided answers to the 
research questions. Among other things, evidence needed to indicate how 
LIFT responded to the influence of factors surrounding its implementation, 
and to identify what information could help in suggesting improvements 
needed in targeting and managing future LIFT schemes. Such evidence 
identified inputs and activities (described in the analysis framework) 
embodied in contexts and mechanisms as descriptors of how LIFT 
responded to influence factors surrounding its implementation. The range 
of such issues in LIFT documents and those raised during the interviews 
meant that diverse sets of codes for the evidence, examples of which are 
shown in Table 2.14, were initially created.  
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Table 2.14: Examples of codes used for the evidence  
 Risk management 
 Relations and culture 
 Quality of buildings 
 Competition and provider diversity 
 Value-for-money 
 Private sector skills and expertise 
 Technical support 
 Cost containment 
 Influence 
 Governance arrangements 
 Discretion  
 Information dissemination 
 
Some elements of LIFT contexts and mechanisms (e.g. the different types 
of risks or how certain risks were to be managed) are explicitly defined in 
the documents and interview transcripts making it straightforward in 
creating relevant codes. In a number of cases, interpretative codes had to 
be created especially where the issues were just described in context of 
processes or particular LIFT activities. The codes on “relations and 
culture”, “conflict of interest” and “private sector skills and expertise” are 
examples of those created through interpretation of descriptions. Thus, the 
coding used in this research may not be the exhaustive list considering 
that some of LIFT’s critical issues could be obscure in official documents 
and possibilities exist for people to differently code LIFT issues in one 
document due to lack of consensus in interpretations of some issues.  
Notwithstanding this, the coding attempted at closely matching the ideas 
discussed in the different documents and those mentioned during 
interviews to the created codes. Figure 2.1 illustrates the different types of 
evidence searched for matching to the code “value-for-money”. It 
illustrates that value-for-money may be measured using different 
indicators such as whether LIFT use comparable government buildings in 
assessing feasibility of projects, or economic and strategic benefits that 
LIFT may bring within PCT areas vis-à-vis overall costs met by the 
concerned PCTs.   
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Figure 2.1: Examples of NVivo nodes – Value for money 
The codes initially involved using unrestricted branch-codes that were later 
reduced through repetitive grouping and cross-sharing between 
appropriate codes in rounds of analyses. In the process, some codes were 
renamed while new ones were created until those comprehensively 
explaining related ideas were finally determined and categorised into LIFT 
contexts, mechanisms, and outcomes during interpretation of the findings. 
The evidence from observations at LIFT buildings was cross-checked 
against informant responses in the interviews for coding at the relevant 
codes that supported or refuted whether LIFT had the ability to improve 
procurement. For example, evidence from observing the sizes and 
designs of treatment rooms and reception and waiting areas was coded on 
the codes explaining quality of LIFT buildings. This is because descriptions 
in the documents are that LIFT was to support the PCTs in procuring 
Value-for-money 
Use of comparators 
Construction cost 
Quality of buildings relative to cost 
Economic and strategic benefits 
buildings 
Efficiency in delivery of buildings 
Facilitation of coordinated care 
activities at buildings relative to cost 
Innovation / modernisation in 
services 
Quality of maintenance relative to cost 
Service disruption and gentrification 
Patient –GP disconnections 
Displacement of other GPs 
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buildings with features that promote physical access by all types of patient 
(DH 2001, DH/PfH 2003). 
2.4.3 Using RE principles in data interpretation   
The use of RE principles concerns interpreting data to develop a real-world 
based understanding of evidence about how processes within a 
programme (contexts and mechanisms) may interact to produce the 
observed outcomes (Byng 2005, Kazi 2003, and Pawson 2006). It is 
considered important for researchers to clarify why and how programme 
outcomes whether expected or unexpected benefit the different groups of 
participants in different ways. In this research, data interpretation involved 
distinguishing facts from individual opinions to identify the groups of LIFT 
participants that the informants had consensus on as benefiting or losing 
from specific contexts surrounding LIFT and mechanisms used in 
procuring LIFT buildings. This was then reconciled with what officials at the 
DH had anticipated LIFT to achieve.  
Aside from providing answers to the research questions, the findings could 
identify the ideas to make central to the theory explaining how LIFT is 
understood to operate based on perspectives of informants within the 
case-study. Pawson (2006) argues that this is the ultimate intention of 
data interpretation in research informed by RE principles.  
Initial documentary analysis revealed that LIFT was intended to 
decentralise aspects in procurement by supporting PCTs towards 
improving the condition of buildings through competitive procurement that 
transferred related risks to the LiftCo and increased efficiency using 
private sector skills and expertise. These are some of the ideas tested 
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using RE principles to understand their alignment or contrast to what 
actually obtained within the case-study - a way of prioritising real-world 
experiences shared by the people interviewed because they are directly 
involved and affected by LIFT.  
The use of RE principles in data interpretation was considered to be useful 
in highlighting how circumstances specific to the PCTs influenced other 
important outcomes to feed into the theory explaining LIFT. It was 
recognised that changes within the economy and the NHS were likely to 
affect LIFT outcomes. For example, loss of experienced staff at 
government departments with strategic roles in LIFT may prevent the PCTs 
from getting sufficient technical support needed in LIFT. This may mean 
the PCTs risk missing on some important expected outcomes like 
improvement in risk management or better value-for-money. The potential 
effects of all possible changes in social and economic factors surrounding 
LIFT needed to be accounted for in interpreting evidence about the 
outcomes experienced within the case-study. Using RE principles 
facilitated this including exploring whether LIFT’s capacity to produce 
benefits depended on complexity of its surrounding contexts and 
mechanisms. It is possible that LIFT outcomes are not always along what 
officials at the DH expected because in reality, some of its contexts and 
mechanisms cause participating groups to benefit in different or 
unintended ways.  
This is not to suggest that RE principles made it easier to interpret and 
explain some of the evidence. Some documentary sources of evidence on 
LIFT tend to contain hidden interests of their producers not easy to 
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interpret in research. For example, even RE inspired analyses may have 
difficulties in interpreting the salient meanings behind designs of some of 
the buildings. Their meanings may be only known to the LiftCo. 
Notwithstanding this, RE principles are considered as important in 
understanding whether or not explanation derived from data interpretation 
match what was initially understood about a programme (Pawson 2006). 
The researcher attempted at thinking about the broader theoretical and 
practical implications of this research by adjusting the initial middle range 
theory, hoping that the revised one may help informants and others 
externally in making informed decisions to improve LIFT.  
2.5 Research ethics   
The important ethical issues in qualitative research relate to minimising 
potential harm to participants and ensuring intellectual coherence of 
research findings (Marshall & Rossman 2006, Mack et al 2005, Kvale 
1996). Mack et al (2005), state that harm to research participants is not 
only about physical injury but also threat to integrity and other forms of 
backlash people may suffer upon participating in research. In seeking to 
explain intellectual coherence of qualitative research findings, Kvale 
(1996) and Marshall and Rossman (2006) consider it ethically important 
for researchers to aim at minimizing potential biases that may exist in the 
design or during implementation or analysis of the collected data. The 
steps that the researcher took to have this research cleared and to ensure 
ethically sound data collection, data analysis and interpretation and 
objectivity of the findings are explained below.       
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2.5.1 Research clearance 
Initially, the researcher contacted the Research Unit at PCT-2 for advice 
on ethical issues in the current research. In their view, the research did not 
require ethical clearance from the DH because it did not involve patients. 
The University Research Ethics Committee (REC) was then approached to 
provide the clearance. The REC assesses ethical issues of all research 
proposals to ascertain intellectual coherence of proposed research. The 
necessary ethics application forms including a personal risk and health 
and safety form were completed and backed with letters from the PCTs 
and the LiftCo indicating their support of the research. The REC 
considered these submissions sufficient for this research without the 
researcher having to orally defend the proposal before the committee.   
2.5.2 Data collection 
The steps taken to ensure ethically sound data collection were previously 
discussed under conducts of documentary analysis, in-depth interviews, 
and tours of LIFT buildings. Within documentary analysis, it was mentioned 
that steps were taken to review templates of some restricted documents 
like LIFT contracts and tenders that were perceived as too sensitive to 
share with the public. This helped the researcher to have a feel of the 
actual documents.   
With regards to the interviews, all interviewees were informed about the 
purpose of the research prior to their volunteering. It is argue that informed 
consent enables interviewees to self-judge their ability to contribute to 
research (Mack et al 2005). In this research, it helped in reducing risks of 
the interviewees withholding important information about LIFT. This is 
because they realised that the research did not threaten their interests in 
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light of the sensitivity attached to some aspects of LIFT. The tours of LIFT 
buildings were timed to avoid inconveniencing the GPs and other service 
providers by disturbing their routines.   
2.5.3 Data analysis and interpretation  
Previously, subsections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3 explained the steps taken in 
minimizing potential biases in the conduct of data analysis and 
interpretation. One of the ethical considerations involved giving codes to 
the concerned PCTs and LIFT buildings in data analysis, interpretation, and 
reporting of the findings. This was in line with anonymity promised to 
participants at beginning of the research. The case-studied PCTs were 
coded as PCT-1 and PCT-2. The codes B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4 were used 
to anonymise the involved LIFT buildings throughout the research.  
All the individual informants were promised confidentiality of their 
contributions. Accordingly, their names and circumstances that may make 
them identifiable were removed. Throughout this research, informants are 
identified by their positions – e.g. GP/Primary care coordinator, Lead GP or 
Clinical Officer. The raw and processed data that they contributed was 
stored as password protected files. Within embedded case-studies, there 
may be challenges in anonymising the places and individuals. Because of 
the many units of analysis involved, some of the units may remotely 
suggest the identities intended for hiding (Yin 2009). In this case-study, it 
was fairly easy to anonymise the PCTs, LIFT buildings and informants. But 
the fact that the PCTs may have slight variations in the titles held by 
people with similar responsibilities may make anonymising informant 
positions not entirely foolproof. But this was not considered to be a 
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problem since coding the PCTs, the buildings, and avoiding informant 
names meant that citing the positions may effectively disguise identities.  
2.5.4 Objectivity of the findings 
The criterion of objectivity of the findings is a major consideration in study 
design, data collection, and data analysis and interpretation (Marshall and 
Rossman 2006, Creswell 2002, Guba and Lincoln 1998). It questions 
about accuracy and credibility of the findings from the perspectives of the 
researcher, or participants or readers. While recognizing the challenges in 
ensuring objectivity of findings from qualitative research, Guba & Lincoln 
(1998) consider it ethically unsound if the findings result from subjective 
bias of the researcher rather than being a product of the research. In this 
research, informants were selected on strength of their official positions 
rather than private interests in LIFT. Throughout the research, data 
interpretation sought to ensure that the views central to the findings were 
traceable back to informants not the researcher.  
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2.6 Research Timeline   
The research timeline shows that it was registered in August 2008. It was 
introduced at the LiftCo in March 2009 and at PCT-1 in April 2009.  
Table 2.15: Timeline of research activities (2008 -2013) 
Research activity / Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Registration of PhD Aug      
Introductions: 
LiftCo 
PCT-1 
PCT-2  
  
March 
April 
 
 
 
 
June 
   
Documentary review Aug      Ongoing 
Fieldwork: 
LiftCo 
PCT-1 
PCT-2 
Centre administrators  
GPs  
  
Oct 
Oct - 
Nov 
 
 
 
 
 
Jul – 
Aug 
 
Jul – Oct 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apr – 
Jun 
  
Data entry and analysis  Oct                       
Writing of the Thesis   Jan    July 
Submission of Thesis      August 
 
The actual fieldwork started in October 2009 and ended in June 2011. Its 
duration was prolonged by challenges in getting the GPs to commit 
themselves for interviews. The fieldwork coincided with DH phasing out 
PCT role in commissioning primary care through the Health and Social 
Care Act 2012. Given centrality of the PCTs in this research, there was 
some urgency to complete fieldwork while they still existed. To this end, 
part of the data entry and analysis was done in conjunction with the 
fieldwork. The thesis was eventually submitted in August 2013.  
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SECTION 3: THE FINDINGS 
This research explored with staff involved in executing LIFT schemes their 
perceptions of why LIFT produced outcomes that they experienced within 
their PCT areas. The researcher believed that an in-depth understanding 
of LIFT based on operational staff’s experiences would allow DH officials to 
proceed from an informed perspective in considering ways of reviewing 
the guidance to make them more supportive on LIFT activities. This belief 
resided in that the research informants may highlight LIFT’s contextual 
factors and mechanisms perceived to facilitate or constrain, and those 
perceived to be helpful in making it more effective.  
This section presents that findings obtained from analyses of LIFT 
documents; interview scripts from 25 informants drawn at two PCTs, the 
LiftCo and four LIFT buildings; and observations during tours of four LIFT 
buildings. From the documents analysed and through interviewing the 
informants, the researcher obtained accounts of the contexts, mechanisms 
and outcomes (CMO configurations) expected and experienced in LIFT. 
The answers to the research questions were then derived through coding 
of categories of evidence in NVivo during to understand the CMO 
configurations central to LIFT as experienced within the case-study.  
The findings are presented and explained in the form of CMO 
configurations. Explanations of how the CMO configurations were 
constructed and the ways in which the overall findings could be interpreted 
to answer the research questions are provided.    
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Presentation of the findings is organized around a discussion of key 
answers to the research questions one by one. The major finding is spelt 
out first for each research question followed by explanations of the 
evidence about how each question might be answered. The findings are 
presented in subsections 3.1 to 3.5. Subsection 3.1 presents the CMO 
configurations answering research question (i). Subsection 3.2 analyses 
the CMO configurations answering research question (ii). It identifies what 
informants thought were the facilitating and constraining factors in LIFT. 
Subsection 3.3 analyses the CMO configurations answering research 
question (iii). It identifies what informants perceived were the factors that 
may help them to progress against LIFT outcomes. Subsection 3.4 
presents the findings from the tours of LIFT buildings. Subsection 3.5 
synthesizes the findings to construct a revised middle range theory 
explaining how LIFT was understood to operate at least in the case-study.    
As previously indicated, informants were promised anonymity and 
confidentiality of information. Thus, informant names and those of the 
PCTs, LIFT buildings and anything that may closely identify the data 
sources have been avoided in presenting the findings. Informants are 
identified by their professional titles (e.g. estate manager, centre 
administrator, or lead GP) together with their PCTs or buildings 
respectively coded as PCT-1 and PCT-2, and B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4. 
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3.1 CMO configurations answering research question (i)  
The evidence to answer research question (i) was obtained through 
documentary analysis. The contents of the documents prioritised for 
analysis indicate what DH officials that designed LIFT and wrote its 
guidance perceived were its key CMO configurations.  
3.1.0 Construction of CMO configurations - research question (i) 
The CMO configurations for evidence about the first research question 
were constructed through documentary analysis. The analysis identified 
repeatedly emphasized contexts and mechanisms that the DH officials 
perceived as fundamental to maximising benefits from LIFT if operational 
staff were to comply. This implies that the contexts and mechanisms may 
be viewed as the benchmarks for what DH officials perceived to facilitate 
achievement of LIFT objectives. The analysis framework developed in the 
research (Table 2.13 page 147) was then applied to understand causation 
between major contexts, mechanisms and outcomes in evaluating LIFT’s 
ability to facilitate progress.   
Most of the CMO configurations were derived from the following 
documents: 
 NHS Local Improvement Finance Trust Prospectus (DH 2001);  
 NHS-LIFT Strategic Partnering Agreement: Version 5 (DH/PfH 2003);  
 NHS-LIFT and pharmacy (DH 2005, Gateway Ref: 5535); and 
 NHS-LIFT Business Case Approval Process – Establishing a LIFT 
company Version 7 (DH 2005, Gateway Ref: 5268);  
 LIFT Guidance for GPs: NHS England only (BMA 2001) 
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The DH officials perceived that the guidance provided would deliver 
benefits for LIFT participants chiefly: the PCTs; primary care providers; 
investors in the LiftCo; and contractors in LIFT (DH 2001, DH/PfH 2003, DH 
2005). These participants have different roles in coordinating, financing, 
managing and providing services at LIFT buildings. Depending on their 
roles, the participating groups may require specific contexts and employ 
unique mechanisms to achieve LIFT outcomes. The guidance issued by 
the BMA (2001), for example, provide GPs with advice on how they could 
minimise risks when using LIFT mechanisms recommended in documents 
written by DH officials.     
Schedule 17 Part 1 of the strategic partnering agreement Version 5 
(DH/PfH 2003) provides the basis for an initial description of CMO 
configurations in LIFT by describing how LIFT participants are expected to 
perform their roles. The LIFT Prospectus (DH 2001, page 22-29) is also 
explicit about the benefits that the participants may realise through LIFT. 
These documents describe LIFT’s expected outcomes more than the 
corresponding contexts and mechanisms. The analysis framework 
described in subsection 2.4.1.1 (page 147) was used in examining the 
expected outcomes aligned with the different participating groups. The aim 
was to determine the relevant contexts and mechanisms which the groups 
employed to achieve LIFT objectives. The findings are therefore presented 
in the reverse order to the norm in RE. In the illustrative tables, the 
expected outcomes are described before their relevant mechanisms and 
contexts. This distorts neither meaning nor logic in causation between 
contexts, mechanisms and outcomes. The RE principles permit such 
flexibility in making sense of a programme’s features (Pawson 2006). 
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3.1.1 Key Finding 1: Aside from the PCTs, LIFT was designed to benefit a 
range of other participants within the NHS.  
The overriding finding of this research is that LIFT is primarily intended to 
benefit PCTs through improved procurement of healthcare buildings. But 
its implementation encourages other players, chiefly primary care 
providers, investors in the LiftCo, building contractors and service-
suppliers to involve themselves in procurement of local primary care 
buildings. The DH officials believed that these groups would make LIFT 
work provided they complied with the guidance (DH 2001, DH/PfH 2003). 
This finding suggests that LIFT decentralises roles in procurement of 
healthcare buildings by providing CMO configurations conducive to PCTs 
and other players to benefit as follows:       
3.1.1.1 CMO configurations affecting PCTs 
Table 3.1 draws on documents that were analysed to summarise findings 
on expected outcomes, mechanisms used, and surrounding contexts that 
DH officials anticipated would affect PCT activities in LIFT. Most of the 
expected outcomes were explicitly stated in the documents analysed. 
Mechanisms are the ways through which LIFT works to achieve the 
expected outcomes, and contexts are the environment or conditions under 
which the mechanisms work for LIFT to produce the expected outcomes. 
The terms “mechanisms” and “contexts” were seldom used explicitly in the 
documents making it necessary to tease them out from elaborated 
descriptions of the expected outcomes. 
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 Table 3.1: CMO configurations affecting PCT activities 
Expected outcomes Mechanisms Contexts 
PCTs will have up to 
date Strategic 
Services Development 
Plans (SSDPs) at all 
times 
(DH 2001, DH/PfH 
2003). 
The LiftCo participates in 
auditing the condition of 
buildings to match patient 
demands.  
There is external technical 
support in developing SSDPs 
within PCTs. 
PCTs prioritise engaging the 
LiftCo in planning improvements 
at healthcare buildings. 
Stock of higher quality 
buildings is increased 
(BMA 2001, DH 2005). 
Participants in LIFT value 
quality and reflect priorities 
in condition of LIFT 
buildings   
The LiftCo prioritises equipping 
GPs with improved buildings, 
relevant technology or working 
environment. 
Improved coordination 
of primary care within 
PCTs (DH 2001, DH 
2005, DH/PfH 2003). 
Buildings are co-located 
with social care services 
and complementary 
services. 
PCTs and the LiftCo appreciate 
benefits of the “whole-systems 
planning” approach in their areas.  
Better value-for-
money in procurement 
(DH 2001, NHS 
Gateway Ref 5268, 
Unison 2003, DH/PfH 
2003). 
LiftCo prioritises 
competition in financing 
and hiring of contractors. 
There is actual competitive 
bidding to deliver services at 
buildings. 
Contractors prioritise quality and 
reduce variations in standards. 
Bigger buildings facilitate 
efficiency through 
providers working under 
one roof. 
LiftCo is flexible to renegotiate 
aspects the contract for 
alignment to changing PCT 
circumstances. 
Procurement costs are 
reduced through using 
standardised delivery 
(DH/PfH 2003). 
Batching schemes 
promotes economies-of-
scale and efficiency in 
procurement. 
LiftCo seeks agreement with 
PCTs on what to standardise at 
the buildings. 
Standardisation is within rather 
than across PCTs. 
Flexibility procurement 
increases efficiency 
within PCTs (DH/PfH 
2003). 
Buildings are delivered in 
response to changes in 
PCT priorities. 
PCTs recognise their problems 
and have ability to prioritise 
strategies for addressing them. 
Participants share optimism in 
LIFT and are prepared to meet 
their obligations. 
Increased access to 
capital within PCTs 
(DH 2001, DH/PfH 
2003). 
LiftCo has expertise in 
mobilising resources 
needed for sustaining 
investments.  
PCTs can assess LiftCo’s 
strengths and weaknesses to 
influence borrowing levels. 
 
The CMO configurations in Table 3.1 suggest that LIFT is intended to 
facilitate improvements in primary care through better quality buildings 
coordinated with social care within the PCTs. This is achieved through the 
LiftCo providing contexts and mechanisms conducive to PCTs’ 
investments in improving the quality of procuring healthcare buildings. LIFT 
involves deregulating procurement activities and management of the 
buildings to work in partnership with local stakeholders led by the LiftCo 
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and advised by the PCTs. Within the PCTs, LIFT prioritises investments 
that are derived from agreed Strategic Services Development Plans 
(SSDPs). The DH (2005) reiterates that the SSDPs are developed through 
a “whole system” approach that enables local stakeholders in influencing 
how their healthcare buildings are procured. Contextual factors to achieve 
this include the PCTs giving priority to consulting local communities for 
input in LIFT schemes, and the LiftCo hiring financiers, and contractors 
based on their competitive advantages like being able to deliver quality 
buildings and services on time when they are needed and at cost that is 
affordable for the PCTs.  
To deliver buildings efficiently, the PCTs show commitment to the spirit that 
underpins LIFT by engaging the LiftCo. This enables the LiftCo to minimise 
the risks in procurement by harnessing private sector skills and expertise 
in delivering and managing projects. Thus, collaboration between PCTs 
and LiftCo is supposed to help LIFT to achieve increased value-for-money 
in procurement of PCT buildings. The CMO configurations further suggest 
that the LiftCo’s flexibility in renegotiating and realigning the contract’s 
critical aspects in response to changing circumstances within PCTs is a 
requirement for success. For example, even though standardisation in 
delivery and management of buildings is to reduce cost and increase 
efficiency, the context may require modifications to standards within PCTs 
so that new LIFT buildings reflect local priorities.    
3.1.1.2 CMO configurations affecting primary care providers 
The main primary care providers expected to benefit through LIFT 
comprise GPs, dentists, pharmacists, and opticians opting to operate at 
LIFT buildings. Table 3.2 summarises findings on expected outcomes, 
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mechanisms used, and surrounding contexts that define activities of 
primary care providers from the perspectives DH officials and professional 
representative bodies like the BMA.  The outcomes through which the 
primary care providers are expected to benefit are explicit in key 
documents. A number of the corresponding mechanisms and contexts 
were worked out from expected outcomes described in the analysed 
documents.  
Table 3.2: CMO configurations affecting primary care providers 
Expected 
outcomes 
Mechanisms Contexts 
Increased quality 
of care and patient 
experience 
(DH 2001, BMA 
2001, DH/PfH 
2003). 
Buildings meet patient 
expectations for improved 
conditions and technology. 
Buildings are designed to reflect 
patient preferences and 
expectations 
LIFT facilitates GPs in 
integrating patient care. 
GPs’ business practices change to 
prioritise integrated care at 
buildings.  
Work environment 
for providers is 
improved 
(DH 2001, BMA 
2001, DH 2005 
Gateway Ref 
5535) 
Buildings designed to fit 
their purpose match 
provider roles.  
Providers recognise practical 
economic benefits in relocating to 
LIFT buildings if supported by PCTs. 
Buildings provide staff and 
patient comfort and 
security. 
Providers recognise work 
environment as important to 
improving the quality of care. 
Integration of care 
is enhanced (DH 
2001, DH 2005 
Gateway Ref 
5535) 
Providers offer care side-
by-side with 
complementary services at 
LIFT buildings. 
Providers prioritise collaboration in 
meeting patient expectations for 
experiencing seamless services.  
Reduced burden 
in looking for 
buildings or loans 
to build their own 
facilities (DH 2001, 
BMA 2001).  
Ownership and 
cumbersome procurement 
of buildings is transferred to 
the LiftCo.   
Providers recognise practical 
economic gains in using LIFT 
procurement than doing it 
themselves. 
There sufficient information to help 
providers in choosing between LIFT 
and having own buildings. 
Long-term use of 
buildings is 
secured   
(DH 2001, DH/PfH 
2003, King’s Fund 
2008) 
LIFT releases providers 
from inflexible contracts at 
private buildings.  
Evidence for the LiftCo’s 
comparative advantage over private 
landlords is clear.  
Relocating to LIFT buildings is 
neither cumbersome nor a threat to 
business viability for providers.   
 
To achieve the expected outcomes, the care providers need to recognise 
existing weaknesses in primary care in their PCT areas. The recognition 
may influence them in developing a firm commitment to LIFT as a useful 
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approach to addressing these weaknesses. LIFT mechanisms and 
contexts are expected to be conducive to care providers benefiting 
through quality working environments, safer buildings, and flexible entry 
and exit in LIFT deals backed with financial support from the PCTs.  
The pre-existing primary care buildings were criticised as being unfit for 
purpose as well as having poor maintenance that did not help primary care 
providers in meeting increased patient expectations for modernised care 
(DH 2001). The DH (2001) raised concern that the primary care system 
experienced problems in coordinating and integration of patient services 
because of GP surgeries scattered all over the PCTs. Independent GPs’ 
effectiveness in improving services was affected by them experiencing 
negative equity associated with renting buildings from private landlords 
(DH 2001). The mechanisms and contexts described in Table 3.2 are what 
the DH officials and professional representative bodies like the BMA 
perceived to be ideal in addressing problems in the primary care system 
under LIFT.    
3.1.1.3 CMO configurations affecting private investors in LIFT 
As the authors of most documents analysed in this research, the DH 
officials anticipated that private equity holders in the LiftCo that 
spearheads LIFT activities would also benefit through LIFT outcomes, 
mechanisms and contexts summarised in Table 3.3. The equity holders in 
the LiftCo are expected to mainly comprise private companies and 
possibly individuals and local stakeholders. The CMO configurations 
affecting the private investors can therefore be construed to also affect 
activities of the LiftCo representing the equity holders.   
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Table 3.3: CMO configurations affecting private investors 
Expected outcomes Mechanisms Contexts 
Enhanced involvement 
in developing local 
buildings (DH 2001, 
DH/PfH 2003). 
LiftCo facilitates within 
PCT involvement of 
communities in health  
Stakeholders are willing to take 
financial interests in local 
buildings. 
Diversity is encouraged to 
replace preference of particular 
stakeholder. 
Specialisation in delivery 
and management of 
buildings (DH 2005 
Gateway Ref 5268, DH 
2001, DH/PfH 2003). 
LiftCo prioritises 
specialist roles in hiring 
contractors.  
LiftCo has appropriate skills and 
optimistic about LIFT objectives. 
Contractor hiring is based on 
competitive advantages plus 
commitment to LIFT objectives.  
Improvements in risk 
management  (BMA 
2001, DH 2001 Gateway 
Ref 5268, DH/PfH 2003) 
Roles are allocated 
based on ability to 
deliver. 
Contractor skills and expertise 
are not taken for granted before 
hiring.  
There is respect for competition 
and negotiations in shared 
interests. 
Changes in demand for 
buildings are anticipated 
better. 
PCT staff feels empowered to 
use experience in protecting 
public interests in LIFT. 
Increased efficiency due 
to risk spreading (DH 
2001, BMA 2001, 
DH/PfH 2003).  
LIFT spreads risks in 
procurement between 
participants.  
 
 
Risk is allocated based on ability 
to manage and experience 
translated into practice. 
Risks in LIFT are understood and 
there is recognition that effective 
management may be affected by 
individual values. 
Flexibility in sourcing 
capital (DH 2001, 
DH/PfH 2003, NHS 
Gateway Ref 5268). 
Investors have freedom 
to acquire or dispose 
equity in the LiftCo. 
 
Established financiers impose no 
barriers for smaller investors. 
Helpful information is provided 
for those wishing to acquire 
equity in their LiftCo. 
 
The above CMO configurations indicate that LIFT emphasises citizenship 
in planning local buildings. It encourages “people” and “system” oriented 
practices to influence communities in taking an active financial interest in 
delivery of local buildings. LIFT’s expected outcomes and mechanisms 
affecting the investors in the LiftCo are believed to be achieved through 
using appropriate skills and expertise held by individuals and grouped 
investors within communities. The important mechanisms include 
emphasizing specialist roles in LIFT activities through allocating the roles 
and risks based on participant’s ability to deliver and manage. Most 
documents from the DH portray LIFT as having mechanisms for facilitating 
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private investors to freely acquire or dispose equity in their local LiftCo (DH 
2001, DH/PfH 2003, DH 2005). 
These mechanisms require facilitative contexts that include encouraging 
diverse stakeholders to take financial interests in local healthcare 
buildings, and the LiftCo hiring contractors with proven competencies and 
commitment to subordinating their professional or group values to LIFT’s 
objectives. Thus, enhancing capability to deliver the expected outcomes 
also depends on investors understanding of the risk components in LIFT 
and appreciating that inflexible adherence to individual values may affect 
effective sharing and management of the risks (NAO 2005). Mutual trust 
between the local investors and between other constituents of LIFT is 
considered an important contextual factor explicitly stated in the strategic 
partnering agreement document governing LIFT (DH/PfH 2003). Having 
mutual trust between LIFT investors, PCT staff and service suppliers 
facilitates sharing of ideas which promoted LIFT objectives. The DH 
(DH/PfH 2003) argues that this also discourages equity holders in the 
LiftCo from imposing barriers to investment by smaller investors. 
3.1.1.4 CMO configurations affecting contractors 
Here, contractors in LIFT refer to the different groups hired by the LiftCo for 
roles in delivering and maintenance of LIFT buildings. The LiftCo hires 
architects to design buildings along specifications in the SSDPs before 
hiring building contractors to erect the buildings. Thereafter, non-clinical 
services at the buildings are supplied by different specialists ranging from 
cleaners, security providers, and equipment repairers to building 
maintenance specialists. The outcomes, contexts and mechanisms that 
the DH officials perceived to affect activities of this variety of contractors 
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for non-clinical functions in LIFT are described in Table 3.4. Those 
affecting clinical service provision have been described in subsection 
3.1.1.2 (page 165) under the CMO configurations affecting care providers.    
Table 3.4: CMO configurations affecting LIFT contractors 
Expected outcomes Mechanisms Contexts 
Businesses 
opportunity within the 
health estate market 
(DH 2001, DH/PfH 
2003) 
LIFT deregulates activities 
to procure public buildings 
within PCTs.  
Contractors are able to identify 
opportunities within PCTs. They 
possess recognisable competitive 
advantages in their speciality 
areas. 
Potentially long-term 
contracts with the 
LiftCo (Unison 2003, 
DH 2001, DH/PfH 
2003) 
LiftCo’s exclusive rights 
with PCTs guarantee 
continuity in engaging 
contractors. 
Gains from long-term contracts 
are translated into improved 
quality at buildings. 
PCTs are empowered in 
monitoring to influence contractor 
performance.  
Enhanced 
involvement in local 
activities (DH 2001, 
DH/PfH 2003) 
LIFT facilitates 
contractors’ involvement in 
delivering services at their 
own local buildings. 
Contractors recognise they have 
a social contract to service 
buildings as part of the 
community. 
Contractors value the importance 
of quality in reducing transaction 
costs. 
There is maximum exploitation of 
professional diversity or 
experience of contractors. 
Improved quality of 
buildings (DH 2001, 
DH/PfH 2003, Unison 
2003) 
Competitive advantages in 
speciality areas increase 
quality of services. 
Quality benchmarks are clearly 
defined for effective evaluation of 
performance   
PCTs are empowered in 
penalising underperforming 
contractors. 
 
Table 3.4 shows how LIFT provides opportunities for a variety of 
contractors to enter the previously restricted NHS estates market. This 
mechanism may enhance efficiency through competition in delivering 
services. That the LiftCo has exclusive rights to deliver buildings specified 
in the SSDPs is a mechanism that potentially ensures continuity in 
investment by the LiftCo and guarantees long-term engagements with the 
contractors. LIFT presupposes that income guarantees encourage service-
suppliers in prioritising quality in order to retain contracts. They also 
incentivise suppliers to reduce transaction costs in LIFT, thereby aligning 
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financial practices to PCTs goals. It influences delivery and maintenance of 
buildings for availability at the time when they are need.  
Another important mechanism is that more private cleaning companies 
and other service suppliers are involved in maintenance of healthcare 
buildings in their areas upon being hired by the LiftCo. Previously, these 
functions were provided by staff and tradesmen directly hired by the PCTs. 
This suggests the LiftCo considers the private contractors as elements of 
the community to allocate roles in procuring healthcare buildings needed 
by their PCTs.  
LIFT seeks to improve the conditions of buildings using the mechanisms of 
spelling out quality benchmarks against which contractors’ performance is 
monitored. The necessary contexts for the mechanisms to produce the 
expected outcomes include contractors with recognisable competences 
being able to identify opportunities to acquire contracts to provide their 
services under LIFT. The outcomes are also achieved provided the 
contractors understand and adhere to quality benchmarks, and translate 
experience from long-term contracts into prompt responses to 
requirements at LIFT buildings. The LiftCo hires the contractors and allows 
them to adopt innovative ways towards meeting the tenants’ needs at LIFT 
buildings. Therefore, from the contractors, the LiftCo exploits professional 
diversity and experience that LIFT seeks to tap from the private sector 
(DH/PfH 2003). Progress is eventually achieved provided the PCTs as the 
ultimate clients of the LiftCo, feel empowered in monitoring to control 
underperformance by the LiftCo and its hired contractors.   
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These CMO configurations support the view that LIFT participants need to 
have capacity for assessing how LIFT adds value to their activities. Among 
many other outcomes, they may want to understand, for example, whether 
LIFT impacts patient choice, displaces smaller care providers, affects 
governance of primary care buildings, or increases the stock of buildings. 
The official documents also emphasize commitment and trusting relations 
as important contexts that facilitate LIFT mechanisms and outcomes (DH 
2001, DH/PfH 2003). It is argued that the contexts ensure accountability 
and enhance value-for-money through openness in risk management, 
prioritising quality, and regular evaluations to improve LIFT’s performance. 
3.2 CMO configurations answering research question (ii)  
The evidence to answer research question (ii) was obtained through in-
depth interviews with informants drawn at the PCTs, the LiftCo and at LIFT 
buildings. The informants comprised different categories of staff directly 
involved in executing LIFT schemes in their PCT areas. They shared their 
experiences and perceptions of the contextual factors and mechanisms 
(CMO configurations) that they perceived facilitated or constrained them in 
discharging their responsibilities. The evidence was then derived from 
analysis of significant themes generated in coding of interview transcripts 
in NVivo software through application of the analysis framework previously 
laid out in subsection 2.4.1.1 (page 147).    
3.2.0 Construction of CMO configurations – research question (ii)  
The use of in-depth interviews is considered an effective way in collecting 
data within case-studies (Creswell 2002). But Yin (2009) argues that it 
presents challenges in understanding personal feelings and experiences 
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expressed by different informants drawn from different places. The 
important challenges experienced in this research are highlighted here in 
order to illuminate how the CMO configurations central to findings from in-
depth interviews were developed.  
The purpose of analysing interview transcripts was to compare and 
contrast different individual perspectives in order to identify areas of 
agreement and disagreement in their interpretations of LIFT. The 
perspectives were then reconciled to build a possible theory explaining 
LIFT, at least within the case-study. It is possible that some PCT staff 
interviewed were uncomfortable with the LiftCo’s role because it reduced 
their control over some aspects of procuring and managing buildings. The 
risk of polarised opinions between informants at the PCTs and those at the 
LiftCo may potentially distort objectivity of some information from 
interviews making it difficult to distinguish official from unofficial stories in 
explaining LIFT. Thus, completeness of the perspectives used in 
developing the final CMO configurations explaining LIFT may be uncertain.  
There was concern that some of the informants potentially used power 
bestowed by their positions to control the nature and depth of information 
shared with the researcher. This concern arises from the fact that 
responses like: “I don’t know”, “I am not involved in that” or “Estate 
department knows better” occasionally punctuated the interviews making it 
hard to tell when informants lacked the knowledge and when they were 
just reluctant to delve into potentially sensitive information. Since analysis 
of the interview transcripts attempted to distinguish between “facts” and 
“opinions”, the CMO configurations constructed and presented here may 
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be viewed as a reasonably accurate reflection of the views and how 15 
PCT programme managers, LiftCo CEO, five GPs and four centre 
administrators that were interviewed understood LIFT to be working within 
the case-study.   
The informants were interviewed using topic guides that addressed issues 
on contexts, mechanisms and outcomes (CMO configurations) derived 
from documentary analysis. Some CMO configurations developed during 
documentary analysis were either discarded or modified in light of 
evidence from interviews. New ones were added depending on 
significance of their rating by informants. Therefore, CMO configurations 
developed from in-depth interviews critiqued what in LIFT guidance the DH 
officials perceived would make LIFT effective. In context of RE, Pawson 
(2006) argues that causation between programme factors may be better 
understood if those directly affected are given opportunity to share their 
experiences. With this in mind, informants in the current research were 
given opportunity to shed light on various contextual factors and 
mechanisms they perceived to either facilitate or constrain their efforts in 
LIFT.  
The evidence for answers to research question (ii) is presented in 
subsection 3.2.1. Subsection 3.2.1.1.1 presents perceptions on LIFT’s 
facilitating mechanisms. Subsection 3.2.1.1.2 presents the perceived 
facilitating contexts. The constraining mechanisms are presented in 
subsection 3.2.1.1.3. Subsection 3.2.1.1.4 presents perceptions on 
constraining contexts.    
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3.2.1 Perceived facilitating or constraining factors 
In the interviews, informants shared their experiences and perceptions of 
how LIFT contexts and mechanisms supported them in achieving the 
intended outcomes. This included commenting on LIFT and the LiftCo’s 
strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis tasks to be accomplished within the 
PCTs. The responses were analysed to identify the factors perceived to 
facilitate or inhibit progress and those considered necessary yet missing in 
order to achieve the benefits.   
3.2.1.1 Key Finding 2: Most informants perceived LIFT as having 
mixed facilitating and constraining factors some of which inherent to how 
LIFT is designed and others due to problems in implementation.  
The primary finding in relation to research question (ii) is that LIFT has 
positive and negative effects resulting from either variation in contextual 
factors surrounding its implementation or mechanisms through which the 
activities are carried out. Some of the contexts and mechanisms facilitated 
operational staff in their activities while others constrained them. LIFT is 
perceived to also produce some positive outcomes and unwanted 
outcomes that the DH officials may not have expected. Informants 
perceived the pertinent details about the evidence as follows: 
3.2.1.1.1 Facilitating mechanisms 
The mechanisms perceived to facilitate LIFT outcomes are summarised in 
Table 3.5 below. The findings were deduced from analysis of significant 
themes generated in coding of interview transcripts in NVivo software 
during data analysis. The column on “Outcomes” indicates the facilitating 
themes that emerged on coding of categories of information in NVivo. The 
column on “Mechanisms details” shows the researcher’s analyses of 
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interview material showing how informants understood the mechanisms as 
facilitating them in achieving LIFT outcomes.     
Table 3.5 shows that LIFT was perceived to have mechanisms that 
facilitated flexibility in sourcing the finance needed to complete started 
projects and adapting buildings to meet tenant requirements. Keeping the 
same staff in charge of LIFT activities at the LiftCo was associated with 
increased value-for-money in LIFT. The ability of both the LiftCo and PCTs 
to seek internal and external technical support for effective delivery of 
buildings was mentioned as an important LIFT mechanism. Other 
facilitative mechanisms were thought to involve the continuous flow of 
projects within PCTs, and the LiftCo being able to anticipate changes in 
primary care demand and GP strategies for responding to the changes 
while retaining tenancy at LIFT buildings.   
Table 3.5: Mechanisms perceived to facilitate LIFT outcomes 
Outcomes Mechanism details 
 
Increased flexibility 
in procurement 
Easy flow of capital in and out of the LiftCo ensured availability of 
resources to construct and maintain buildings (LiftCo Rep., Finance 
Director, PCT-2). 
LiftCo adapted buildings to meet tenant requirements (LiftCo Rep, 
Lead GPs B-1, B-2, B-4 Clinical Officer). 
 
Increased scope 
within PCTs 
The LiftCo facilitated speedy delivery of buildings and continuity in 
services (Administrators B-1 & B-2).   
Internal and external technical support improved the delivery of 
buildings (Corporate & Communication Director PCT-2). 
New ideas substituted poor value existing procurement ways (Estate 
& Facilities directors PCT-1 & PCT-2). 
 
Better management 
of uncertainty in 
demand for facilities 
LIFT encouraged GPs to modernise their surgeries or move into new 
buildings (Lead GPs B-1 & B-2, Estate & Facilities Directors, PCT-2) 
LiftCo anticipated changes in demand (patients & GPs) and 
improves size and designs of buildings (Lead GP B-4, GP B-2, LiftCo 
Rep) 
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Outcomes Mechanism details 
 
 
Increased GP & 
PCT collaboration in 
estate planning 
Minimum standards were met through active involvement of Lead 
GPs in planning and delivery of buildings (LiftCo Rep, Lead GP, B-
2). 
GPs were consulted and they provided specifications prior to 
construction of buildings (Lead GPs B-1 & B-2, Risk, Health & Safety 
Director PCT-2). 
Higher utilisation showed PCTs, GPs and patient satisfaction with 
improved quality at LIFT buildings (Clinical Officer B-4, Lead GPs, 
Administrator, B-1). 
 
Improved quality 
with no service 
disruptions  
LIFT replaced old buildings without displacing providers (LiftCo Rep, 
Lead GPs, Estate & Facilities Director PCT-1). 
GP relocations to centralised buildings did not affect or disadvantage 
their patient lists (Lead GPs). 
 
GP willingness to take part in LIFT through coordinating delivery, and 
taking occupation of new buildings were mechanisms perceived to 
facilitate progress. The PCT programme managers interpreted higher 
service-user patronage at LIFT buildings as confirmation of LIFT’s ability to 
increase patient experience. This encouraged them to continue using LIFT 
in procuring new buildings. A related perceived mechanism was that LIFT 
provided the PCTs with opportunities to replace old buildings and relocate 
GPs to central sites without risking disconnection of patients from their 
GPs. Yet another facilitative mechanism was that LIFT buildings neither 
involved GPs changing geographical areas nor patients experiencing 
distance disadvantages to their preferred GPs.    
3.2.1.1.2 Constraining mechanisms 
The mechanisms perceived to constrain progress against LIFT outcomes 
are described in Table 3.6. The column on “Outcomes” indicates the 
constraining themes that emerged on coding of categories of informant 
experiences in NVivo.  The column on “Mechanisms details” shows the 
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researcher’s analyses of interview material showing how informants 
understood the mechanisms as operating to constrain them in achieving 
LIFT outcomes.      
Table 3.6: Mechanisms perceived to constrain progress 
Outcomes Mechanism details 
 
 
LIFT guidance were 
inflexible for staff to 
implement effective 
schemes  
LIFT was promoted as the only way to procure primary care buildings 
(Strategy Director PCT-1, Lead GPs B-1 & B-4) 
PCTs roles were interfered with through being forced to comply with 
LIFT stages (Estate & Facilities Director PCT-1, Lead GP, B-1). 
Compliance with LIFT stages exacerbated bureaucracy that delayed 
projects (Estate & Facilities Director PCT-1, Lead GPs B-1 & B-2). 
Legal barriers precluded PCTs from revising contracts that may have 
become obsolete for local interests (Corporate & Communication 
Director PCT-2, Finance Director PCT-2). 
 
Evidence for LIFT 
enhancing value-
for-money in 
procurement was 
questionable 
No economic evaluations like cost-benefit analysis or cost-
effectiveness analysis were expected prior to constructing LIFT 
buildings (GP/Primary care coordinator PCT-1, Lead GP B-2). 
There was exemption on using comparable public facilities to assess 
feasibility of LIFT buildings (Finance directors PCT-1 & PCT-2). 
LIFT has no agreed benchmarks against which to measure evidence 
for value-for-money (Lead GP B-1, GP/Primary care coordinator 
PCT-1). 
LiftCo has exclusive 
rights in delivering 
SSDP’s contents 
Lack of competition excluded small developers in LIFT and made the 
LiftCo complacent (Lead GP B-1 & Administrator B-3). 
Contractors with multiple projects risk quality by rushing to new sites 
(Administrator B-3 & GP/Primary care coordinator PCT-1). 
 
 
It is challenging for 
PCTs to make LIFT 
affordable and 
sustainable  
PCTs paid unaffordable rates because they lack influence on LiftCo’s 
borrowing (Lead GPs B-1 & B-2, Commissioning Director PCT-2). 
Anticipated benefits from competition were missed due to exclusivity 
clauses LIFT (Finance Director PCT-2, Lead GP PCT-1). 
LiftCo delivered only what PCTs can afford risking loss of innovation 
& decreased durability of buildings (LiftCo Rep, GP/Primary care 
coordinator PCT-1). 
PCT capacities has 
not increased after 
LIFT 
Inappropriate surgeries still exist because bureaucracy limited the 
LiftCo in managing demand (Lead GP B-1, Clinical Officer B-4). 
PCTs are not adequately supported in monitoring LIFT activities 
(Strategy Director PCT-1 & Lead GP B-2). 
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Outcomes Mechanism details 
Consultation and 
citizenship in LIFT 
is not effective 
Consultation time was inadequate for better input by staff 
(GP/Primary care coordinator PCT-1, Finance Director PCT-2). 
PCT and stakeholder inputs were not entirely respected in designing 
of buildings (Commissioning Director PCT-1 & PCT-2). 
 
Some of the mechanisms constrained informant’s individual efforts in 
various ways, either increasing costs or decreasing quality in LIFT. Most 
informants wanted to avoid inflexible procedures but were unable to do so 
because they had to comply with LIFT guidance. This was perceived to 
lock the PCTs into long-term expensive and unsustainable LIFT deals. LIFT 
guidance was criticised for failing to give PCT staff freedom to consider 
options that matched local resource availability in delivering the desired 
buildings. Informants expressed that the LiftCo was often not willing to 
make the necessary structural changes to LIFT buildings. High costs were 
quoted to deter tenants from pursuing the desired alterations.   
Most informants commented about the problems of the PCTs being unable 
to influence the LiftCo’s levels of borrowing from private banks. They 
argued that traditional procurement may not have been perfect but could 
have been considerably cheaper. High interest rates paid on the LiftCo’s 
borrowing were passed over to the PCTs through rent and fees. This was 
perceived as affecting the long-term affordability and sustainability of LIFT. 
Affordability was cited as the probable driver for the LiftCo not prioritising 
innovations for quality, design and increased durability of buildings. Yet 
the LiftCo argued that it was committed to innovating within the limits of 
what the PCTs can afford. A clinical governance director in PCT-1 summed 
180 
 
up most informants’ confession of unawareness about how individual LIFT 
buildings were financed: 
“It is difficult to understand how LIFT projects are financed. We know that 
the LiftCo is an investment arm of private banks and shareholders whose 
origins and motives are varied yet united in making profit. Ordinary people 
cannot grasp the financing structures.” (Clinical Governance director, 
PCT-1, Interviewed) 
This raises issues about quality and level of stakeholder involvement in 
LIFT. Most informants felt progress was inhibited by inadequate 
engagement with local staff, community groups and service-users; 
meaning that LIFT failed to prioritise local needs and interests in delivering 
buildings despite this being highlighted in the guidance (DH/PfH 2003 page 
192). But they believed PCT staff and GPs were better consulted than were 
service-users.  
The problem is that the quality of contributions is reduced when a short 
lead time is given because of the LiftCo’s desire to reduce planning time to 
speed up delivery of the buildings. So the trade-off between consultation 
and speedy delivery means that LIFT buildings may miss out on some 
quality elements such as reflecting cultural diversity of local service-users. 
A director in PCT-2 observed that:   
“The LiftCo deliberately gives short deadlines to give meaningful feedback 
on the plans. Neither service-users nor health and safety experts are 
consulted for basic fittings. There is a rush to meet construction deadlines 
so tenants are sometimes consulted after the work is already done and 
there is no scope to reverse anything” (Risk, Health & Safety Director, 
Interview). 
3.2.1.1.3 Facilitating contexts 
According to Pawson (2006), contextual factors facilitate programme 
mechanisms to produce intended outcomes. Thus, Table 3.7 summarises 
the contexts that informants in the current research perceived as 
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facilitating LIFT mechanisms in producing the expected outcomes. The 
column on “Outcomes” indicates the root themes that emerged on coding 
of categories of informant experiences of contextual ideas about the 
facilitators.  The column on “Context details” shows the researcher’s 
analyses of interview material showing how informants understood the 
conditions or environment (context) required for LIFT mechanisms to 
produce expected outcomes.     
Table 3.7: Contexts perceived to facilitate LIFT mechanisms 
Outcomes Context details 
 
Increased GP & PCT 
collaboration in 
estate planning   
LiftCo & PCT saw benefits from a continuous flow of projects within 
their area (LiftCo Rep). 
Collaborative working relationship was valued by the PCTs and 
LiftCo (LiftCo Rep, Estate & Facilities Director PCT-2). 
PCT boards supported managers in activating desired mechanisms 
(Estate & Facilities Director PCT-1, Strategy Director PCT-1). 
 
Better management 
of uncertainty in 
demand for facilities  
Stability at the LiftCo and committed CEO allowed planning of 
projects ahead of demand and their timely delivery (Estate & 
Facilities Director PCT-1 & PCT-2). 
LiftCo took time to update local SSDPs and reflects to correct 
operational problems (LiftCo Rep, Strategy Director PCT-1). 
 
 
 
Increased scope 
within PCTs  
LiftCo and SPB participated and were familiar with local SSDPs 
(LiftCo Rep, Clinical Officer B-4, Estate & Facilities Director PCT-2). 
LiftCo innovated and consulted stakeholders for contributions before 
constructing buildings (LiftCo Rep, Lead GP B-2 & B-4).   
PCTs required discretion to use other procurement methods proved 
to be better than LIFT 
PCT staff required discretion to influence choice of contractors 
employed by the LiftCo 
 
 
Improvements in 
quality without 
service disruptions  
GPs recognised quality buildings as fundamental to improved care 
and were optimistic about PCT intentions to modernise buildings 
(Lead GP B-2, GP/Primary care coordinator PCT-1). 
GPs were willing to relocate to LIFT buildings (Lead GPs, B-1 & B-2) 
GPs saw benefits in leading the development of LIFT buildings 
(Estate & Facilities Director PCT-2, Lead GP B-1, B-2 & B-4). 
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Outcomes Context details 
 
Increased flexibility in 
procurement 
LiftCo was skilled at mobilising capital to complete started projects 
(Clinical Officer B-4, Estates & Facilities Director PCT-2, LiftCo Rep). 
LiftCo reimbursed tenants for “self-help” expenses incurred at 
buildings to maintain standards (LiftCo Rep, Lead GPs B-1, B-2, & B-
4, Administrators B-1, B-2, B-3). 
LiftCo was prepared to adapt buildings according to tenant 
requirements (Lead GP B-2, Administrator B-2, LiftCo Rep).    
 
 
Increased value-for-
money in 
procurement 
LIFT buildings showed evidence for improvement on quality 
compared to procurement by government (Lead GPs B-1, B-2, & B-
3). 
Contractors had competitive advantages in project delivery and 
reduced cost by substituting inputs without compromising quality 
(LiftCo Rep, Clinical Officer B-4, Administrators, B-1 & B-2). 
LIFT buildings showed evidence for innovation and high utilisation by 
patients (Lead GPs B-1 & B-4). 
 
The overriding facilitative context was perceived to be the PCTs and 
LiftCo’s acknowledgment of the poor condition of primary care buildings 
and the need for improvement. This led PCT boards and managers to 
commit to having a continuous flow of LIFT projects in order to urgently 
deliver improved buildings. It also helped them to win the trust of the 
residents by demonstrating that the PCTs valued their wellbeing:  
“...the residents here strongly believe that we are short-changing them, 
and we cannot blame them for contemplating to leave the borough when 
the conditions of our GP surgeries are so poor. They feel undervalued by 
the responsible authorities.” (Clinical Governance Director, PCT-1, 
Interviewed)   
Most informants expressed that progress was achieved because there 
was relative stability at the LiftCo. They argued that having the same CEO 
in charge throughout LIFT projects enhanced value-for-money in 
procurement. It encouraged trust and collaborative relations between the 
PCTs, the LiftCo and centre administrators and care providers at LIFT 
183 
 
buildings. This allows the LiftCo to deliver services in a timely manner 
through projects that are planned ahead of demand. Collaborative 
relationship was particularly emphasised by the LiftCo representative who 
perceived it creating goodwill that reduces conflict in resolving problems in 
LIFT:    
“There is a good public relation between the LiftCo and PCTs. Shared 
interest for progress means that neither party is driven into situations that 
create conflict. LIFT contracts are specific on our expected deliverables 
and methods to resolve issues without resorting to invoking discretionary 
rights.” (LiftCo CEO, Interviewed) 
Another important facilitative context that was present is that the LiftCo is 
familiar with the local SSDPs that are the blueprints for LIFT buildings. 
Buildings were therefore delivered with reduced bureaucracy when they 
were needed. The GPs within the PCTs were perceived to value quality in 
service delivery. As a result, they were willing to take up leadership roles 
in developing LIFT schemes and to relocate to new premises, meaning 
that the quality of care was improved with minimum disruptions.  
Some PCT managers felt that the LiftCo increased flexibility in 
procurement by bringing in skills in sourcing the capital needed to 
complete projects. Some thought that the LiftCo was also willing to adapt 
LIFT buildings according to the requirements of the tenants. It was pointed 
out that when the LiftCo reimbursed its tenants for expenses they may 
have incurred through individual initiatives to fix problems at LIFT 
buildings, the tenants felt encouraged in maintaining quality at the 
buildings. Other important facilitative contexts reported included 
competitive contractors that made LIFT a step improvement in procuring 
quality buildings by reducing costs through innovation.  
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Places where LIFT buildings were erected were mentioned as a facilitative 
context. Proximity to public transport or being reached by walking or riding 
increased utilisation and also promoted physical activities for service-
users. LIFT buildings in regeneration zones tend to show higher utilisation 
by patients. 
3.2.1.1.4 Constraining contexts  
The findings about the contexts perceived to constrain LIFT mechanisms 
and outcomes are described in Table 3.8. The column on “Outcomes” 
shows the root themes on which corresponding contextual ideas about the 
constraints were coded in NVivo during data analysis. The column on 
“Context details” shows the researcher’s analyses of interview material 
showing how informants understood the conditions or environment 
(context) that constrained LIFT mechanisms in producing expected 
outcomes.  
Table 3.8: Contexts perceived to constrain LIFT mechanisms 
Outcomes Context details 
 
 
PCT capacities not 
improved 
  
PCTs were incapacitated by lack of discretion over critical LIFT 
processes (GP/Primary Care Coordinator PCT-1). 
LiftCo had more discretion and support of the SPB in LIFT than PCTs 
(Lead GP B-1, Administrator B-3). 
The LiftCo was small and cannot meet demand for improved GP 
surgeries through managing multiple projects (Lead GP B-1, Health, 
Risk and Safety Manager PCT-2). 
 
 
Reduced flexibility 
in LIFT activities  
PCTs had little latitude to adapt guidance for suitability to local 
situations (Strategy Director PCT-1, Commissioning Director PCT-1, 
& PCT-2). 
Creativity to join-up activities at LIFT buildings and PCT wide 
activities was limited by restrictions on using LIFT’s “enabling funds” 
(GP/Primary Care Coordinators PCT-1, PCT-2).    
 
Affordability and 
Cost of renting LIFT buildings was high because PCTs had no 
influence on level of borrowing by the LiftCo (Lead GP B-1, B-4, 
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Outcomes Context details 
sustainability of 
LIFT schemes 
Clinical Officer B-4). 
Cost of land reduced opportunities to innovate, expand or add 
amenities (e.g. parking for staff) at buildings (LiftCo Rep, Lead GP B-
4, Clinical Officer B-4). 
 
 
Questionable value-
for-money evidence 
Contractors lacked appropriate skills and experience in maintaining 
healthcare buildings (Administrators B-1, B-2 & B-3, Strategy Director 
PCT-1). 
Frequent rotation of contractors and delaying repairs failed to 
reconcile quality and rent at buildings (Administrators B-2 & B-3, 
Lead GP B-1). 
LiftCo had no dedicated maintenance staff to provide consistence in 
performance benchmarks (Estate & Facilities Director PCT-1).   
 
Asymmetric 
information on LIFT 
activities 
Tenants cannot assess their financial gains prior to joining LIFT 
because they do not know the pertinent details about the buildings 
more than the LiftCo does (GP B-2, Clinical Officer B-4). 
Exchange of LIFT ideas to benefit PCTs was hindered by centralised 
decision-making at SPB and DH (Strategy Director PCT-1, Corporate 
Director PCT-2, Lead GP B-1). 
 
Contestable 
governance 
PCTs always sought clearance for decisions from the DH or Treasury 
(Finance Director, PCT-2, Health, Risk and Safety Manager PCT-2). 
SPB prioritised LiftCo to PCT interests (Estates Director PCT-1, 
GP/Primary Care Coordinator PCT-1). 
 
 The behaviours of public sector officials and service contractors hired by 
the LiftCo were most often cited as constraining contexts. PCT managers 
argued that public sector departments, especially the DH and Treasury did 
not adequately decentralise decision-making responsibilities for important 
LIFT processes and functions to the PCTs. As a result, LIFT was perceived 
not to have increased the PCTs’ capacity to improve procurement of the 
desired buildings. Informants thought that progress was restricted by lack 
of discretion and contestable governance issues at PCT levels.   
Progress was also limited when DH officials interfered in local activities. 
Interference was perceived to restrict the activation of mechanisms 
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thought to produce desirable outcomes. One lead GP argued that the DH’s 
requirement for numerous additions to the process of procurement inflated 
the final costs for preparing tenders for their building: 
“...the LiftCo spent a lot of money to produce unnecessary volumes of 
tender documents. Too many consultants were engaged at the behest of 
the DH. ….they forced the LiftCo to gobble a lot of money on tenders 
alone.” (Lead GP, B-1, Interviewed) 
It was further pointed out that when information about critical 
developments in LIFT was inadequate, local staff would be ill-equipped to 
handle challenges imposed by inflexible guidance. GPs particularly found it 
difficult to see how they could financially gain from relocating to LIFT 
buildings because critical information about LIFT remained with the LiftCo 
or the Strategic Partnering Board (SPB), or the DH and Treasury. Such 
centralisation of information reflects the concern that LIFT was 
characterised by lack of open debate and staff hesitation in questioning 
some of its aspects. Commenting on LIFT’s strengths and weaknesses, a 
director at PCT-1 thought lack of openness in activities blocked staff in 
monitoring improvement processes: 
“Nobody wants to openly discuss or explain LIFT. It leaves people to 
familiarise themselves with it through reading rather than open debate. It 
is deliberate to withhold information because if we become more 
conversant, we may cause problems by asking many questions risking 
abandoning LIFT.” (GP/Primary Care Coordinator, PCT-1, Interviewed) 
Most informants felt achieving value-for-money in LIFT was constrained by 
using private contractors who often lacked experience and appropriate 
skills within healthcare. This affected their response to important 
maintenance jobs at the buildings. It reduced the quality at LIFT buildings 
causing tension between the LiftCo and tenants.     
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The underlying problems in LIFT may be public and private sector 
differences in approaches to deliver healthcare service. For example, 
while the DH (2001) sees LIFT as offering opportunity for independent GPs 
to operate at more permanent premises than before; the GPs themselves 
do not consider longer stay at LIFT buildings as a priority. They prefer 
short contracts to have the freedom in changing places if they feel demand 
for services at LIFT buildings is reduced. As a result, some GPs are 
unwilling to occupy LIFT buildings and how they make demands could be 
an important contextual factor for progress as explained by the lead GP at 
B-2:   
“GPs have almost a veto with regards to occupying LIFT buildings. The 
PCT can do nothing without our express consent. We forced the PCTs 
into offering GPs 5-year contracts at LIFT buildings when they wanted 
more. The PCT cannot dictate because they need our support for LIFT to 
succeed.” (Interviewed) 
Most informants believed that in the long-run, LIFT would be neither 
affordable nor sustainable. They argued that the cost of inner-city land 
was likely to force the LiftCo into borrowing expensively from private banks 
with the costs eventually being passed over to the PCTs through rent and 
other surcharges. Anticipated benefits from competition in financing LIFT 
buildings were missed because LIFT areas were geographical monopolies 
of the LiftCo. 
3.3 CMO configurations answering research question (iii)  
The evidence to answering research question (iii) was obtained through in-
depth interviews with informants directly involved and affected by 
executing LIFT schemes within their PCT areas. Among the facilitating 
contextual factors and mechanisms, they identified those they believed 
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facilitated them most in their activities. Some contextual factors and 
mechanisms were perceived as missing or operating to constrain them in 
achieving LIFT outcomes. Based on this, they rated how they perceived to 
have made progress in the PCT areas. 
The findings are presented subsections 3.3.1 to 3.3.5. Subsection 3.3.1 
presents what informants perceived to be the most influential mechanisms 
in LIFT. Indications about perceived influential contexts are presented in 
subsection 3.3.2. Subsection 3.3.3 presents the contexts, mechanisms 
and outcomes (CMO configurations) that informants did not identify as 
important. Subsection 3.3.4 presents how informants rated themselves on 
progress against LIFT outcomes in the case-study. Subsection 3.3.5 
presents what informants thought were emerging unexpected or unwanted 
CMO configurations due to LIFT. 
3.3.1 Perceived mechanisms that most influence LIFT outcomes 
The analyses identified mechanisms that informants thought helped them 
most to achieve LIFT outcomes whether at the PCTs, LiftCo and LIFT 
buildings. The mechanisms identified at each level of data collection are 
described in Table 3.9 below. 
3.3.1.1 Key Finding 3: While informants lacked consensus about 
most mechanisms, they perceived collaboration in activities between 
operational staff as the mechanism that helped them most to achieve LIFT 
outcomes.    
The primary finding here concern informants’ acknowledgement of LIFT as 
having mechanisms perceived to influence expected outcomes. But 
effectiveness of some of the mechanisms was contested. Informants 
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indicated the mechanisms that they perceived to be present or contestable 
yet important in influencing progress in LIFT as follows:  
Table 3.9: Mechanisms that most influence LIFT outcomes 
Analysis 
level   
Influential mechanisms on outcomes Status 
PCT level 
 
PCT Boards and managers were committed to LIFT 
procurement method (Strategy Director PCT-1, Estates and 
Facilities Director PCT-2). 
Present 
Local GPs collaborated by leading in coordinating delivery of 
individual buildings (Lead GP, B-2). 
Present 
PCTs were represented in LIFT boards to improve feedback 
and influenced LIFT procedures (LiftCo Rep, GP/Primary care 
coordinator PCT-1). 
Contested 
A single rather than multiple LiftCos developed familiarity with 
SSDPs and strengthened collaboration (LiftCo rep, Estates 
and Facilities Director PCT-1).  
Present 
PCTs had ready to implement SSDPs (Estates and Facilities 
Director PCT-1, Lead GP, B-1, LiftCo Rep). 
Contested 
LiftCo level 
 
LiftCo was resourceful to complete and maintain buildings 
(Lead GP B-4, LiftCo Rep). 
Present 
LiftCo collaborated in developing SSDPs and was familiar with 
PCT priorities (LiftCo Rep, Primary care and commissioning 
Director PCT-2). 
Present 
Contractors were skilled and hired in collaboration with 
tenants (LiftCo Rep, Lead GP, B-4, & Administrator B-3).  
Contested 
Flexibility in adapting buildings to tenant requirements was 
observed for continuity in services (clinical Officer B-4, LiftCo 
Rep, Administrator, B-3). 
Contested 
LIFT 
buildings 
 
Administrators shared experience with colleagues at different 
buildings within their PCT (Administrators B-1 & B-2). 
Present 
Trade-people at buildings provided better maintenance than 
government (LiftCo Rep, Administrator B-3, Lead GP, B-1). 
Contested 
Receptionists collaborated in processing patient appointments 
for other GPs (Administrators B-1 & B-2) 
Present 
 
Whether at the PCTs, LiftCo or LIFT buildings; collaboration in activities 
between PCT boards and management team members, LiftCo and PCT 
staff, and care providers and centre administrators was mentioned as the 
most influential mechanism. It increased quality and flexibility in LIFT 
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activities as well as scope within PCTs through sharing new ideas. 
Encouraging participants to engage and support each other was seen as 
important for maximising benefits from LIFT.  
Having a single rather than a series of LiftCos within PCTs was believed to 
enhance progress against outcomes. It helped in strengthening relations 
between PCT and LiftCo staff and the contractors because confusing 
diversity caused by a series of LiftCos is avoided. By participating in 
developing local SSDPs, the LiftCo developed familiarity with PCT priorities 
which enabled it to manage uncertainty in demand for buildings and to be 
flexible in adapting buildings according to needs of the tenants.   
PCT staff did not believe that having a ready-to-implement SSDP affected 
LIFT outcomes. They argued that they were expected to work on the basis 
of SSDPs whether or not implementing LIFT. But the LiftCo representative 
believed that having ready-to-implement SSDPs speeded up delivery of 
buildings. Whether or not the SSDPs were truly products of stakeholder 
engagement was not seen as an influential mechanism from the LiftCo’s 
perspective even though it was considered desirable at the PCTs.  
PCT staff contested the effectiveness of private sector skills and expertise. 
It was argued that most contractors lacked appropriate experience in 
health. As a result, they did not significantly help in solving problems 
associated with healthcare at LIFT buildings. Moreover, their technical 
skills were not perceived to be better than their public sector counterparts:   
“The LiftCo may be doing its best to hire competent tradesmen. But our 
position is that if the services were provided by government artisans, 
repairs would be done expertly and promptly to give us the comfort of 
knowing that those doing the jobs are skilled and familiar to our peculiar 
needs.” (Lead GP, B-1, Interviewed) 
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Staff at LIFT buildings contended that in the past, they received better 
maintenance outcomes from PCT trades-people compared to the present 
performance of LiftCo contractors.  
The LiftCo cited collaborative management of the supply chain to account 
for high quality of buildings yet staff at the PCTs and LIFT buildings thought 
otherwise. Prompt response to repairs or adaptations at the buildings was 
again perceived an absent yet important mechanism. The administrator at 
B-3 thought the LiftCo was lax at monitoring the contractors it used to 
keep buildings in useable condition:  
“Initially, the LiftCo was quite effective. (...) we are not sure whether 
they are complacent, but it is clear that our expectations on 
maintenance are not being met. Small jobs like lights or lock 
replacement are not promptly attended to at the buildings.” (Centre 
Administrator, B-3, Interviewed)   
Seconding PCT managers to the LiftCo board was intended to provide 
feedback and influence prioritisation of PCT interests in LIFT (DH/PfH 
2003). This mechanism is present but was contested by PCT staff. They 
argued that since their representatives were outnumbered by the private 
investors in the board, PCT interests were not prioritised. They wanted 
more managers to be seconded to the LiftCo board to increase technical 
scrutiny of LIFT decisions currently perceived to be favouring the LiftCo. 
3.3.2 Perceived contexts that most influence mechanisms and outcomes 
It is argued that programme mechanisms require specific contexts for 
them to produce the expected outcomes (Pawson 2006). In light of this, 
the analyses identified contexts that informants thought most helped LIFT 
mechanisms to produce the expected outcomes.             
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3.3.2.1 Key Finding 4: Although they lacked consensus, informants 
indicated that they wanted enhanced discretion in LIFT activities to 
progress. Stability at the LiftCo and GP willingness to take part  in LIFT 
were cited as influential contexts.  
The overriding finding is that informants expressed mixed perceptions 
about contextual factors perceived to influence LIFT outcomes. The 
contextual factors corresponding to main LIFT constituents and believed to 
be either present, or absent or contested yet important in influencing LIFT 
outcomes are presented in Table 3.10. The main LIFT constituents 
analysed are identified in the 1st column and the corresponding contextual 
factors are described in the 2nd column. The 3rd column indicates whether 
informants believed the context were present, absent, or contested. 
Table 3.10: Contexts that most influence mechanisms and outcomes 
Features 
analysed 
Influential contexts on mechanisms and outcomes Status 
SPB  SPB robustly enforced compliance with LIFT (LiftCo Rep, 
Strategy Director PCT-1 & Estates & Facilities Director PCT-
2). 
Present 
Discretion was encouraged in executing LIFT schemes 
(GP/Primary care coordinator & Finance Director PCT-1).  
Absent 
SPB enforced PCTs and LiftCo in meeting their obligations 
(LiftCo rep, PCT-1, PCT-2, Lead GP, B-1). 
Contested 
Technical support was provided where PCT capacity was low 
(LiftCo Rep, Primary care and Commissioning Director PCT-
2). 
Contested  
LiftCo LiftCo had positive and trusting relations with PCTs and 
tenants (LiftCo Rep, Estates and Facilities Director PCT-2, 
GP/Primary care coordinator PCT-1). 
Contested  
LiftCo promoted diversity in financiers, designers, and 
contractors (LiftCo Rep, Finance directors PCT-1 & PCT-2). 
Contested  
Innovation in procurement and management of buildings was 
prioritised (Lead GP, B-4, LiftCo Rep, Strategy Director PCT-
1). 
Contested 
The LiftCo’s size was ideal for averting bureaucracy (Estates 
and Facilities Director PCT-2). 
Present 
There is optimism about LiftCo’s commitment to LIFT goal Contested  
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Features 
analysed 
Influential contexts on mechanisms and outcomes Status 
(Administrator B-1, Clinical Officer B-4, & Administrator B-3). 
LiftCo mobilised capital requirements better than government 
(Estate and Facilities Director, PCT-1). 
Present  
Contractors were competitively hired based on their skills and 
competences (Lead GP, B-4, Strategy Director PCT-1). 
Absent  
Stability at LiftCo strengthened collaboration with the PCTs 
(LiftCo Rep, Strategy Director PCT-1). 
Present 
Learning from experiences and mistakes enabled improved 
practices (Lead GPs, B-1 & B-2). 
Absent 
LIFT buildings 
 
Cost of buildings made LIFT affordable and sustainable for 
PCTs (Clinical Officer B-4, Finance Director PCT-2). 
Absent 
Maintenance was standardised by channelling problems 
through centre administrators (Administrator B-2, LiftCo rep). 
Present 
Combined tenant meetings promoted collaborative problem 
solving at buildings (Administrator B-1, lead GP, B-1). 
Present 
Care 
providers   
Care providers valued improved facilities and are willing to 
use LIFT buildings (GP tenant B-2, Lead GP B-1). 
Present 
GPs recognised benefits from coordinating delivery of LIFT 
buildings (Lead GP, B-2, Strategy Director, PCT-1). 
Present 
Care providers had confidence with the LiftCo in addressing 
gaps in quality at buildings (Lead GP, B-1, Administrator B-3). 
Absent 
Participation at national or local LIFT conferences influenced 
GPs in prioritising innovation (Lead GP, B-2, LiftCo Rep). 
Present 
PCT boards  
 
Importance of improved buildings in meeting patient demands 
was recognised (Lead GPs B-1 & B-4, GP/Primary care 
coordinator PCT-1).  
Present 
PCTs evaluated options to procure buildings (Finance 
Director PCT-1, Estates and Facilities Director PCT-1) 
Absent 
A sense of owning LIFT increased PCT commitment 
(GP/Primary care coordinator PCT-1).  
Absent 
PCT boards supported adoption of LIFT in their areas 
(Strategy Director PCT-1, Primary care & commissioning 
Director PCT-2). 
Present  
Staff felt their contributions were valued (GP/Primary care 
coordinator PCT-1, Lead GP, B-1). 
Absent 
Diverse skills and experience of PCT staff were used to 
maximise benefits from LIFT (LiftCo Rep, Strategy Director 
PCT-1) 
Contested 
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There was mixed perception about influential contexts affecting the SPB. 
PCT staff contested favourability of a number of the contexts present. For 
example, they felt that the context provided by the SPB was not conducive 
for mutual respect of agreed upon roles between the PCTs and LiftCo. This 
is reflected by the SPB failing to provide adequate technical support 
needed to increase PCT capacity to monitor LiftCo activities. It was argued 
that giving the LiftCo more discretion over critical activities in LIFT 
compared to the PCTs prevented some mechanisms from facilitating 
progress. Further, robust enforcement of compliance with LIFT means the 
PCTs were not given enough time to evaluate the impact of changes in the 
ways the DH prefers to procure NHS buildings. It suggests that enforcing 
rigid guidance is no remedy in procurement.   
“We had no choice but to accede to LIFT since the DH would not fund any 
other route. If options were considered at DH, they were never 
communicated to us. We are unaware of criteria used to judge LIFT’s 
suitability for our needs.” (Finance Director, PCT-1, Interviewed) 
The frustration felt by PCT programme managers that their contributions in 
LIFT were never valued was more than matched by an anxiety from most 
managers that their diverse skills and experience were not tapped in 
translating LIFT guidance into practice. Yet these could have been useful 
in increasing LIFT’s effectiveness and improving relations with the SPB and 
LiftCo. Informants reiterated that progress in LIFT depended on 
collaboration in activities. This was achieved provided those involved in 
executing LIFT schemes show genuine commitment to LIFT objectives.   
Positive and trusting relations were mentioned as ideal contexts, yet were 
contested by some informants. For example, the LiftCo’s commitment to 
maintenance of buildings was questioned on grounds of using cheap 
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labour presumably to cut cost. Some informants believed the LiftCo was 
not innovative in delivering the buildings considering their frequent 
modification to meet tenant requirements. However, centre administrators 
remained optimistic that the LiftCo had the commitment to maintenance 
despite complaints about delays to some works. Estate and Facilities 
managers that are more involved in LIFT than others perceived the LiftCo’s 
size as an important context for progress as pointed out by the manager at 
PCT-2: 
“We tend to see advantages of having a small LiftCo. It is more efficient 
than bureaucratic structures of the government. Besides, the board is 
dynamic in terms of expertise and skills to protect us from problems of 
monitoring a bigger LiftCo.” (Estate & Facilities Director, PCT-2, 
Interviewed)  
PCT managers raised concerns about situations when they felt frustrated 
by lack of open debate on facilitative mechanisms. They preferred 
contexts that give security in openly debating or giving feedback on how 
LIFT procedures impact local activities. These important conditions were 
absent because of perceived politicisation of LIFT. Hence the feeling that 
staff contributions in improving LIFT were neither valued nor respected yet 
the LiftCo influenced a fair share of the outcomes.      
Most PCT staff thought private sector skills and expertise including 
experience in maintenance of healthcare buildings were important 
contexts for success but absent in practice. There was concern that 
contrary to official assumptions, service suppliers lacked appropriate skills 
and expertise.  This reduced progress in effectively substituting for poor 
value DH procurement and PCT performance. It may affect the residual 
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value of buildings leading to PCT staff concern that LIFT may not be a 
convincingly value-for-money procurement method:  
“...people hired by the LiftCo on short-term contracts have no health 
sector background. They have difficulties in connecting local health 
priorities to buildings designs without input from the PCTs yet they are 
more expensive than the government.” (Strategy Director, PCT-1, 
Interviewed) 
GPs expressed contrasting views that LiftCo contractors have an 
accumulation of skills and experience in project management. According 
to a lead GP at B-4, this helps the PCTs in benefiting from cost-effective 
procurement: 
“The LiftCo and its contractors have experience in delivering projects. It 
makes them to be more cost-effective in developing multiple projects at 
the same time without time overruns compared to the government.” 
(Interviewed)  
Other GPs thought simultaneous development of LIFT buildings and using 
DH grants to modernise private surgeries was a missing yet important 
context which could enhance PCT capacity through increasing the stock of 
appropriate buildings compared to using LIFT alone. Previously, the DH 
assisted GPs with grants to upgrade their buildings (DH 2001). Now the 
GPs are encouraged to use LIFT even though the LiftCo may lack capacity 
to meet demand within the PCTs:  
“Shortage of improved buildings has not been addressed because only 
four LIFT buildings have been completed within this PCT. There are sites 
that certainly require face-lifting and indications are that we need more 
upgraded premises.” (Lead GP, B-1, Interviewed) 
This clearly shows that GPs think LIFT may have neither increased 
investment nor addressed the problems of many wrong surgeries within 
their areas. It suggests that few gains may have been achieved from 
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substituting LIFT for DH grants in managing uncertainty of demand for 
buildings. 
3.3.3 CMO configurations perceived not important 
From the menu of CMO configurations emerging in data coding, the 
analyses identified those perceived not important by informants. Such 
CMO configurations may be prominent in the documents analysed and 
interview transcripts yet informants did not believe they added value in the 
case-study.  
3.3.3.1 Key Finding 5: PCT managers believed that some contexts, 
mechanisms and outcomes emphasized in LIFT duplicated existing 
practices within the PCTs.    
PCTs managers expressed that guidance that merely encouraged what 
they already practiced within their PCT areas added no value to their 
activities. They expected LIFT to introduce new ideas and opportunities 
rather than duplicating what they were already doing. Table 3.11 describes 
the CMOs that informants identified as not important to their activities in 
LIFT.  
The 1st column in the table indicates the outcomes emerging from data 
coding and the 2nd column explains what would influence the outcomes. 
The 3rd column shows the researcher’s analyses of ideas in the 
documents analysed and interview transcripts to identify whether the 
description details were perceived to be contexts or mechanisms. 
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Table 3.11: CMO configurations that informants believed not important 
Expected Outcome Description details Category  
PCTs will get support 
in developing SSDPs 
SPB facilitated exchange of ideas on LIFT. Context 
LIFT promoted sharing of essential procurement 
information within PCTs. 
Mechanism 
LiftCo knows and understands the priorities within 
PCTs. 
Context 
LiftCo used its skills to translate knowledge into 
written local SSDPs. 
Mechanism 
Increased community  
involvement in estate 
planning   
 
LIFT buildings were agreements of PCTs and 
LiftCo with their communities. 
Context 
Communities participate in LIFT to influence sites 
and designs of their buildings. 
Mechanism 
Increased efficiency 
in procurement   
 
LiftCo prioritises value-for-money strategies 
including competition in procurement. 
Mechanism 
Patient convenience is prioritised in locating 
buildings. 
Context 
LiftCo flexibility enables adaptation of buildings 
along tenant needs. 
Mechanism  
Procurement risks 
are transferred from 
PCTs to the LiftCo 
LiftCo manages uncertainty in demand for 
buildings.  
Mechanism 
Maintenance standards are met and measured to 
replace ineffective contractors.  
Mechanism 
LiftCo assumes risks 
in management of 
contractors 
Hiring contractors based on ability to manage 
risks increases efficiency. 
Mechanism 
Contractors have long-term contracts for 
consistence in standards within PCTs.  
Context 
 
Informants argued that they adopted LIFT in their areas because, like the 
officials, they recognised the importance of improved conditions of 
buildings to enhancing patient experience. But they were not convinced of 
the importance of the CMO configurations described in Table 3.11 to their 
effort in improving the condition of buildings. From the officials’ 
perspective, effective LIFT mechanisms and contexts involved, among 
other things, the SPB providing technical support to the PCTs, the LiftCo 
assuming procurement and management risks, and communities 
contributing in developing local SSDPs and influencing where to site the 
buildings.  
Yet most informants thought such CMO configurations neither brought 
additional benefits within PCTs nor improved individual performances in 
carrying out their responsibilities. They pointed out that prior to LIFT the 
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PCTs delivered buildings on basis of SSDPs that were always products of 
community engagement and public scrutiny in compliance with Planning 
Commission requirements (DH/PfH 2003). It was also argued that the PCTs 
were as interested as ever in modernising buildings but felt under funded 
by the DH. PCT staff suggested that like the LiftCo the PCTs had always 
hired and managed relevant contractors at primary care buildings where 
they lacked appropriate skills. For these reasons the informants 
considered the CMO configurations described in Table 3.11 to be 
unimportant because they had always been integral to PCT activities 
through existing PCT Boards and managers. Some still existed within PCTs 
with or without LIFT.  
For example, Estate and Facilities departments still coordinated 
development of SSDPs, and delivery and maintenance of buildings. While 
the LiftCo is acknowledged for sourcing finance that the DH fails to provide 
for buildings, in other roles, together with the SPB they are perceived to 
duplicate some functions that still existed within PCTs. The duplications 
risked increasing cost compared to investing in mechanisms that 
increased capacity to influence stronger collaboration between care 
providers under PCT leadership. 
3.3.4 Perceived progress against LIFT outcomes   
In line with research question (iii), the influence of the perceived facilitating 
and constraining factors was cross-checked by analysing informants’ 
rating of the achievement of expected outcomes in their PCT areas.  
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3.3.4.1 Key Finding 6: Informants indicated that to some extent they 
achieved improvements in the quality of buildings, value-for-money and 
risk management in procurement, and diversity in ownership of buildings 
and integration of care within the PCTs.    
Informants indicated the outcomes which they agreed on or contested 
about in rating the achievements. The lack of agreement on some 
perceived achievements may be a result of informants facing challenges in 
assessing their progress due to changes in socio-economic factors 
surrounding LIFT. PCTs managers felt that more progress could have been 
achieved if they were given more discretion in LIFT activities. Among other 
things, they wanted freedom to use other procurement methods where 
these were superior to LIFT, freedom to influence choice of contractors 
hired by the LiftCo, freedom in using funds set aside to assist GPs in 
relocating to LIFT premises and to link activities at LIFT buildings with other 
PCT programmes. In Table 3.12, the column on “Status” indicates whether 
informants had agreement or contestation on perceived progress 
corresponding to the expected outcomes.  
Table 3.12: Perceived progress against expected outcomes 
Expected 
Outcome 
Perceptions of progress Status 
Improved quality 
of buildings 
 
 
Buildings were designed to fit their purpose better  
than pre-existing surgeries (Lead GPs B-1 & B-4) 
Agreed 
Buildings were conveniently located nearer patient 
homes (Administrator, B-1) 
Agreed  
Buildings were maintained better than before (Clinical 
Officer B-4, Estates & Facilities Director PCT-2) 
Contested 
Buildings accommodated more patients without 
problems of overcrowding (Lead GPs B-2 & B-4) 
Agreed 
Increased value-
for-money in 
procurement   
Efficiency was prioritised to reduce construction and 
maintenance costs (LiftCo Rep, Communication 
Director PCT-2) 
Agreed  
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Expected 
Outcome 
Perceptions of progress Status 
LIFT procedures consumed staff time by including 
activities of little relevance to solving PCT problems 
(GP/Primary Care Coordinators PCT-1)  
Contested  
Being fixated on efficiency compromised quality by the 
LiftCo (Administrator B-3, Estates Director PCT-1, 
Lead GP, B-1) 
Contested  
Improved risk 
management 
 
 
Partners respected their share of agreed upon risks 
(LiftCo Rep)  
Contested 
LiftCo provided capital for desired buildings in the 
absence of government funding (LiftCo Rep, Estate 
Director PCT-1) 
Agreed 
Risk of demand for buildings was transferred from 
PCTs to the LiftCo (LIFT Rep, Finance Director PCT-2) 
Contested 
Risk of residual value of buildings was retained by the 
LiftCo (LIFT Rep, Estate and Facilities Director PCT-1 
& PCT-2)  
Contested 
Increased stock 
and diversity in 
ownership of 
buildings 
 
LiftCo has addressed contents in the agreed SSDPs 
(LIFT Rep, Lead GP B-1, Strategy Director PCT-1) 
Agreed 
LIFT encouraged competition in delivery and 
maintenance of buildings (Administrator B-1, LIFT 
Rep) 
Contested 
LIFT does not determine investment needed to 
increase PCT capacity. It only finances PCT 
investment (Finance Director PCT-2). 
Agreed 
Integration of care 
within PCTs   
 
 
More GPs are willing to operate at LIFT buildings 
(Finance Directors PCT-1 & PCT-2) 
Contested 
LIFT buildings offer a range of curative and health 
promotion services (Lead GPs B-1, B-2 & B-4) 
Agreed 
Centre administrators relieved GPs of administrative 
duties (Administrators B-1 & B-2, Lead GP B-2) 
Agreed 
LIFT has not enhanced integration of activities within 
PCTs (Strategy Director PCT-1) 
Agreed 
 
Informants agreed about progress made in improving conditions at primary 
care buildings. Most felt that LIFT buildings were appropriately designed 
for their purpose and also conveniently located for patients in line with 
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their preferences expressed in Our Health, Our Care, Our Say (DH 2006b).  
Having bigger buildings promoted increased utilisation by patients without 
the problems of overcrowding. But the quality of maintenance at LIFT 
buildings was contested. High frequency modifications and lack of prompt 
response to repair jobs were cited as indicators of contestable quality.   
Although informants agreed about LIFT prioritising efficiency to increase 
value-for-money in delivery and management of buildings, they thought 
some mechanisms used constrained progress. It was argued that being 
fixated on efficiency drove the LiftCo to reduce the quality of construction 
and maintenance inputs. This in turn risked reducing the residual value of 
LIFT buildings. PCT staff further felt that they lost valuable time and 
resources on LIFT procedures of little relevance to solving problems in 
discharging their responsibilities. If these costs are factored and 
considered side-by-side with sustainability vis-à-vis lengths of LIFT 
contracts, progress could be less: 
“(...)...it is unsustainable that this building cost more than £2m per year. 
Twelve percent fixed rent plus 6% for hard furniture make the interest 
rates higher than for ordinary mortgage. In 25 years we could develop 10 
similar buildings from the interest alone.” (Lead GP, B-1, Interviewed) 
Some informants advised against rating progress merely on whether LIFT 
increased efficiency as this failed to account for adverse effects of some 
mechanisms.  
PCT staff believed that progress in risk management was achieved only 
when the LiftCo was able to mobilise capital needed to deliver buildings in 
the absence of DH funding. They were concerned that the LiftCo often 
failed to respect its share of agreed upon risks indirectly forcing PCTs into 
self-help activities for continuity of services at LIFT buildings. Furthermore, 
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the PCTs and not the LiftCo retained risk of demand for buildings. Others 
contested that at the end of LIFT contracts, PCTs risked inheriting buildings 
with reduced useful lives given the frequency of repairs that they currently 
experience.    
Most informants contested the outcome of LIFT increasing the stock of 
upgraded buildings within PCTs. They argued that investment decisions 
were made by the PCTs with the LiftCo invited only to finance them. There 
was agreement that the LiftCo addressed most contents of the agreed 
SSDPs. But the number of new or upgraded buildings was perceived 
inadequate to satisfy demand within the PCTs. This suggests that the 
LiftCo has not been effective in increasing PCT capacities by helping to 
update the SSDPs as expected. The fact that the PCTs were geographical 
monopolies of a single LiftCo meant that anticipated competition in 
procurement of the buildings did not exist and PCTs missed on the benefits 
expected from competition.   
Regarding integration of services, most informants agreed that LIFT 
buildings offered a range of care and health promotion services. Operating 
under-one-roof was perceived to reduce administrative overheads as 
pointed out by the finance director at PCT-1: 
“...Rather than paying for different activities scattered all over the Trust, 
overheads are reduced because the PCT focuses at central premises 
occupied by multiple providers.” (Interviewed)  
The presence of centre administrators meant that GPs were relieved of 
administrative duties to focus on patient care. PCT managers agreed 
about a negative outcome that activities of GPs based at same LIFT 
buildings were neither linked to each other nor joined up with PCT initiated 
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programmes. Some GPs contested the expected outcome that LIFT would 
encourage more care providers to operate under one roof at LIFT 
buildings. They argued that rent charges and oblique financial gains 
presented challenges in convincing GPs owning their own buildings to 
prefer LIFT buildings.   
Overall, informants thought some limitations on progress were explained 
by their initial inexperience of LIFT. Progress against the more challenging 
outcomes increased due to new schemes using experience or lessons 
learnt from older schemes.  
3.3.5 Other emerging CMO configurations due to LIFT 
Further evidence for research question (iii) was obtained by analysis of 
other contexts, mechanisms and outcomes perceived to emerge within the 
PCTs as a result of using LIFT procurement. Realist evaluation (RE) 
principles have the advantage of giving informants opportunity to highlight 
some CMO configurations whose effects within a programme may not be 
otherwise known or expected (Pawson 2006).  
3.3.5.1 Key Finding 7: Informants pointed out that using LIFT 
procurement produced other positive and negative contexts, mechanisms 
and outcomes that the DH officials did not foresee in designing LIFT.     
The findings about CMO configurations perceived to emerge within the 
case-study are summarised in Table 3.13. The first column describes what 
informants perceived to be the outcomes emerging within their PCT areas. 
The column on “Mechanisms” shows the positive (P) or negative (N) ways 
through which the outcomes were perceived to be produced. The positive 
and negative prevailing conditions for the outcomes are shown in the 
“Contexts” column.    
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Table 3.13: Other emerging CMO configurations due to LIFT 
Emerging 
Outcome 
Mechanisms Contexts 
GPs gain influence 
in strategic services 
planning    
P - Independent GPs coordinate 
delivery of buildings (Estate & 
Facilities Director, PCT-1). 
P - GPs are trusted to use their 
experience to improve 
buildings (LiftCo Rep). 
P - GPs gain knowledge about 
governance of buildings (GP B-
2). 
P - Lead GPs’ role is valued 
within PCTs (Finance Director 
PCT-2, LiftCo Rep). 
Increased expertise 
exchange between 
public and private 
sectors 
N – Government interference in 
LIFT fuel staff resignations 
(Lead GP B-1). 
N – Staff believe they are not 
valued and seek opportunities 
elsewhere (Lead GP B-1). 
P - Managers bring experience 
of LIFT from non-health sectors 
into PCTs (Estate & Facilities 
Director PCT-1, LiftCo Rep). 
P - Partners use different 
experienced professionals 
(LiftCo Rep, Estate & Facilities 
Director PCT-2).  
Some PCT staff are 
affected by conflict 
of interest in their 
roles 
N – PCT managers are 
appointed to LiftCo board. 
(GP/Primary Care Coordinator 
PCT-1). 
N – PCT representatives are 
outnumbered by private 
investors in the board 
(GP/Primary Care Coordinator 
PCT-2). 
Parallel programs 
are increased within 
PCTs 
N - GPs at LIFT buildings retain 
individual independence (Lead 
GPs B-2 & B-4).  
N - GPs don’t value joint 
working and sharing of 
practices (Risk, Health & 
Safety Director PCT-2). 
N - Restrictions on “enabling 
funds” prevent linking activities 
at LIFT buildings with other PCT 
programmes  (Finance Director 
PCT-1) 
N - Providing seamless 
services within PCTs is not 
prioritised for funding by the 
DH (GP/Primary Care 
Coordinator PCT-1).  
Service continuity at 
sites is achieved   
P - Disruptions caused by 
frequent search for buildings are 
reduced (Administrator B-1). 
P - LiftCo has less perverse 
incentives than private 
landlords (LiftCo Rep).  
 
On the positive side, it was indicated that LIFT increased independent GPs’ 
involvement in influencing strategic planning and delivery of buildings 
within their PCTs. The GPs were given leadership in coordinating delivery 
of individual LIFT buildings as agents of the PCTs and in consultation with 
prospective tenants meaning they were increasingly collaborating with 
PCTs in improving conditions at publicly used buildings. According to the 
lead GPs, their effort in modernising healthcare buildings through LIFT 
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gave them local, national and international recognition. For example, two 
LIFT buildings within the case-study attracted national and international 
visitors in recognition of showcasing innovation. Such outcomes reinforced 
GP commitment to working with the PCTs more than before.   
Another positive outcome was that GPs and centre administrators believed 
LIFT ensured continuity of activities at permanent sites. This reduced 
disruptions caused by frequent relocations when care providers searched 
for appropriate buildings needed to meet increased demand caused by 
population growth within their PCTs. LIFT gave them opportunity to plan for 
the long-term without having to worry about adequacy of space or 
suitability of their buildings. This happened because the LiftCo was 
perceived to have less perverse incentives than private landlords in 
managing buildings.   
The outcome concerning increased movement of expertise between the 
public and private sector was mentioned as having both positive and 
negative effects. On the negative side, concern was raised that 
frustrations encountered at government departments with strategic role in 
LIFT may be influencing increased loss of skilled and experienced public 
sector workers through resignation of posts to seek opportunities 
elsewhere:  
“Frustrated government workers may be resigning their posts where they 
feel not valued. Some end up investing in LIFT connected companies and 
run it from the private sector side because it is not clear who buys private 
equity in the LiftCo.” (Lead GP, B-1, Interviewed) 
The opinion may not be backed with strong evidence. However, it 
suggests that LIFT could be generating mistrust within PCTs especially in 
context of lack of clarity about people that are eligible for private equity in 
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the LiftCo. Public sector workers’ feelings of not being valued may be due 
to factors other than LIFT. Loss of experience at departments with strategic 
roles in LIFT may impact progress within PCTs and private companies may 
also profit from employing senior health workers leaving DH employment.     
On the positive side, movement of expertise was seen as opportunity for 
the PCTs and LiftCo to recruit staff and contractors with LIFT experience 
from outside the health system. Their experience helped to influence PCTs 
in making progress against LIFT objectives. For example, one manager at 
PCT-1 had coordinated LIFT projects that delivered Sure Start Children’s 
Centres. Another at PCT-2 had accumulated experience in managing 
Housing Association projects that mimic LIFT. The two were convinced 
that their experiences put them in good stead to influence progress within 
their PCTs.  
PCT staff raised concern that seconding some managers to the LiftCo 
board had a negative effect of creating conflict of interest in their roles. 
The managers were torn between satisfying the interests of private equity 
holders in the LiftCo and protecting PCT interests. This risked damaging 
trust that is essential in fostering teamwork between PCT staff:  
“...people seconded to LiftCo boards don’t seem to give us technical help 
to objectively scrutinise LIFT activities. Our managers are not actively 
involved in the delivery of buildings since the LiftCo got operational” (GP / 
Primary Care Coordinator, PCT-1, Interviewed).  
Conflict of interest came about because of the negative context that PCT 
representatives in the LiftCo board were outnumbered by private equity 
holders. Their contributions and measures to protect PCT interests may be 
outvoted, meaning their inability to influence board decisions exacerbated 
negative outcomes. Hence concern that PCTs were forced to rubber stamp 
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board decisions that failed to consider their local priorities. PCT staff still 
valued being represented in the LiftCo board provided their number was 
increased in order to effectively influence critical decisions.  
Some PCT managers were concerned that bringing care providers to 
operate under one roof failed to translate into seamless caring for patients 
as had been hoped. GPs at LIFT buildings still worked independently and 
showed little interest in integrating their services. Parallel activities 
therefore existed at LIFT buildings and within the PCTs.  Managers were 
unable to use the funds set aside for relocating GPs in linking up LIFT 
based activities to those outside. On their own, providers using LIFT 
buildings lacked incentive in integrating their services.     
Whereas the LiftCo tended to disclose more positive than negative 
emerging CMO configurations, informants at the PCTs and those at LIFT 
buildings emphasized the negative more than the positive. Overall, 
analyses of the findings suggested that the LiftCo was risk averse and 
lacked promptness in attending to maintenance jobs. Neither was it ready 
to reimburse the PCTs for maintenance expenses incurred if the LiftCo 
delayed attending to requests at the buildings. This is likely linked to the 
necessity to prioritise shareholder value.  
Another unexpected finding was the view that LIFT was implemented in the 
context of different cultural values between PCT staff and the LiftCo and its 
contractors. Some PCT staff divided opinion about the emerging CMO 
configurations by believing that their colleagues were unrealistically 
negative about LIFT under prevailing economic conditions. This may 
suggest differences in their views driven by evolving contexts and 
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mechanisms upon how PCT functions could be delivered. Yet 
convergence in values was expected in order for LIFT to deliver the 
desired outcomes.    
3.4 Findings from the tours of LIFT buildings 
Tours of buildings were organised because service areas were not 
specifically discussed in the interviews yet their quality can be considered 
a useful indicator of improvements in condition of buildings. The 
researcher’s assessment of, inter alia, the buildings’ fitness for purpose, 
accessibility by patients, patient comfort and safety, and show of 
innovation was compared with informants’ ratings of progress against 
quality outcomes. 
3.4.1 Key Finding 8: The conditions at LIFT buildings were sufficient to 
promote continuity in care providers’ activities. They appeared to support 
informant perceptions that the quality of LIFT buildings was significantly 
better than pre-existing ones.      
Although informants raised the concern that conditions at the buildings 
were affected by the LiftCo not promptly responding to maintenance 
requests, they did not perceive this as causing non availability of essential 
facilities for use by the care providers. Findings on status of the essential 
service areas that were observed are presented in Table 3.14 below. The 
1st column shows the service areas that were analysed. The 2nd column on 
“Main findings” shows the researcher’s interpretation of the corresponding 
conditions. The 3rd column indicates the individual buildings affected by 
the respective findings.  
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Table 3.14: Observations on essential service areas 
Service area Main findings Buildings affected 
External Access for patients using wheelchairs and 
pushchairs was provided. 
B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4 
External painting was required at one building. B-3 
Receptions  Receptions were manned and prioritised patient 
privacy and staff security. 
B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4 
Waiting area 
 
 
There were sufficient seats and space for 
wheelchairs and pushchairs. 
B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4 
GP stations were signposted and facilitated 
patient circulation. 
B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4 
Toilets and refreshment areas were accessed by 
people with disability.  
B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4 
Treatment 
rooms 
GPs had separate consultation rooms accessed 
by patients including those with disabilities. 
B-1, B-2, B-4 
Rooms had sufficient lighting, heating and 
cooling. 
B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4 
Security 
 
 
Where needed, lockers for patients’ personal 
possessions were provided. 
B-4 
Rooms had appropriate locks and lockers for 
hazardous substances used at the buildings. 
B-2, B-3, B-4 
Staff facilities 
 
 
Staff are provided with sufficient working space 
and refreshment facilities jointly used with 
patients.  
B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4 
Premises lacked sufficient parking space and 
social amenities (e.g. prayer rooms) for staff.       
None 
Buildings’ 
comfort  
Buildings showed innovation and cleanliness. B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4 
Buildings display energy performance 
certificates.  
B-2, B-4 
Analysis at the level of the service areas rather than at the level of the 
whole building helped in unpicking the impact of LIFT on the condition of 
buildings as opposed to the effect of circumstances unconnected to LIFT. 
For example, where faults are not reported on time, poor conditions may 
reflect tenants’ performance as opposed to the LiftCo that repairs them 
upon being informed on time.   
The primary beneficiaries of LIFT (PCT staff and GPs) endorsed LIFT for 
delivering improvements in standards and quality of primary care 
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buildings. Although no comparable government buildings were toured to 
confirm their views, they believed LIFT buildings were better than pre-
existing ones as indicated by the lead GP at B-1:  
“…the buildings that we used before LIFT were of poor quality in all 
respects. LIFT certainly provides buildings that are of better quality.” 
(Interviewed)  
Although external paintwork and repairs to a non-functional entrance were 
required at one building (B-3), conditions at all the buildings were sufficient 
to promote continuity in provider activities.  
While the LIFT buildings toured in the course of the research were large, it 
was not possible to conclusively judge whether they were able to 
accommodate heavy flows of patients without congestion problems. This 
is because tours were organised outside the busiest times in order to 
enable GPs and administrators to take part in research interviews. The 
GPs indicated that the buildings had capacity to handle increased volumes 
of patients. 
Security was generally good except at B-1 where one consultation room 
had the problem of a broken down lock. The affected GP raised concern 
about security of his tools of trade. He took initiative to personally replace 
the lock but not with the expected professionalism. Building B-4 prioritised 
security of patient personal possessions by providing lockers needed by 
maternity patients.   
The buildings provided parking facilities for staff but not for patients. The 
GPs and centre administrators felt that parking spaces for staff were 
inadequate for their numbers. This was reported to cause inconveniences 
such as staff being late for work or leaving early to avoid parking fines 
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when using public spaces. Lack of parking space for patients was not 
seen as a major inconvenience because LIFT buildings are well serviced 
with public transport. Some are located within residential areas for easy 
access by walking or riding which also promote physical activity. Centre 
administrators raised concern about the LiftCo’s delay in attending to 
repairs at the buildings. At B-3, repainting had not been done despite 
request made four months before the tours. The same building’s main 
entrance was not working at the time of the tour. The lack of urgency in 
attending to repairs and the LiftCo’s perceived tendency to hire cheap 
labour in maintenance was reported to reduce quality at the buildings as 
pointed out by the administrator at B-3:  
“The LiftCo is not prompt to our distress calls for repairs and compromises 
itself by hiring cheap labour to further affect quality. We are talking of 
simple maintenance that the LiftCo is failing to provide yet they are 
supposed to be specialists in estate management.” (Interviewed) 
Such concerns potentially caused tension between tenants and the LiftCo. 
Prolonged delays pushed the tenants into doing the jobs to keep the 
buildings useable despite being concerned that the LiftCo takes long to 
reimburse them. At B-3, no energy performance certificates were 
displayed as required. The administrator explained that:  
“The performance reports are not displayed because they have not been 
provided despite us paying the LiftCo every month. We have never seen 
the actual bills for us to monitor how this building performs for water, gas 
and electricity consumptions.” (B-3 Administrator, Interviewed)  
All the buildings lacked dedicated socialisation facilities such as prayer 
rooms. It forced staff to use either unoccupied rooms or neighbouring 
buildings for prayers. But service delivery at the buildings had not been 
disrupted by lack of maintenance. That building B-3 required repainting 
soon after opening may indicate poor initial work by the contractors.  
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SECTION 4: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS 
This research explored with people directly operationalizing LIFT schemes 
their perceptions of why LIFT produced outcomes that they experienced. 
Evaluating activities around the planning and execution of LIFT schemes 
was hoped to give staff at the operational level opportunity to shed light on 
how LIFT contexts and mechanisms facilitated or impeded their efforts. It 
was anticipated that the findings would then influence DH officials in 
improving LIFT guidance, and help the case-studied PCTs to improve their 
practice. Other PCTs wishing to adopt LIFT could draw lessons from the 
case-study in order to execute successful schemes.  
4.0 Research questions alignment with Analytic Categories  
The research sought to address these questions: 
(i) What did DH officials perceive were the contexts and 
mechanisms for effectiveness in LIFT and who were expected to 
benefit from its outcomes?  
(ii) What factors were perceived to facilitate staff directly 
operationalizing LIFT schemes in discharging their 
responsibilities? 
(iii) What factors did operational staff perceive might influence or 
help them in progressing against LIFT’s expected outcomes? 
(iv) What lessons can be learnt from the case-study experiences to 
better explain and understand LIFT for the benefit of future 
schemes and other PCTs?   
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The research questions were to a large extent answered by the findings so 
far presented. This was achieved through reconciling documentary 
evidence, interview transcripts and observations at LIFT buildings. The 
central finding was that informants within the case-study were not 
convinced about LIFT’s effectiveness in helping them to solve problems in 
procuring healthcare buildings under conventional method. They 
contested LIFT’s ability on grounds of mechanisms and contexts perceived 
to facilitate while others were barriers to progress. Informants believed that 
inability in helping them was compounded by perceived lack of enhanced 
discretion in LIFT activities. This prevented them from adapting some LIFT 
guidance to circumstances within their PCTs. The pertinent findings 
aligned with research questions and data collection methods were 
presented in Section 3.  
In this section (Section 4), the findings are integrated to develop a holistic 
explanation of LIFT. The section analyses and interprets the emerging 
themes to get possible answers to the research questions. To this end, the 
findings are organised along analytic categories aligned with the research 
questions as follows: 
(a) Reconciling DH officials and operational staff perceptions to 
LIFT’s helpful mechanisms, contexts and outcomes (CMO 
configurations) and intended beneficiaries (Research question 
(i) and (ii)) 
(b) Perceptions about factors that facilitate or constrain progress 
against LIFT outcomes (Research questions (ii) and (iii))  
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(c) Perceptions about factors most influential or helpful on staff 
activities in LIFT (Research questions (ii) and (iii)) 
(d) Lessons learnt from the case-study in explaining and 
understanding LIFT (Research question (iv)). 
This synthesis analyses and interprets perspectives of the different 
categories of informants from whom information was obtained. The 
objective is to understand any similarities and differences in what they 
meant in the key findings.  For example, estate and facilities managers’ 
perception of LIFT may be compared against those of the lead GPs or 
building administrators.  
How the findings on the research questions relate to each other is also 
analysed. This enables the researcher to reconstruct a complete picture of 
LIFT as understood at least in the case-study. The synthesis concludes by 
revising the middle range theory that the researcher developed at the 
beginning of the research to incorporate the emerging ideas and lessons 
learnt from the case-study. This is consistent with analytic category (d) and 
answers to the fourth research question.  
4.1 Analytic category (a): Reconciling DH officials and informant 
perceptions of helpful CMO configurations in LIFT 
 
The findings being interpreted under this analytic category were derived 
from information answering research question (i) and part of research 
question (ii). Research question (i) sought to understand what the DH 
officials thought were the contexts and mechanisms that would make LIFT 
effective if the intended beneficiaries comply. Part of research question (ii) 
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attempted at determining informants’ views regarding whether LIFT 
guidance considered their role in facilitating the expected outcomes.   
It was found out that aside from the PCTs, LIFT was designed to benefit a 
range of other participants in NHS activities. From the DH officials’ 
perspective, the guidance was expected to encourage other players to 
involve themselves in procurement of healthcare buildings within their PCT 
areas. The main players expected to benefit from LIFT are: primary care 
providers; investors in the LiftCo; building contractors; and service-
suppliers at LIFT buildings. Previously, these players had roles in NHS 
activities but not in the procurement of buildings for the PCTs. Thus, LIFT 
could be interpreted as the DH decentralization of aspects in procurement 
of buildings from PCTs to primary care providers and private contractors 
led by the LiftCo and coordinated by the PCTs.  
This development may explain why most informants thought that LIFT was 
a drastic change in procurement arrangements. They believed it was 
conceived by DH officials with neither consultation nor their input despite 
them being the ones affected by the guidance. A GP/Primary care 
coordinator at PCT-1 argued that:  
“LIFT is an edict from the government. It was pushed on us and no one 
within the PCT understands how such a drastic change in approach to 
procure public buildings through private providers should work.” 
(Interviewed) 
Perceiving LIFT as an imposition by the DH may be a major impediment on 
progress. Fitzsimmons et al (2009) argue that PCT managers may not be 
connecting with LIFT because they feel excluded at its conception. 
Similarly, Beck et al (2009) associate perceived imposition with reduced 
motivation among PCT managers in acquiring skills needed in dealing with 
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challenges encountered in implementing LIFT. The DH officials had hoped 
that LIFT guidance would help PCT staff by providing contexts and 
mechanisms for using new skills and expertise of the LiftCo. They 
anticipated that the PCTs would benefit from efficiency generated by 
competition in procurement. This would translate into them getting 
affordable buildings that increase their capacity in service delivery.  
But what the DH officials anticipated from LIFT does not appear to 
reconcile with perceptions held about influence of the guidance and who 
may be benefiting from them. PCT managers believed that through their 
skills and experience, they could have improved procurement of buildings 
without the DH having to recommend LIFT. In their view, they had similar 
skills to those of the private contractors. Further, they believed that their 
better experience in managing healthcare functions might give them an 
edge over the LiftCo. Thus, the managers and involved GPs are not 
convinced that LIFT promotes efficiency in order to deliver affordable 
buildings. Neither does LIFT increase their capacity in procurement 
because the way it was designed impinges progress through restricting 
competition in procurement activities. It appears that PCT managers 
believe anticipated benefits in LIFT could be achieved provided DH officials 
prioritised them retaining leadership roles, and allowing them power and 
authority to influence the LiftCo’s activities. At present, the LiftCo is 
perceived as having power to exert control over LIFT activities. This is 
because controlling equity in the LiftCo is reserved for private investors.  
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4.2 Analytic category (b): Informant perceptions about factors that 
facilitate or constrain progress against LIFT outcomes 
 
The findings were derived from information to answer research questions 
(ii) and (iii). Research question (ii) sought to understand informant 
perceptions of factors that facilitated or constrained them in LIFT activities 
whereas research question (iii) required them to distinguish those 
perceived as most influential on staff activities. Informants used their 
actual experience to indicate which and how LIFT contexts and 
mechanisms influenced them in making progress within their PCT areas. 
These findings may help the researcher in developing a holistic 
understanding of helpful factors in LIFT since they are based on the views 
of people actually involved in its implementation.    
Most informants in this case-study believed that they experienced positive 
and negative effects on their activities. They indicated that LIFT had 
facilitating and constraining contexts, and facilitating and constraining 
mechanisms. This may be explained by possible variation in either 
contextual factors surrounding LIFT activities or mechanisms through 
which the activities are carried out. Pawson (2006) and Marchal et al 
(2010) explain that changes in any programme contexts and mechanisms 
may either facilitate or constrain operational staff in their activities.  
Informants indicated that facilitating factors included their PCT boards’ 
commitment to using LIFT procurement, and GP willingness to take part in 
LIFT whether as coordinators in delivery of individual buildings or through 
using the buildings. On the surface, it appears these factors would 
facilitate staff activities. But this may not influence progress unless PCT 
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staff actually show personal commitment, skills, and competence in 
handling constraining factors in LIFT. For example, their approach to 
dealing with perceived inflexible LIFT guidance under conditions of 
restricted discretion over key processes may determine success more 
than commitment of PCT boards and GPs’ willingness to take part. The 
estate and facilities manager at PCT-1 reflected this view when he argued 
that: 
“LIFT guidance gives the impression that involvement of GPs facilitates 
our activities yet not. Success is a result of our own initiatives than 
guidance by DH that prioritise LiftCo discretion and not our inputs in 
LIFT.” (Estate and Facilities manager, PCT-1, Interviewed) 
This idea further suggests that PCT managers perceive not being 
consulted in some LIFT activities and their lack of discretion as barriers to 
progress. But this may be a temporary constraint because they also 
reported using their experience to circumvent problems in LIFT. This may 
explain why some of them thought the constraints to progress in LIFT were 
not insurmountable. They indicated that LIFT outcomes envisaged by the 
DH officials were generally achieved within their PCT areas mainly 
because of their determination to succeed. This suggests that PCT 
managers may have now accepted LIFT and understand how using their 
experience helps in reducing the impact of constraining factors on their 
activities. 
The majority of informants in this case-study indicated that LIFT delivered 
buildings that were of better quality than the pre-existing ones procured 
through conventional route. But they expressed reservations about some 
of the contexts and mechanisms through which this success was 
achieved. They felt that the process to deliver LIFT buildings did not 
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sufficiently involve them in the practical aspects of procurement. 
Consequently, there was the perception that LIFT neither empowered them 
in decision-making nor increased their capacity in improving future 
procurement within their PCT areas.  
The essence of an effective decentralization strategy is its ability in giving 
local staff a sense of ownership of decisions and increasing their capacity 
in activities to deliver the decentralize functions (Peckham et al 2005). In 
this case-study, lack of these elements was perceived to restrict progress. 
It could be that PCT staff and GPs at LIFT buildings may be reflecting on 
their experiences to realise that some contexts and mechanisms 
envisaged by DH officials through LIFT guidance may be ineffective at 
facilitating their activities. This reality may have afforded the opportunity 
for them in being more critical of using LIFT. They now know what could 
have been done better, with what mechanisms, and under what contexts 
to improve their buildings.  
In summary, two issues concerning involvement and engagement of local 
staff in LIFT’s strategic decisions emerged as key factors facilitating or 
restricting progress against expected outcomes. Involving and engaging 
management staff was perceived to motivate them in acquiring skills for 
handling challenges in procurement of buildings. At the same time, it may 
reinforce commitment to using LIFT. When neither consulted nor engaged, 
PCT managers particularly felt not being valued. Hence the belief that the 
DH officials viewed them as recipients rather than as participants in 
shaping strategic decisions within their own PCT areas. This may cause 
tension between PCT managers and Strategic Partnering Boards (SPBs) 
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recommended by DH officials to influence LIFT activities on behalf of the 
PCTs. Allowing PCT managers to influence strategic decisions may help in 
nurturing a sense of their owning LIFT and motivating them in acquiring 
skills for making it more effective.   
4.3 Analytic category (c): Informant perceptions about the most 
influential or helpful factors on staff activities in LIFT 
 
Perceptions derived from information to answer research questions (ii) and 
(iii) concerned what informants thought were factors that most helped or 
impinged their progress. The researcher’s belief was that critical views 
about factors believed to be most helpful could be a more reliable bank of 
practical “dos and don’ts” in informing future LIFT schemes than centrally 
issued guidance alone. PCT managers and GPs at LIFT buildings argued 
that even where most success was achieved, some aspects could have 
been done better under different contexts. In light of this, they indicated 
what they believed were factors that helped or deterred them in improving 
matters about: governance of LIFT; quality of buildings and their 
maintenance; and obtaining value-for-money in their activities. 
4.3.1 Execution and governance of LIFT  
Informants provided insight into what helped or constrained them most in 
activities for improving execution and governance of LIFT. They perceived 
the helpful and constraining factors to be in: the quality of LIFT procedures; 
handling of tenders; role of the SPB; and the extent to which PCT 
managers were engaged for effective contribution to decisions on 
governance.  
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While agreeing that LIFT facilitated improvement in the quality of buildings, 
PCT managers’ concern over some of the mechanisms used in executing 
LIFT schemes suggests lack of consensus about the quality of LIFT 
procedures. This may mean that managers value the quality of buildings 
but not at the expense of quality in the mechanisms through which 
success is achieved. The managers reported being prevented from 
considering other procurement methods. Thus, being able to assess LIFT’s 
feasibility against options was perceived as a missing yet fundamental part 
of procuring the desired buildings. The following comment by a director for 
quality and governance at PCT-2 sums up what most managers placed on 
assessing options to LIFT in improving buildings in their areas:  
“We are unaware of any alternative or criteria used to judge some options 
as unsuitable for our needs. We believe that refurbishing existing facilities 
would have been more affordable than adopting LIFT to meet our primary 
care objectives.” (Quality and Governance Director, PCT-1, Interviewed) 
This perception may be understood in light of what Gaffney et al (1999b) 
believed was required in the context of PFI hospitals within the NHS. They 
recommended testing feasibility of projects by comparing different 
procurement ways prior to construction. PCT managers saw it as 
anomalous for LIFT to have the exemption when it was an offshoot of PFI.  
If PCT managers know the necessary benchmarks against which to 
measure improvement in procurement; it is possible that appraising the 
options may help them in making informed choice between different ways 
to procure desired buildings before choosing LIFT. This was missing in the 
case-study hence perception that it restricted progress in improving 
procurement using LIFT.     
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While the DH officials believed that LIFT procedures would help in cutting 
bureaucracy and speeding up procurement (DH/PfH 2003); informants in 
the case-study thought that the governance arrangements could generate 
perverse incentives. Their perception that the DH officials retained 
decision-making over important LIFT procedures could be interpreted as 
bureaucracy or interference potentially constraining effectiveness in 
governance. One of the GPs highlighted impact of this constraint by 
reflecting on how tenders at their building were handled:  
“We realised that the LiftCo spent £500,000 on tender documents only 
because DH officials forced them to engage too many consultants.” (Lead 
GP, B-1, Interviewed)  
Directives by the DH officials and changing project specifications 
midstream may increase cost in LIFT. This makes it difficult to understand 
whether LIFT is an efficient procurement method on its own. The LiftCo 
wanted the PCTs to fund incremental costs for transactions forced by DH 
officials and those for project specifications changed midstream even if 
that may have been caused by changes in PCT priorities.  
“Because the PCTs bear no risks at Pre-Stage 1, the DH and the PCTs 
find it easy to recommend completely new procedures and projects that 
may require separate feasibility analyses. It is only fair that the PCTs 
share the risk to discourage directives or abandoning projects on which 
the LiftCo has already invested” (LiftCo Rep, Interviewed).  
Potentially, how payment for these costs is handled may cause tension 
between PCT managers, DH officials and the LiftCo. PCT managers want 
the costs to be directly paid by the DH or the LiftCo. The managers also 
believe that it may be misplaced to expect the LiftCo alone to provide best 
value governance in context of DH control. Consequently, they expect the 
DH to directly pay for directives in LIFT activities.  
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The following comment describes some of the informants’ confession 
about their fading enthusiasm upon realising that governance 
arrangements in LIFT did not sufficiently support them to use their 
professional judgement and discretion:  
“You can invest effort in LIFT if you feel valued. Otherwise you become 
detached from its development.” (Estates and Facilities Director, PCT-1, 
Interviewed) 
Despite PCT representation on the LiftCo board, managers and GPs may 
be feeling excluded from important decisions. They are unconvinced that 
their views conveyed through the representatives influenced decisions 
made by the LiftCo board. Maybe the managers and GPs see themselves 
as more familiar with healthcare needs and priorities about desired 
buildings within their PCT areas compared to other constituents of the 
LiftCo board. This may explain why most of them thought it would be 
helpful in addressing these issues in governance if PCT representation on 
the LiftCo board was increased.  
Further, the DH officials might have envisaged presence of SPBs within 
PCTs that implement LIFT as facilitating staff in making progress. With the 
role to supervise the LiftCo, the SPB was expected to ensure that its 
activities do not prioritise LiftCo shareholder interests over those of the 
PCTs and LIFT’s primary objectives (DH/PfH 2003).  This may involve it 
facilitating exchanging ideas in LIFT to prevent problems that may arise 
from the LiftCo being more aware about important issues on governance 
arrangements than its clients. Yet the following comment may suggest that 
the SPB was not tolerant to open exchange of ideas leading to the concern 
that it prioritised LiftCo’s decisions over contributions by PCT staff:  
225 
 
“(...) the SPB muzzles debate about LIFT and we do not raise critical 
views for fear of being labelled as trouble makers.” (GP/Primary Care 
Director, PCT-1, Interviewed)  
 Although the SPB is largely made up of PCT representatives, it is possible 
that it feels under pressure from the DH to make LIFT succeed by 
enforcing PCT compliance. This interpretation may be understood in light 
of one of the lead GPs’ description of how the government values 
completed LIFT projects:  
“(...) the government wants to see LIFT succeed. We went to No. 10 
Downing Street when this building opened. They were quite excited and 
congratulated us for adopting LIFT.” (Lead GP, B-1, Interviewed) 
 In addition, this may explain some informants’ opinion that support 
received by the PCTs from either the DH officials or the SPB sought to 
enforce compliance with LIFT rather than increasing staff capacity in 
making effective procurement decisions. The NAO and the Planning 
Commission were identified as sources of less partisan advice and 
support:    
“...we see the NAO and Planning Commission as giving us more 
appropriate advice. They want us to redirect our activities towards 
influencing the LiftCo and its contractors to collaborate in maximising 
benefits from LIFT.” (Estate & Facilities Director, PCT-1, Interviewed)   
The findings revealed GPs to be less concerned than PCT managers about 
being excluded from strategic decision-making. This may be because GPs 
are not held accountable for LIFT outcomes. Meanwhile, lead GPs were 
satisfied that coordinating delivery of individual LIFT buildings gave them 
sufficient involvement in procurement of permanent buildings from which 
to operate. In line with one of the expected outcomes (Table 3.2 page 
166), LIFT spared them of the need to procure and manage private 
buildings.  
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An important problem cited by the GPs was that LiftCo bureaucracy and 
monopoly led to delays in responding to maintenance jobs at the buildings. 
Perhaps the LiftCo in this case-study has grown too powerful for the GPs 
to monitor and control as observed by one of the lead GPs:    
“(...) a group of companies may own a series of LiftCos that share 
strategies and information across a number of PCTs. If the LiftCo gets 
bigger than the PCTs that it is supposed to serve, it may have more 
discretion over LIFT processes than PCT staff and GPs.” (Lead GP, B-1, 
Interviewed) 
It cannot be assumed that the people implementing LIFT will necessarily 
have discretion over all its activities. In context of decentralization, 
discretion is an important factor that cannot be taken for granted because 
of its effect on executing the decentralised functions (Bossert 1998, 
Saltman et al 2006). The researcher defined discretion in terms of the 
freedom that the operational staff held in determining or crafting the way 
important LIFT activities were delivered within their PCT areas. 
Understanding why the different categories of informants felt constrained 
in LIFT could be a function of the freedom they perceive to hold in 
determining important ways to carry out their activities.  
A number of PCT managers reiterated that they were constrained by the 
DH officials’ unwillingness to fund procurement methods other than LIFT. 
This suggests that the DH is determined to reduce its role in developing 
primary care buildings in favour of using LIFT. Staff within the PCTs may 
not contemplate other options in the absence of funding from the DH. In 
addition, legal implications of the exclusivity clauses in LIFT contracts 
prevent PCT staff and GPs from considering other procurement methods. 
Then the need to increase stock of modernised buildings forces the case-
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studied PCTs to stick with LIFT. This lack of discretion as an obstacle to 
progress was framed by one informant as follows:  
“We could have considered the traditional procurement route but are 
prevented from making choices. We desperately needed improved 
buildings but have to deliver them through LIFT and using the appointed 
LiftCo.” (GP/Primary care coordinator, PCT-1, Interviewed) 
Bossert (1998) and Sharma (2006) remind us that decentralisation within 
health systems is often ineffective because government departments tend 
to restrict discretion at lower levels. With LIFT, it may be in the interest of 
fairness if DH officials were to consider allowing PCT managers and lead 
GPs increased discretion compatible with its governance arrangements 
because they are the ones directly involved and affected by its 
implementation. Most informants thought it was one of the helpful ways 
likely to increase progress in LIFT. 
4.3.2 Quality of buildings and their maintenance 
In addition to helpful factors and barriers to improved governance, 
informants highlighted the factors that they perceived to influence progress 
in the quality of LIFT buildings and their maintenance. Knowing why they 
succeeded and what restricted their success may give the researcher a 
realistic picture of LIFT’s contribution to improvements in the condition of 
primary care buildings within the case-study.  
Most informants perceived LIFT buildings to be a step improvement in 
quality measured in terms of: sizes of the buildings; fitness for their 
purpose; and availability for continuity in service provision compared to the 
pre-existing ones. They cited the LiftCo’s ability in: innovation; prioritising 
efficient delivery of buildings; and providing buildings that are affordable 
relative to appropriateness for need by the PCTs as factors that supported 
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or presented barriers to progress. Other factors influencing quality of 
buildings and their maintenance involved: the LiftCo’s ability in delivering 
buildings that are easily accessed by patients; responding to maintenance 
jobs; and flexibility in maintenance. This could be interpreted to mean that, 
at least in the case-study, informants prefer using multiple indicators for 
quality in assessing LIFT activities.   
The perception of some of the informants was that LIFT significantly 
differed from conventional practice by sourcing private sector capital and 
expertise to deliver PCT buildings. This may explain why they considered it 
as innovation that increased the quality of building compared to 
government led schemes. They probably viewed innovation as new ways 
that increased benefits in procurement including utilisation of primary care 
buildings. PCT managers and GPs using the buildings could be noticing 
the added value of LIFT given that desired buildings would have been still 
delivered without LIFT. This interpretation is illustrated by a GP who cited 
their buildings getting local and international recognition as evidence of 
innovation: 
“This building is top class to the extent of attracting local and foreign 
visitors to view it. (...) the Prime Minister has been here to recognise us 
for winning awards for creativity.” (Lead GP, B-3, Interviewed) 
Other informants thought that LIFT did not innovate per se. They argued 
that it standardised buildings within the economy through LiftCos importing 
technology that was tested outside health into the NHS. Such informants 
may understand innovation as introducing technology that is unique within 
their PCTs rather than adapting old ones like experience from delivering 
Children’s Sure Start Centres being used within the NHS.  
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One possibility could be that LiftCos within the NHS are perceived as 
motivated to reduce or recover costs for designing individual buildings by 
using the same technology across a number of PCTs. While this may 
increase the quality of buildings, the risk could be that innovation gets 
questionable when buildings fail to reflect unique circumstances or 
priorities within PCTs.  
The findings that LIFT had the ability to deliver high quality buildings within 
budget, and on time, corroborate the views of King’s Fund (2008), the 
CABE (2008), and NAO (2005). Informants explained this as a 
consequence of the exploitation of the skills and experience of the private 
contractors which helped reduce procurement costs.  
But GPs and administrators at LIFT buildings felt that LiftCo performance in 
relation to day-to-day management of buildings was not satisfactory and 
deterred progress. The buildings administrators particularly raised concern 
about the LiftCo’s commitment to quality and thought that the contractors 
hired at LIFT buildings lacked appropriate maintenance skills. But it is also 
possible that the reported need for frequent repairs at fairly new LIFT 
buildings may be evidence that fast delivery of buildings sometimes 
compromised quality.    
Another explanation as to why PCT managers did not find LIFT quite 
helpful may be due to what they perceived to be mismatches existing 
between rents and quality of maintenance of the buildings. Issues were 
raised about the affordability and sustainability of LIFT because staff within 
the PCTs felt limited by a number of factors in setting up affordability caps 
prior to developing LIFT buildings. The urgent need to upgrade GP 
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surgeries gave the LiftCo chance to dictate the rules. And even if LIFT was 
deemed unaffordable, there is no other option the DH is willing to fund. 
Legal agreements also force the PCTs to use and pay agreed rent for LIFT 
buildings. One director framed the dilemma in reconciling affordability and 
quality of maintenance as follows:  
“...the LiftCo extends no favours in terms of cheaper rent compelling us to 
pay more than market rate for similar buildings. Its income is guaranteed 
because once it delivers the buildings, we have to use them despite poor 
maintenance.” (Finance Director, PCT-1, Interviewed) 
This suggests that the LiftCo may be getting income safe in the knowledge 
that its buildings will be occupied despite poor maintenance. It may explain 
why some managers and GPs felt that 25-year contracts were too long and 
affected long-term liquidity of the PCTs. The contracts risked future 
investment in buildings given the reported mismatches existing between 
quality and cost of LIFT buildings. But the LiftCo representative believed 
that LIFT helped in matching what the PCTs wanted in buildings with what 
they could afford:  
“Our opinion is that 25-year contracts attract financiers needed to help in 
improving the quality of buildings. It allows them to recover costs without 
straining the PCTs because shorter contracts increase rent charges which 
affect PCT liquidity.” (LiftCo representative, Interviewed) 
The perception of how LIFT helps to increase investment is reflected in 
Beck et al (2009) and the NAO (2005) studies that argue that LiftCos have 
the ability to attract capital needed to complete and maintain buildings. In 
contrast, PCT managers and GPs feel that the LiftCo may borrow 
expensively straining the PCTs through repaying unaffordable interest 
rates. Maybe at their micro-levels, the managers and GPs are less 
interested in capital flows within LiftCos than how they are supported to 
adapt and use the buildings to improve patient experiences. This may 
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explain why they expected the DH to improve the quality of buildings by 
funding the extras that the PCTs may demand from the LiftCo.    
Another dimension of quality was perceived to involve how the LiftCo was 
flexible in matters of adapting LIFT buildings as required by tenants. It was 
indicated that only the LiftCo provided the necessary authority to carry out 
or contract the changes. While this may be logical as the LiftCo owned the 
buildings, some GPs and building administrators wanted to be delegated 
the authority to make desired modifications because they did not feel that 
the LiftCo appreciated or responded to urgency of some jobs. The 
administrator at one of the buildings supported the LiftCo retaining 
authority and responsibility arguing that it restricted haphazard alterations 
that may reduce quality and life of the buildings:   
“(...) people may see it as being inflexible when the LiftCo discourages 
unauthorised alterations because they do not realise that the LiftCo’s 
contractors understand the maintenance of buildings. Restrictions ensure 
discipline to control tampering that may affect residual value of the 
buildings.” (Administrator, B-2, Interviewed)    
Observations by the researcher during tours of the buildings corroborated 
previous findings by King’s Fund (2008) that LIFT buildings absorbed large 
patient volumes. Their sizes and appropriate technology speed up patient 
flow. This is what the DH officials primarily intended to achieve through 
adopting LIFT (DH 2003). Improvements of this nature may help in 
preventing dilapidation that is caused by congestion as happened at the 
old surgeries. This is important in light of increasing population, at least 
within the case-studied PCTs.    
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4.3.3 Value-for-money  
Value-for-money assesses whether or not, within available resources, 
maximum benefit is obtained from service providers’ activities (Sloan & 
Hsieh 2012). In the current research, it could not be taken for granted that 
LIFT provided value-for-money for the PCTs simply because it involved 
private sector providers that are assumed to be experts in their allocated 
roles. Aside from measuring the direct cost of buildings and their 
maintenance, value-for-money in LIFT requires taking account of the mix 
of governance and quality issues already discussed above. By 
commenting about: the quality of LIFT buildings and their maintenance and 
costs; how resources for LIFT were used; timeliness of LiftCo activities; 
and the LiftCo’s fitness for purpose in procuring PCT buildings, informants 
considered these elements together to indicate whether or not LIFT 
constituted good value.  
Except for the LiftCo representative, informants thought that the 
mechanisms for financing LIFT schemes were too complex to reveal the 
true value of the buildings. Most informants could not articulate the 
financing mechanisms and tended to refer to finance directors within their 
PCTs as more likely to clarify whether the PCTs obtained value-for-money 
from how LIFT schemes were financed. Despite their being uncertain 
about the actual cost of individual buildings, the finance directors 
concurred with their colleagues that LIFT was an expensive procurement 
method compared to the government route.  
Complexity of LIFT financing and its value-for-money contribution may be 
understood in the context of variations in valuation of the buildings by the 
finance directors and the LiftCo representatives. At PCT-1, the finance 
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director believed the cost of one of the buildings (B-1) was £11m. The 
LiftCo representative reported £9m for the same building. At B-4, the lead 
GP reported £30m as the cost of the building but the figure was three 
times as much as £10.2m reported by the LiftCo. Sloan and Hsieh (2012) 
remind us that assessing value-for-money has challenges including 
difficulties in measuring some elements while others may be 
misunderstood. This may be the case when PCT staff wishes to conduct 
value-for-money audits in LIFT. At the same time, it may explain the 
reason as to why estimates of the costs of buildings among PCT managers 
and GPs differed significantly from those of the LiftCo representative in the 
case-study.  
It raises questions about whether procedures in assessing value-for-
money in LIFT activities are circumvented, and if elements included in 
costing of the buildings are complete and accurate. Some PCT managers 
suspected that the cost of maintenance contractors at LIFT buildings was 
underestimated. This echoes the concern by Pollock et al (2005) that 
private developers have an incentive to understate costs to make 
procurement through PPPs attractive to government. Hence the House of 
Commons (2001) recommendation for addressing such concerns by 
having direct delivery and maintenance costs included in value-for-money 
procurement audits. Perhaps this desire for inclusiveness may explain why 
the House now expects PCT accounts to show the value of LIFT buildings 
(Beck et al 2009).  
With this research, a potential limitation may be the lack of quantitative 
evidence for value-for-money. The research neither gathered quantitative 
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cost information nor assessed options to LIFT. This may preclude the 
researcher from making a firm judgement about whether the case-studied 
PCTs obtained better or less value-for-money from LIFT than other options. 
Some of the views on value-for-money may be subjective due to reliance 
on informant reports of their individual experiences even though some of 
them lacked detailed knowledge of financial aspects of LIFT and were 
uncomfortable in discussing this.   
By characterizing LIFT as an economic, efficient and effective procurement 
method, Milburn (2004b) and the NAO (2005) were suggesting that it 
prioritised careful use of public resources to save time, effort and cost in 
delivering better public sector buildings. When expressing their views of 
helpful factors on progress in governance and achieving quality in LIFT; 
informants in the current research were inclined to reflect on the manner in 
which LIFT buildings were delivered and managed. This is because they 
considered it as an important element in assessing whether or not they got 
maximum benefits from LIFT given the resources available to them and the 
working relations it promoted. One respondent at PCT-1 explained how 
strained relations between the LiftCo and contractors may affect the PCTs 
in obtaining value-for-money:  
“The LiftCo did us no favours by firing the contractor that had a history of 
good relations with this PCT. We were getting value-for-money from the 
contractor’s quality workmanship but the manner in which they lost their 
contract prevents them from returning to fix problems at some buildings.” 
(Deputy CEO, PCT-1, Interviewed)   
A related perception of PCTs managers and building administrators was 
that close monitoring of the performance of contractors involved in LIFT 
was necessary to ensure that LIFT becomes economically more efficient 
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and effective than government procurement. It was indicated that the 
contractors hired by the LiftCo were less experienced and less skilled than 
government tradesmen in providing maintenance services at healthcare 
buildings. Yet they were more expensive for routine services provided as 
stated by a manager at PCT-2:  
“The LiftCo uses short term consultancy to hire contractors lacking health 
sector background. Without our input, they have difficulties in connecting 
healthcare needs with building designs yet they charge high fees 
eventually paid by the PCTs” (Estate & Facilities manager, PCT-2, 
Interviewed) 
This perception may mean that LIFT is yet to convince PCT managers that 
it helps in reducing procurement costs and improving management of 
buildings. It also raises the question of why the DH officials recommended 
LIFT when according to operational staff, it is not accompanied with 
additional skills and expertise needed to increase value-for-money in their 
activities. Instead, LIFT may be said to bring about additional costs when 
the LiftCo passes over contractors’ fees to the PCTs. It may have been 
avoided were the PCTs responsible for all activities in procuring the 
buildings. 
This may be further understood in light of Milburn’s (2004b) argument that 
PPPs may be the quickest and convenient way to accessing private sector 
resources and management competences in procuring NHS buildings. In 
this case, it may suggest that LIFT was designed for the PCTs to benefit 
from substituting LiftCos for poor value government led procurement. 
Besides mobilising private sector capital to reduce direct DH funding, LIFT 
would exploit private sector skills and competences to achieve efficiency 
and effectiveness in procuring better quality buildings. But there may be 
236 
 
questions as to whether LIFT has the capacity to take on increased 
procurement and management risks, and determining or timing for when 
to deliver new buildings as currently done by PCT staff.    
The fact that PCT managers advocated renegotiating the maintenance 
contracts in favour of government tradesmen may mean that they perceive 
them as better at managing risks in procurement to obtain maximum 
value-for-money benefits from LIFT than the LiftCo and its contractors. 
This may be economically sensible in that if the tradesmen have skills and 
competences similar to those of the private contractors, as the cheaper 
option, they may convey efficiency and savings to the PCTs. More value-
for-money could be achieved because government tradesmen may use 
their familiarity with requirements at healthcare buildings to adopt more 
cost-effective ways in service provision than private contractors. 
In considering whether value-for-money has been satisfactorily achieved 
or not, benchmarks against which to pass judgements may be required. 
Perrot (2006) and McKee et al (2007) consider them as helpful indicators 
for whether expectations on performance or quality are realistic. This is 
because some elements in performance and quality may be intangible. In 
this research it may mean that differences might exist in informant views 
about the mix of quality, costs, convenience, or fitness for LIFT in procuring 
desired buildings. Such difference could be evidence for contested 
benchmarks about these elements in judging value-for-money obtained 
from LIFT.  
This was illustrated by differences among PCT managers about 
expectations on LiftCo activities. Some managers believed that their 
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expectations for the LiftCo to offer value-for-money by reducing expenses 
and time in delivery while offering better quality were unrealistic under the 
standards within the estates industry. The logic of this argument may 
reside in that the buildings that LIFT was replacing were designed, built, 
and maintained by the DH. Yet despite being less than 25 years old, the 
buildings were already deemed rundown and inappropriate for desired 
services. Expecting LIFT buildings to be cheaper and yet again of higher 
quality to outlive what could have been delivered by the DH may be 
therefore considered unrealistic.  
The GPs using LIFT buildings perceived 25 year contracts governing PCT-
LiftCo relations to be unfeasible for their business. Their preference for 
five year contracts with the PCTs may be evidence for them having 
problems reconciling length of LIFT contracts and expected value-for-
money under unpredictable patient demands at LIFT buildings. Or it may 
be show of whom between GPs and PCT managers actually influence 
progress in light of one of the GPs’ statement that:  
“...the PCT wanted our contract to run for 25 years but we thought it did 
not make business sense; (...) we forced them to offer 5 year contracts. 
Some GPs refused to join because the PCT did not guarantee continuity of 
business in the event of reduced patient demand before maturity of LIFT 
contracts” (Lead GP, B-2, Interviewed) 
Another possible explanation as to why GPs perceived better value-for-
money under shorter contracts may be due to difficulties in predicting 
neither what patients would want nor how they may expect to respond to 
these demands or changing service configurations 25 years into the 
future. The DH desire to bring healthcare “nearer home” in line with patient 
preferences expressed in Our Health, Our Care, Our Say (DH 2006b) may 
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also cause uncertainty about appropriateness of LIFT buildings if services 
are reconfigured before the expiry of LIFT contracts. GPs and building 
administrators raised the concern that rents for LIFT buildings were 
payable whether they were fully occupied or not. It means that GPs may 
be perceiving 25 year contracts as locking them into deals with declining 
value-for-money due to changes in circumstances. In comparison, private 
companies renting private buildings prefer short contracts that give them 
freedom to maximise value-for-money by moving with changes in 
circumstances.  
The fact that risks in supply of LIFT buildings were perceived to be fairly 
predictable and easier to manage than those on the demand side was 
considered as influential on progress. PCT managers did not consider it as 
a significant benefit that LIFT buildings were delivered on time and within 
budget. This is because they believed that the risks involved and borne by 
the LiftCo were predictable and easy to manage since LIFT buildings were 
derived from agreed and ready to implement SSDPs. The SSDPs were 
developed by the PCTs through interpreting complex and unpredictable 
demand factors. It left the LiftCo to only take risks to deliver buildings 
along agreed specifications and quality standards. The belief that the PCTs 
retained unpredictable risks in demand for buildings may explain why most 
managers thought that LIFT neither provided enhanced value-for-money 
nor improved risk management in procurement.   
Apart from being considered as predictable; construction delays and cost 
overruns were risks perceived to also benefit the LiftCo more than the 
PCTs if managed effectively. In fact some managers and building 
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administrators believed that contractors sometimes paid attention to 
avoiding some risks at the expense of quality which reduced value-for-
money the PCTs may obtain from LIFT activities. They pointed out that 
delaying maintenance was strategy forcing tenants into expenses not fully 
reimbursed. Inadequate consultation of PCT staff in planning stages was 
also cited as strategy for the LiftCo to avert cost overruns by beating 
delivery deadlines.  
The nature of the boundaries between the LiftCo’s responsibility in 
managing financial risks, and PCTs’ ultimate responsibility to meet their 
costs if realised to some extent influenced value-for-money obtained in 
LIFT. PCT managers maintained that the LiftCo only managed whereas 
PCTs retained most risks in LIFT. In their perceptions, rents and 
maintenance fees at the buildings were negotiated with a view to ensuring 
the LiftCo could recover its capital and make profit. This may mean that 
PCT managers see LIFT as not conveying value-for-money if costs are 
passed over to the PCTs directly. At times these were passed over 
indirectly through either unreimbursed expenses or reduced quality of 
services. It may mean that LIFT imposes extra risks for PCT managers who 
believe they lack adequate power to penalise the LiftCo for not meeting 
standards agreed on.  
Feedback on whether LIFT replaced buildings because they were at wrong 
sites provided insights into value-for-money obtaining from decisions 
about where LIFT buildings are built. The indications were that all except 
one of the LIFT buildings toured were on the same site as a pre-existing 
government building, meaning PCT managers consider the pre-existing 
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sites as still appropriate for their needs. The managers use LIFT to only 
improve their buildings. An alternative explanation could be that the PCTs 
perceive loss if they were to sell the land that they owned for using the 
proceeds in acquiring a new one and renting LIFT buildings. Simultaneous 
land retention and using improved buildings may be consensus within 
PCTs that value-for-money is achieved through high value LIFT buildings 
substituting for existing poor value ones. This could present LIFT as not 
the disposal of PCT buildings but a change in ownership; where the 
change is merely a strategy to finance delivery and subsequent 
management of better quality buildings. 
In summary, why different categories of informants in this research 
experienced mixed progress in LIFT could be a result of complex sets of 
factors. To a greater or less extent, a number of factors in LIFT appear to 
facilitate while others constrain progress. It does not appear progress was 
a function of issues on governance, or quality improvement, or activities 
with best value-for-money alone. The extent of their influence is likely to 
be a function of, for example, the ease with which some LIFT outcomes 
may be either measured or understood; plus whether the outcomes are 
intangible or subjective interpretations by those affected. Despite the 
complex factors, most informants in this research thought that LIFT had the 
potential to help them in meeting patient expectations for better quality 
buildings in terms of sizes, fitness for purpose and modern technology 
compared with pre-existing surgeries. 
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4.4 Analytic category (d): Lessons learnt from the case-study 
experiences to better explain and understand LIFT for the benefit of future 
schemes and other PCTs 
 
Since the present research focused at LIFT’s operational level and 
excluded policy-making and care provision levels, the following lessons 
(4.4.1 to 4.4.4) deriving from the findings reflect on experiences and views 
of staff at the frontline of LIFT activities:  
4.4.1 LIFT is not just about delivery of improved buildings but 
decentralising four important aspects in procurement:  
(i) It reaffirms decentralised planning for primary and social care 
buildings from the DH to the PCTs. In turn, PCTs decentralise 
through involving and giving roles to the LiftCo and independent 
GPs. The LiftCo takes part in developing the SSDPs from which 
LIFT buildings are derived. Unlike in the past, GPs have a role to 
coordinate delivery of buildings on behalf of the PCTs.  
(ii) LIFT devolves financing of the buildings used by PCTs from the 
DH and Treasury to private financiers through the LiftCo. The 
LiftCo mobilises finance needed for all procurement stages up to 
making the buildings available for use by the PCTs. 
(iii) LIFT decentralises maintenance of the buildings from PCTs to 
the LiftCo. Decentralisation is then extended by the LiftCo hiring 
different contractors at the buildings rather than relying on its 
own staff. 
(iv) LIFT could be a DH strategy to centralise control and influence 
over general practice at LIFT buildings through the PCTs. PCTs 
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are the principal tenants and they decide which GPs to contract 
for providing specific services at LIFT buildings.   
4.4.2 In this context of decentralisation, LIFT on its own may not increase 
the stock of buildings. It is the PCTs that ascertain demand for buildings 
and invite the LiftCo to deliver new or refurbish existing ones based on 
agreed SSDPs. Thus, LIFT is a way of financing PCT investment decisions 
and maintenance thereafter.  
4.4.3 Interpersonal factors are perceived as more influential on progress 
than presence of new features in governance. This lesson resides in that 
commitment, engagement, and collaboration between PCT and LiftCo 
staff, and GPs and contractors at LIFT buildings were repeatedly alluded to 
during interviews. The DH officials anticipated that the SPB would facilitate 
progress yet it was perceived to cause confusion by duplicating role of the 
existing PCT Boards. 
4.4.4 A related lesson was that PCT managers are predisposed to 
positively assess their role in LIFT. They emphasize their strengths and not 
weaknesses in explaining progress. In their view, progress was achieved 
because being professional, committed, and working as teams spurred 
them in taking risks that enhanced benefits. The managers blame 
governance arrangements in LIFT for restricting progress by not helping 
them in translating their experience and professionalism to improve 
imperfections of DH led procurement. Although they may have possible 
weaknesses like, for example, doing some activities wrongly or making 
wrong decisions and choices, the managers rarely talk about them in 
relation to restricted progress in LIFT.   
243 
 
4.5 The revised middle range theory    
This subsection uses the first person to clarify how the middle range 
theory was revised. Prior to fieldwork, I analysed documents to understand 
how LIFT was expected to work. The documents were mostly written by 
DH officials as guidance for LIFT. Thus the initial theory that I developed 
had a limitation of favouring DH officials’ perspectives in explaining LIFT. At 
that time, my understanding was that the officials perceived LIFT as a 
strategy for decentralising some aspects in procurement and management 
of primary care buildings. This led me to state the initial middle range 
theory (page 108) to the effect that:   
PCTs that implement effective LIFT schemes deployed decentralised 
structures which support staff in influencing long-term risk management in 
procurement of healthcare buildings. They prefer LIFT because it is the 
convenient and effective option in financing and maintenance of the 
desired buildings. Activities to execute LIFT schemes stimulate 
participatory decision-making, information sharing and openness between 
PCT staff, LiftCo staff, GPs using LIFT buildings and local stakeholders 
and contractors providing service at the buildings. LIFT activities ensure 
that the LiftCo assumes higher proportion of risks associated with 
procurement and management of buildings compared to the PCTs. The 
LiftCo is familiar with, and responsive to priorities of the PCTs. Its good 
working relations with the PCTs promote collaboration in increasing 
patient experiences when they are attracted by improved conditions at 
LIFT buildings. 
In context of RE methodology, Pawson (2006) recommends refining the 
middle range theory in light of key findings and lessons learnt from 
research. In this research, part of the contribution of in-depth interviews 
was in helping to explore how staff implementing LIFT confirmed, refuted 
or refined my initial understanding of LIFT using their individual 
experiences. The interviewees were directly involved and affected by LIFT 
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and could therefore enlighten the theory about how LIFT actually worked 
rather than me relying on documentary evidence alone. Based on the 
findings and lessons learnt, I adjusted the middle range theory to state 
that: 
PCTs that implement LIFT schemes fail in achieving some of the 
anticipated benefits. They are restricted by the fact that the DH officials 
conceived LIFT with neither involvement nor engagement of frontline staff 
that are expected to implement it. Consequently, PCT staff lack motivation 
in developing skills and expertise needed in managing risks to effectively 
achieve LIFT objectives. PCTs still use LIFT despite it possessing 
challenges in improving efficiency, or making the procurement of buildings 
more affordable and sustainable than conventional method. Using LIFT 
does not promote competition that is needed to generate anticipated 
benefits. Its governance helps little in increasing PCT capacities in 
improving procurement. PCT managers perceive the DH officials as not 
prioritising their engagement for practical issues in implementing LIFT. 
Consequently, they feel that LIFT’s mixed achievement is influenced by a 
mismatch between their responsibilities, and power and authority to 
control the LiftCo. Combinations of these factors create negative 
atmosphere yet LIFT could be more effective if PCT staff had enhanced 
discretion to promote commitment, trust and collaborative relations with 
the LiftCo.  
The overall findings may be considered as confirming the research’s 
primary assumption (1.1.5.2, page 5) that LIFT decentralises both funding 
and financing of primary care buildings. It was revealed that the 
responsibility to develop SSDPs and business cases for LIFT schemes was 
passed over from the DH and strategic health authorities to the PCTs. The 
PCTs decided on whether or not to partner with the LiftCo in procuring 
desired buildings. Financing of buildings was decentralised to holders of 
private equity in the LiftCo.  
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The second assumption was that the PCTs had discretion to increase 
effectiveness by varying LIFT guidance including choice of options in 
procurement. The findings so far incorporated in the revised middle range 
theory revealed that this assumption was partially correct. PCT staff lack 
adequate discretion over LIFT’s critical procedures. It means that progress 
achieved so far owes much to staff commitment in collaborating with the 
LiftCo than ability to manipulate LIFT guidance. Interpersonal factors were 
cited as effective in facilitating progress compared to governance 
structures such as the SPB and LiftCo board that merely increased 
bureaucracy. These issues have been so far incorporated in the revised 
theory but may not be the ultimate explanation of LIFT. It may require 
continual testing in different case-studies to get an apt explanation as 
recommended in RE practice (Pawson and Tilley 1997). 
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SECTION 5: DISCUSSION 
In the previous section, the overall research findings were integrated and 
interpreted to construct common themes explaining LIFT. The discussion 
in subsection 5.1 considers the key findings in relation to literature some of 
which is already embedded in the Background section (Evans and Gruba 
2002). Subsection 5.2 considers the findings’ implications for policy and 
practice before LIFT is contextualised to the 2012 Health and Social Care 
Act (subsection 5.3). The discussion concludes with a reflection on 
limitations of this research (subsection 5.4).  
5.1 Key findings and how they relate to literature    
The present research chose decentralization as the concept on which LIFT 
was based. So, the discussion here considers the key findings emerging 
from the analyses in the light of literature on decentralization and public-
private partnerships (PPPs) in which domain LIFT falls. Attention is given to 
explaining whether and how the findings make LIFT consistent or different 
from decentralization theory and literature. A great deal of the literature is 
already embedded in subsection 1.2 of this thesis.  
5.1.1 LIFT involves and benefits a range of participants  
The first major finding from the analyses indicated that, aside from the 
PCTs, LIFT involved and benefited a range of other participants namely: 
primary care providers; investors in the LiftCo; contractors; and service 
suppliers at LIFT buildings. This finding aligns considerably to the 
discourse on evolving approaches to public service delivery within the UK. 
Commentators use either New Public Management (Hood 1991, Pollit and 
Bouckaert 2000) or Third Way (Powell (2000) in describing trends that 
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increase role for more non-governmental agents in public service delivery. 
In the UK, the trend is perceived as relentless within the NHS (Klein 2003, 
Allen 2006 and McKee et al 2006). 
That LIFT facilitates increased role for more players in procurement and 
management of healthcare buildings is consistent with New Public 
Management theory and practice in context of decentralization. 
International agencies such as the WHO (2000) believe that health 
systems that deregulate more health functions may improve performance. 
This further aligns LIFT with the various decentralization strategies in the 
sense that financing of buildings is passed over to investors in the LiftCo 
and private companies are involved in construction and post-delivery 
management of the buildings.  
There is also the perception that PPPs along which LIFT was designed are 
a way of engaging and involving communities in influencing investment 
decisions in their areas (Milburn 2004a). The finding that LIFT involves 
and benefits a range of participants may therefore suggest that it is 
entrenched in operationalizing “community involvement” ideology. If so, 
you could argue that DH officials behind LIFT conception used a broad 
definition of “community involvement” as involving any entities including 
private corporations. This may invite controversy as analysts (e.g. Morgan 
2001) prefer a narrow definition that considers community involvement as 
involving ordinary service-users affected by official decisions. Thus, it may 
not be surprising that involvement of private companies in LIFT is central to 
controversy surrounding its use within the NHS (Pollock & Price 2006, 
Aldred 2007).   
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5.1.2 LIFT embodies mixed facilitating and constraining factors 
The finding that LIFT had mixed facilitating and constraining factors 
correlates with literature regarding challenges to maximising benefits from 
decentralization strategies. It was reiterated that mixed experiences with 
LIFT was primarily due to some problems inherent to how it was designed 
and others due to problems in implementation. This finding may be 
possible in light of challenges that have been highlighted as affecting 
effective implementation of PPPs within health systems. Perrot (2006) 
reminds us that if PPPs are too complex, they prevent people that are 
expected to implement them from translating their professionalism into 
desired improvements. Operational staff may have mixed experience 
depending on their individual skills and expertise.  
Various commentators (Pollock & Price 2006, Beck et al 2009, Aldred 
2008, and Fitzsimmons et al 2009) concur that progress in LIFT is deterred 
by its complex design and governance arrangements. In most cases these 
elements obstructed operational staff from maximising value-for-money, 
improving quality and management of risks in procurement activities. In 
the present research, informants believed that they achieved progress but 
still felt that more progress could have been achieved if LIFT was less 
complex.  
This finding is also reflected in literature reporting that PCT staff generally 
lack skills and expertise and may need support in managing PPPs in the 
health system (King’s Fund 2008, NAO 2005, Beck et al 2009). The 
complex nature of LIFT means that PCT staff encountered more 
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constraints in discharging their responsibilities. Fitzsimmons et al (2009) 
argue that financial diligence is necessary in maximising benefits from LIFT 
but PCT staff are constrained by inadequate skills in financial matters 
related to risks in procurement. 
Highlighting why some decentralization strategies may constrain progress, 
Pollit (1998) and Bennett et al (1997) point at lack of clarity about activities 
being decentralised. Confusion arises if operational staff are unable to 
identify who is responsible for what important activities. Unclear 
accountability risks neglect of important activities when staff avoids doing 
them thinking other parties are responsible. In this research, informants 
indicated that confusion about responsibility for decisions in monitoring the 
LiftCo’s activities between PCT managers and the SPB restricted their 
progress in LIFT.  
A further explanation for the finding about mixed facilitating and 
constraining factors may be due to misunderstood or problems in 
measuring LIFT outcomes. In light of complexity of LIFT previously cited, it 
may be that some participants’ expectations are unrealistic and probably 
beyond the LiftCo’s ability. In particular, PCT managers may be struggling 
to achieve their expectations and when they fail, the feel not adequately 
supported in their activities. Having higher expectations is not necessarily 
an anomaly as it is consistent with literature. For example, Stevens (2004) 
argues that those in charge of new initiatives in service delivery at local 
levels expect significant improvements in their performance. They are 
sceptical about the initiatives if the benefits obtained are marginal or more 
or less similar to what they would have achieved using conventional ways. 
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This may explain why some informants in this case-study believed that 
improvements in procurement and management of primary care buildings 
would have been better through their leadership rather than the LiftCo’s.        
5.1.3 LIFT’s most helpful mechanism is participant collaboration 
Informants in this case-study lacked consensus about some LIFT 
mechanisms’ influence or helpfulness on progress. But they agreed about 
collaboration in activities between participants in LIFT as probably the most 
influential mechanism to achieve success. This finding is consistent with 
literature suggesting that whether in health or other sectors, success with 
PPPs hinge on participants collaboration. Perrot (2006) explains the effect 
by noting that: 
“...success of agreements requires the active participation of the partners 
as well as complementarities between resources, technology and know-
how. (...) these are agreements in which partners define the terms of 
reference for the co-operation, i.e. how they pool their resources on day-
to-day basis to reach the targets they have set.” (page 863) 
In relation to the present research, informants reiterated that GP 
willingness to take part through coordinating delivery of individual 
schemes, and relocating their practices to the new buildings show 
collaboration in meeting LIFT objectives. Other studies (e.g. King’s Fund 
2008) have suggested that primary care within the NHS may be enhanced 
through the DH investing in promoting collaboration between PCTs and 
GPs. If PCT managers perceive GPs as already collaborating, then LIFT 
may be the springboard for improvement in primary care. Strengthening 
this may now require the DH ensuring that GP resources, technology and 
know-how (Perrot 2006) are joined to those of the PCTs for enhanced 
synergy in activities. Currently, there is concern that progress is restricted 
by PCT activities and those at LIFT buildings being parallel.  
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By definition, mechanisms are factors within a programme that either 
facilitate or constrain progress (Pawson 2006). In this research, LIFT’s 
ability to mobilise capital needed to complete projects and maintenance of 
buildings was cited as an important mechanism. Yet when asked to 
identify mechanisms that helped them most in achieving LIFT outcomes, 
informants emphasized behavioural factors. You would have expected 
them to cite economic factors internal to LIFT that influenced progress 
because some of the behavioural factors involved may overlap as contexts 
in explaining the most helpful LIFT mechanisms.  
Despite them providing contexts conducive for progress, theories about 
involvement, commitment and engagement of PCT managers in making 
strategic decisions were alluded to in discussing helpful mechanisms. This 
may indicate that informants are more interested in process of delivering 
LIFT buildings than what resources, technology and know-how LIFT 
brought within their PCT areas. Their possible belief could be that with or 
without LIFT, procurement inputs would still be provided under their 
leadership, hence interest in improvements that LIFT makes on 
conventional procurement procedures.  
5.1.4 Progress in LIFT may be increased with enhanced discretion 
At the same time, PCT managers and building administrators impressed 
that it may be misplaced to expect them to achieve progress solely on 
collaboration between LIFT participants. They wanted enhanced discretion 
in LIFT activities to increase progress. In context of decentralization, this 
finding is consistent with literature explaining why some reform strategies 
may fail to achieve progress. Authors including Bossert (1998), Savas 
(2000), and Peckham et al (2005), argue that decentralization within 
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health systems primarily seeks to improve performance by allowing local 
staff freedom in decision-making about how to effectively deliver services. 
In this case, progress is therefore not so much about collaboration or 
benefiting from extra resources, skills and expertise, as opposed to 
empowering local staff in making decisions about meeting their priority 
needs. This is achieved by allowing them freedom in issues of governance 
(Bossert 1998), financing (Savas 2002) and management of the 
decentralized functions (Peckham et al 2005, Mill & Vaughan 1990).  
Some studies dealing with challenges in increasing LIFT’s effectiveness 
(Beck et al 2009, King’s Fund 2008, Aldred 2007) have cited inflexible 
guidance as restricting progress. PCT managers that coordinate LIFT 
activities lack adequate discretion in adapting the guidance to local 
circumstances. In relation to the present research, the perception that 
progress in LIFT may be achieved with increased discretion might be 
warranted for one important reason. PCT managers may be feeling that 
inflexible LIFT guidance restrict their progress. In fact, previous research 
commissioned by the DH (e.g. Peckham et al 2005, Beck et al 2009) have 
highlighted inflexible guidance as one of the challenges in implementing 
LIFT. Yet in the current research, PCT managers still feel they lack 
adequate discretion over its main activities.  
Conflict of interest is one of the challenges that may restrict progress with 
PPPs (Bennett & Muraleedharan 2000). It causes tension if those directly 
involved in implementing partnerships perceive disproportional discretion 
allowed between their activities. With LIFT, PCT managers felt that 
progress was restricted by their LiftCo wielding more influence on activities 
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compared to them. They see potential conflict of interest arising when the 
LiftCo charged with delivering buildings is also involved in developing the 
SSDPs that specify what they are expected to deliver. The LiftCo may do 
so knowing that PCT managers lack discretion in dealing with its activities. 
This issue may be consistent with the World Bank’s (2006) concern that: 
“Risks of a conflict of interest arise with PPPs that both provide input into 
the approval process (...) and play a role in identifying and preparing 
projects. Conflicts can also arise if a PPP promotes or assists in 
developing projects and then is asked to carry out ex-post evaluations” 
(page 3)   
The concern that LiftCos may wield power and control over PCT managers 
and GPs’ procurement activities may therefore indicate that informants 
worried about potential conflict of interest as a constraining factor.  
This may explain as to why some informants thought progress achieved 
so far was because the small size of their LiftCo prevented it from dictating 
terms in procurement activities. Having a small LiftCo that is stable in 
terms of keeping the same CEO in position for long may help in making the 
LiftCo familiarized with PCT priorities. It also facilitates progress by 
reducing confusion caused by high churn of CEOs. The finding may mean 
that PCT managers felt constrained by high turnover of CEOs at the LiftCo 
in the early years; reducing the momentum on progress especially when 
new CEOs were getting to familiarize themselves with their responsibilities.   
5.1.5 Duplication of existing practices deters progress 
PCT managers had the perception that some contexts, mechanisms and 
outcomes emphasized in LIFT duplicated existing practices within the 
PCTs. In context of decentralization, literature that reflect on this argue that 
strategies that merely pass over existing responsibilities to new 
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beneficiaries of decentralized functions may not only affect staff morale 
but also restrict progress (Flinders 2004, Dubois & Fattore 2009).  
Duplication of practices may not be a cost-effective way of using 
resources in LIFT. This may also explain why PCT managers and GPs 
echoed findings in previous research (Pollock & Price 2005, Aldred 2008, 
Fitzsimmons et al 2009) that criticise LIFT for using a lot of money to 
develop and maintain fewer buildings than conventional method. 
Another possible explanation for raising the issue about duplicating 
existing practices could be related to concern about its effect on 
accountability in LIFT activities. PCT managers might be concerned that 
sharing the same activities between PCT staff and those from the private 
sector may cause neglect in carrying out some activities if there is passing 
back of accountability between those involved. This may not reflect well on 
the PCTs because the DH expects them to be ultimately accountable for 
LIFT outcomes. It is also possible that this finding arises from PCT 
managers’ desire for regaining influence over procurement activities 
perceivably lost to the LiftCo. They may be hoping that by citing 
duplication of existing practices, DH officials may be persuaded to revise 
LIFT guidance in favour of PCT staff compared to those of the LiftCo.    
5.1.6 LIFT objectives have been achieved to an extent 
Notwithstanding challenges in implementation, at least in this case-study, 
LIFT objectives have been achieved to lesser or greater extent. This is 
consistent with literature that has endorsed LIFT for improving the quality 
of buildings in terms of bigger sizes, fitness for their purpose, and having 
appropriate technology to increase patient experience (King’s Fund 2008, 
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NAO 2005, Beck et al 2009). Other commentators (e.g. Pollock and Price 
2005, Aldred 2007, Fitzsimmons et al 2009) have, like informants in this 
case-study, criticised LIFT as a convoluted arrangement that makes 
procurement expensive and unsustainable for the PCTs. Despite this, most 
informants acknowledge that the quality of LIFT buildings was significantly 
better than pre-existing ones. This finding correlates the researcher’s 
observations during the tours that the conditions at LIFT buildings were 
sufficient to promote continuity in GP activities (Key Finding 8).   
With regards to some of the criticism levelled against LIFT, it is possible 
that some informants may have encountered problems in measuring its 
outcomes especially those related to value-for-money. A considerable 
number of LIFT outcomes may be intangible and therefore misunderstood, 
meaning some informants may be hard on their achievement by reporting 
limited progress sometimes. Or they may even overstate their 
achievement due to the subjective nature of some expected LIFT 
outcomes. Further, considering the PCTs case-studied as part of the 
pioneers of LIFT in London, it may be that negative views on LIFT were 
influenced by experiences at the beginning. Over the years, LIFT may 
have improved in economy, efficiency and effectiveness yet scars from 
pioneering it remain vivid in informant perspectives.  
5.1.7 Success and failure in LIFT 
With over 50 operational schemes across London alone, DH officials may 
view LIFT as a success especially after endorsement by the National Audit 
Office (DH 2007, NAO 2005). Yet problems cited by its critics suggest that 
different criteria and factors are used in judging success in LIFT.    
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5.1.7.1  Criteria to measure success 
The criteria seen to contain useful indicators for success concerned LIFT’s 
ability to: (i) support the PCTs towards meeting their objectives; (ii) deliver 
gains that commensurate with amounts of capital invested by the PCTs; 
(iii) increase PCT capacity in procurement activities; and (iv) generate 
future opportunities for the LiftCo and PCTs (IPPR 2004). For example, 
completing started projects was seen as indicating success under the first 
criterion; and delivering buildings within budget indicated success under 
the second criterion. Caution may be recommended against isolated use 
of individual criteria to measure success. It is possible that confounding 
factors other than LIFT influence the outcomes. For example, some 
indicators for success like increased staff morale due to using more 
comfortable buildings; or GPs using relevant treatment technology in 
appropriately designed buildings, are crossover of success between 
different criteria driven by different LIFT mechanisms. Similarly, when PCTs 
experienced financial challenges in meeting their obligations, it was seen 
as failure (Milburn 2004) along different criteria to measure success. 
Within the case-study, how the conceptual bases of LIFT (subsection 1.2.4 
page 40) are expected to work tend to influence the criteria used in 
measuring success.  For example, how public-private partnerships work to 
solve problems in procurement had bearings on perceived effectiveness of 
LIFT in addressing declining investment in GP surgeries. If LIFT was seen 
as driven by “localism”, its responsiveness to patient demands for a greater 
say in improving local surgeries may be affected by how it is implement. It 
means that how conceptual bases of LIFT are expected to work were 
incentives influencing LIFT outcomes. These were some of the criteria that 
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research informants used in explaining whether LIFT was able to replace 
PCTs in delivering GP surgeries efficiently. Some were also used in 
judging whether LIFT was able to improve democracy in activities for 
improving the quality of services demanded by patients at GP surgeries.  
5.1.7.2  Success factors   
In this case-study, informants believed that the criteria to measure success 
in LIFT were influenced by behavioural, institutional and economic factors. 
Success was achieved provided DH officials, the Strategic Partnering 
Board, and LiftCo executives joined and supported PCT management staff 
in working as a chain of commissioners. PCT managers believed that 
joining up institutional efforts would reduce confusion and counter 
suspicion that constrained progress in LIFT. Yet DH officials and the 
Strategic Partnering Board were perceived as not sufficiently engaging 
PCT managers in making critical decisions in LIFT.  
The DH officials and local strategic partnering boards are expected to seek 
consensus on governance issues by coordinating strategic decisions in 
LIFT. This may help in translating PCT priorities into desired buildings. For 
example, the case-studied LiftCo participated in identifying investment 
opportunities for inclusion in the PCTs’ strategic services development 
plans. It then created synergy within PCTs by making LIFT buildings 
available free of charge for community initiated social activities whenever 
not needed for health provision. The local strategic partnering board 
ensured success by robustly enforcing compliance with LIFT. But PCT 
managers felt that way compliance was enforced alienated them because 
consensus on important issues was not prioritised. 
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Another factor for success concerned continuity in demand for utilization of 
GP surgeries. East London areas experienced high population growth 
meaning increased demand for appropriate buildings. PCT managers 
explained that patients within their PCT areas were now more 
knowledgeable about the quality of services they expect from providers. It 
empowers them to influence their GPs and other providers in prioritising 
appropriate buildings and technology. Thus, the PCTs are persuaded to 
have continuous demand for using LIFT to deliver the desired facilities and 
the providers being ever prepared in taking LIFT accommodation for their 
business. Presence of these factors may explain success achieved so far 
within the case-study. But the Liftco’s capacity to deliver is outstripped by 
demand for alternative accommodation to replace old buildings.  
Economic and financial factors especially those about who pays for what 
activities are also important factors for success in LIFT. The lead GPs and 
LiftCo chief executive officer were concerned that the cost of land in east 
London was high. It inhibited expansion or delivery of new buildings with 
amenities that may take up too much land. Because of population 
concentrations in some areas in the case-study, LIFT was prevented from 
erecting appropriate GP surgeries without financial disadvantages to the 
PCTs and the LiftCo. This is because the necessary land or modifying 
existing buildings is expensive. 
5.1.7.3  LIFT’s success and failure in the case-study   
It was previously argued (subsection 1.2.4 page 40) that LIFT conceptually 
represented DH operationalisation of New Public Management, Third 
Way, Localism and PPP perspectives in public service delivery. Thus, the 
criteria to measure its ability to produce benefits might be similar to those 
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explaining how these conceptual perspectives (Table 1.1b pg 43) are 
expected to work. The perspectives and LIFT’s underlying objectives 
concern: (i) increasing participation; (ii) diversity; (iii) efficiency; and (iv) 
resolving conflict on appropriate ways to deliver public services. It might 
be more helpful to use the underlying objectives as the important 
benchmarks against which to judge LIFT’s success and failure than 
isolated consideration of its delivery of the desired buildings.   
5.1.7.3.1 Participation 
Through LIFT, the DH hierarchically reorganised authority for the PCTs to 
get responsibility in addressing problems in improving GP surgeries. LIFT 
guidance (DH 2001, DH/PfH 2003) facilitated participation by PCT 
managers in strategic decision-making with some degree of liberty from 
DH officials. Although PCT managers always had responsibility to prepare 
business cases for desired GP surgeries, through LIFT the got authority to 
invest public funds into private companies tasked with delivery and 
management of the buildings. Previously, the role was performed by the 
DH officials or their agencies. The reorganisation of participation possibly 
increased effectiveness in procurement and quality in management of GP 
surgeries.  
Some PCT managers contest this by questioning the quality of 
participation in LIFT. They are concerned that the DH officials excluded 
them in designing LIFT and feel they are not allowed sufficient 
discretionary powers in its governance. For example, they cannot use 
funds set aside for assisting GPs to move into LIFT buildings for other 
LIFT related activities without approval from the DH. So while 
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acknowledging that LIFT marginally increased their participation in 
decision-making about procurement; the managers are unconvinced with 
the quality of their participation. They explain it as the result of the DH 
officials and the local strategic partnering board prioritising their LiftCo’s 
contribution over that of the PCT managers. This gives rise to the 
perception their participation in LIFT’s critical decisions is cosmetic 
because it is run from the DH and forced on the PCTs. You could therefore 
argue that LIFT’s ability to increase participation in procurement activities is 
variable. Its procedures in the case-study involved insufficient consultation 
or lack of equality in partnership between the PCTs, LiftCo and public 
sector officials overseeing its implementation.   
5.1.7.3.2 Diversity 
Advocates of decentralization argue that compared to decisions only made 
by officials at national level, involving better informed diverse groups may 
produce more relevant decisions (Silverman 1992). LIFT may be thus a 
response to demands for increased competition in procurement of GP 
surgeries in line with New Public Management, Third Way, and PPP 
perspectives in public service delivery. Its implementation involves diverse 
interests in society joining up to plan, finance, deliver, and manage desired 
buildings. To an extent, LIFT has increased diversity in these aspects of 
procurement including in ownership and maintenance at GP surgeries. 
Previously, the roles were reserved for the DH or its PCT agencies. 
Success on diversity in the case-study is variable due to how LIFT was 
designed. On the one hand, the LiftCo has exclusive rights to developing 
future buildings within the PCT areas. It may be a failure in the sense that 
the LIFT areas become geographical monopolies of the LiftCo thereby 
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negating the benefits of increased competition in improving the GP 
surgeries. On the other hand, too many participants may increase 
problems in implementing LIFT. For example, in the case-study, concerns 
about poor workmanship or delaying responses to maintenance jobs at 
LIFT buildings were explained as the result of diversity. It brought in 
providers lacking experience in health. According to administrators at LIFT 
buildings, diversity introduced challenges in monitoring performance of 
multiple maintenance providers. They preferred it only if increased their 
capacity in procuring and managing the buildings.           
5.1.7.3.3 Efficiency 
The government perceived LIFT as a means to increasing efficiency in 
procuring primary care buildings with improved conditions (DH 2001, 
DH/PfH 2003). Efficiency was understood as delivering buildings of the 
desired quality on time and within budget without direct recourse to DH 
funds. Towards this end, private investors were given controlling equity in 
the LiftCo as incentive for them to apply private sector management 
practices and expertise in reducing inefficiency in bureaucracy of DH led 
procurement. Efficiency would be achieved if the LiftCo and PCT 
managers collaborate in procurement because their proximity to GPs and 
service-users allowed them more timely delivery of the desired buildings 
than the DH officials. But efficiency in this case is likely to depend on how 
PCT managers felt motivated by having discretion over their own creativity 
or initiatives in LIFT within their areas. 
The findings so far presented on this case-study indicate variable 
perceptions about LIFT’s ability in increasing efficiency in procurement. On 
the one hand, they corroborate those of past research that portrayed LIFT 
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as efficient at improving the quality of primary care buildings. King’s Fund 
(2008) and Beck et al (2009) reiterate that it increases efficiency in 
procurement compared to using the DH route by delivering buildings on 
time and within budget.  
On the other hand, PCT managers argue that the measures for efficiency 
in LIFT should not consider ability to deliver buildings on time and within 
budget only. They argue that their LiftCo pegged budgets for the buildings 
higher than market norms to accommodate its failure in reducing 
procurement costs. Coupled with the criticism that the LiftCo and its 
contractors cut-corners in construction or substituted poor quality inputs 
for the standard ones specified by the designers; the claims for efficiency 
in LIFT are perceived to be inflated. This is because the buildings are 
delivered using processes perceived to prioritise efficiency at the expense 
of quality. Thus, some PCT managers are not convinced about durability of 
LIFT buildings because of their speedy construction and poor quality inputs 
used to save delivery cost. Hence argument that it was more efficient to 
procure similar size and designed buildings through the DH route than 
using LIFT.       
5.1.7.3.4 Conflict resolution 
Within the NHS, opinion is divided on which between the DH, market, and 
LIFT routes is the most appropriate one in procuring premises. Some 
public management analysts (e.g. King’s Fund 2008) advocate moratorium 
on investment in new premises to redirect resources to strengthening 
collaboration between DH agencies and independent GPs using the 
existing in buildings. There is also conflict between advocates for markets 
and citizenship (e.g. Milburn 2004b, CABE 2008, NAO 2005) and those 
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favouring government retaining custody of public interests in procuring 
public functions (e.g. Powell 1998 and Pollock and Price 2006).  
Although LIFT is a drastic change in solving problems in procurement, it 
was probably seen as a better compromise in reducing conflict in 
procuring NHS premises. It neither fully privatises nor nationalises 
procurement activities. Its drastic introduction neither prepared PCT 
managers in dealing with problems nor resolving conflict in economic 
matters of its implementation. The conflict is also sustained by the fact that 
LIFT transfers influence of PCT managers on critical procurement 
decisions to the LiftCo to the extent that the PCTs continue using it only 
because the DH is reluctant to fund any procurement options. 
The DH (DH/PfH 2003) hoped that LIFT would make PCTs effective at 
improving GP surgeries by removing obstacles in economic and financial 
activities in the NHS. Yet PCT managers directly involved are not 
convinced that LIFT helps them in improving procurement. They cite their 
experience to point that it neither increases PCT capacities nor 
management capability in solving problems in public procurement. It 
corroborates work by Beck et al (2009) alerting us to the fact that some 
PCT managers still lack skills and expertise in monitoring performance of 
their LiftCos despite years of implementing LIFT in their areas.  
5.1.8 Using LIFT produces some unexpected outcomes  
The issues cited as unexpected outcomes that the DH officials did not 
foresee in recommending LIFT procurement concerned: increased role of 
independent GPs in developing PCT buildings (positive outcome); 
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exchange of expertise between the public and private sectors (positive 
and negative outcome); and conflict of interest (negative outcome).  
It is possible that increased role of GPs in developing PCT buildings is not 
so much an unexpected outcome but rather consistent with the DH’s 
determination in reducing its role in selected procurement activities. The 
unexpected may be the degree to which the GPs influence LIFT activities. 
For both the DH officials and the PCT managers, increased influence by 
the GPs is a positive outcome although for different reasons. The DH 
officials want to shed their role whereas PCT managers desire 
collaboration with the GPs in procurement activities. Hence GPs delegated 
role in coordinating delivery of individual buildings (King’s Fund 2008).  
Increased exchange of expertise between the public and private sectors 
may affect LIFT activities positively or negatively. Let us consider the loss 
of staff with LIFT experience at Treasury for example. Given Treasury’s 
strategic role in LIFT, PCT activities may be inconvenienced by lack of 
appropriate financial advice especially if Treasury finds it difficult to 
replace the lost expertise. A positive development though is that PCTs 
benefit from recruiting staff from private companies and other non-health 
public sector departments. In this case-study; the director for estate and 
facilities at PCT-1 had experience with LIFT from leading the delivery of 
Sure Start Children’s Centres whereas the LiftCo CEO had experience 
from working for a housing association. Their experience increased PCT 
capacity in relating well with the LiftCo and their skills mix was applied to 
improve LIFT outcomes. 
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Previous research by Aldred (2006) and Beck et al (2009) argued that 
seconding PCT managers to the LiftCo board could create conflict of 
interest in LIFT. The managers may be hard pressed to balance between 
PCT interests and those of the private equity holders in the LiftCo. This 
may negatively impact progress. Even if PCT nominees to the board 
achieved a good balance in their concerns with PCT and LiftCo interests, 
the suspicion that they did not do so may damage relations among PCT 
team members.   
The findings from this case-study indicate that progress in LIFT is more 
likely to the result of complex sets of factors. It does not appear to be 
solely a function of how LIFT is designed, mistakes in implementation 
activities, guidance not helping staff within the PCTs, or the involved staff 
lacking sufficient motivation. Casting progress on these individual sets of 
factors may be misplaced because the findings here revealed that 
economic, social and political factors significantly interacted to influence 
progress. For a variety of reasons, changes in these factors may trigger, 
for example, resignations of key staff at government departments with 
strategic roles in LIFT – and these may impinge progress. In this case-
study, the cost of land was found to inhibit delivery of buildings with 
amenities that required too much land. Areas that were affected with high 
population concentrations risked missing appropriate buildings because 
the cost of acquiring land for expansion is prohibitive for the PCTs. In 
summary, the factors impacting progress are not always the result of LIFT.  
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5.2 Implications for policy and practice  
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are believed to facilitate government 
access to private sector finance, skills and expertise needed in improving 
public service delivery (WHO 2000, World Bank 1993). But their use within 
health systems tends to divide opinion and is sometimes criticised for 
making procurement of services cumbersome. Some critics (Gaffney et al 
1999b, Flinders 2004, and Aldred 2008) argue that PPPs are promoted by 
people whose agendas are motivated by profit making. In light of this 
criticism, people involved in LIFT partnerships have divided opinions on its 
value and adequacy of its implementation. 
The findings being discussed here may present limitations in making 
conclusive lessons because they are based on one case-study involving a 
single LiftCo. Despite this, they still show possible links between contexts, 
mechanisms, and outcomes from which to draw out some implications for 
effective policy and practice for LIFT in other PCT areas. The findings 
revealed that most informants believed collaboration, involvement and 
empowerment were the important foundations for LIFT to be successful.  
Because they felt excluded by DH officials at conception of LIFT, PCT 
managers appear to lack sufficient motivation in influencing LIFT to 
succeed. In their view, LIFT could have been more effective if they were 
involved or engaged to indicate their priorities in improving procurement. 
This could imply that success may depend upon how a policy is 
interpreted by those affected by its implementation. PCT managers are 
critical to LIFT’s success because: they assess demand for buildings in 
their areas; develop the SSDPs that are the blueprints for LIFT buildings; 
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and coordinate delivery and use of the buildings by the GPs. The problem 
is that they do not feel connected with LIFT and question its credibility on 
the belief that it was imposed by the DH. Allen (2006) reminds us that 
involving or engaging local staff at the design stages of public 
programmes may increase their commitment as they are bound to value 
their own contributions.  
Another success factor may concern empowerment of PCT staff in 
monitoring and controlling LIFT activities. Given centrality of PCT 
managers to success as explained above, it would be reasonable to 
expect them to be sufficiently empowered in LIFT’s critical activities. The 
managers wanted to have a role in assessing relevance of skills and 
expertise that the LiftCo could bring in solving problems within their PCTs 
areas. Currently, they do not feel sufficiently empowered in influencing the 
LiftCo on issues about who to employ under what circumstances - giving 
rise to criticism that the LiftCo employs inexperienced contractors for jobs 
that could be handled by experienced PCT staff.   
Perrot (2006) contends that PPPs are effective at improving service 
delivery provided their activities focus on addressing specific problems 
identified by those affected. PCT managers and GPs in this case-study 
thought that progress achieved so far was due to their clear understanding 
and ability to identify problems and their possible solutions. This 
influenced them to mobilise themselves into action to develop SSDPs that 
specify their priorities making the LiftCo’s activities easier. Thus, despite 
some problems in implementation, staff within the PCTs may be making 
LIFT effective at addressing their local objectives.   
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This research found that DH officials and PCT managers recognised the 
need to have adequate stock of buildings with improved conditions to meet 
the needs of different patient groups. This finding appears to be consistent 
with literature that says prior agreement in purpose and practice are 
important foundations for successful public policies (IPPR 2002, Stevens 
2004). Although discordance may exist on whether LIFT was the suitable 
strategy to address the problems in conditions of buildings, in terms of 
policy, it is at least with the backing of a shared purpose between DH 
officials and PCT managers. It would appear they agree that buildings 
matter and initiatives like LIFT may increase patient experience in NHS 
activities. Agreements of this nature remain important even where some 
analysts (e.g. King’s Fund 2008) argue for supporting management 
practices that promote collaboration among providers within their PCTs 
than investing in LIFT.  
Pawson (2006) contends that people involved in policy implementation 
benefit from hindsight and experience to understand some unexpected 
and unintended effects. Similarly, informants in the present research may 
have benefited from experience to change their views about LIFT’s 
contribution in improving conditions at buildings within their areas. PCT 
managers acknowledged LIFT’s rationale yet they were concerned about 
the effects of some of its mechanisms on their ability to discharge their 
responsibilities. With hindsight, they may be realising that LIFT has 
problems like denying them adequate discretion in decision-making. Their 
other worries may be also consistent with anxiety resulting from using the 
new policy (Lipsky 1980). Such anxiety might fade as they familiarise 
themselves with LIFT, hence attributing progress to their effort.   
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Although not specifically addressing LIFT, the IPPR (2002) advocates 
policies that promote collaborative relations in delivering public service. 
The current research also revealed that collaboration between 
independent GPs and PCT staff existed in a number of ways in LIFT. The 
GPs took risks of leadership roles in coordinating delivery and post-
delivery occupation of LIFT buildings. Further, they “hot-desked” and 
opened their surgeries for extended hours in line with PCT objectives to 
offer convenience to patients. On their part, PCT staff retained 
responsibility for uncertainty in demand for buildings. Such collaboration 
enhanced LIFT’s credibility by ensuring that the buildings were not viewed 
as “white elephants”. A policy and practice lesson from the findings is that 
commitment to collaboration may be fundamental to success with LIFT and 
other PPPs.  
The findings from this research partly confirm those of the study by Beck 
et al (2009) that argue that the net gains in LIFT are possibly less than the 
risks. This implies that DH officials might have oversold LIFT by 
emphasizing its benefits and understating the risks to make it acceptable 
to the PCTs. For example, PCT managers in this research felt that delays 
and below standard maintenance jobs at LIFT buildings may cancel out 
savings made by the LiftCo in delivering buildings within budgets. 
Duplication of PCT roles also made LIFT’s overall cost higher than 
conventional procurement. Thus, questions arise about whether it is the 
general practice for DH officials to be optimistic and less critical about 
some elements in implementing new policy initiatives. This probably 
leaves PCT staff as the best arbiters of initiatives like LIFT within the NHS. 
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Discordance between the LiftCo and PCT staff in interpreting LIFT implies 
that success may depend upon how PCT interests are protected. LIFT is a 
business that is expected to protect investor interests. However, its 
objectives may be achieved less controversially provided the LiftCo does 
not adopt business practices that undermine PCT interests when using 
LIFT as a method of procuring public buildings. Fitzsimmons et al (2009) 
raise concern that progress in LIFT is restricted because PCT managers 
lack experience in managing PPPs compared to LiftCo staff. Aldred (2008) 
argue that some of LIFT’s problems emanate from lack of experience and 
discretion over its strategic activities. These factors may reduce PCT 
managers’ confidence in effectively transferring some risks to the LiftCo 
especially given LIFT’s complexity. It underlines the need for DH officials to 
support PCT managers in ensuring that procurement risks are managed in 
their favour. If left alone, the LiftCo may have no incentive to take full 
share of the agreed risks. Its priority may be to make profit for investors. 
Despite the concern about interference by DH officials, how the LiftCo 
interprets LIFT makes occasional intervention necessary to provide 
technical support within PCTs.       
Technical support enabling staff to translate LIFT guidance into expected 
outcomes could be more influential on success than quantity and 
frequency of guidance issued. LIFT guidance is perceived as inflexible for 
adaptation to suit specific circumstances within PCTs. If the DH seeks to 
decentralise some elements in procurement, flexible guidance 
accompanied with increased discretion in essential decisions might make 
PCT staff more optimistic especially when they feel their contributions in 
making LIFT effective are valued. Saltman et al (2008) argue that people 
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implementing policies are willing to take accountability for local outcomes 
provided they have discretion over key decisions.  
With LIFT, this may require DH officials making proper use of intelligence 
from PCT staff by soliciting regular feedback about practical issues that 
could help make its procedures adaptable to local priorities. This is 
consistent with Bossert’s (1998) argument that decentralisation is effective 
when local staff are allowed sufficient freedom in influencing operational 
decisions. Most informants in this research thought this was missing in 
LIFT. They believed it risked tension with the LiftCo believed to influence 
key decisions compared to PCT managers. Maybe DH officials were 
concerned that giving PCT managers increased discretion could 
exacerbate bureaucracy that LIFT was intended to avoid.    
An issue seldom discussed in literature around LIFT concerns whether it 
was necessary to invest in completely new primary care buildings. 
Commentary tends to advocate strengthening interpersonal relations 
between PCT staff and GPs in parallel with LIFT (King’s Fund 2008, IPPR 
2004). In this case-study, PCT managers and GPs wanted the number of 
modernised buildings increased. But they were concerned that LIFT used a 
lot of money to deliver a small number of completely new buildings. Most 
argued that it would have made better economic sense had the funding 
been spread to upgrade a large number of existing small GP surgeries as 
opposed to LIFT buildings. Although they acknowledged the poor 
conditions at pre-existing buildings, they felt that the problems could have 
been solved in other ways. In terms of policy and practice, this may 
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underline the importance in understanding problems within PCTs before 
imposing strategies for solving them. 
The findings highlighted how staff that operationalise LIFT schemes 
measured the promised benefits of LIFT against actual experience. The 
staff judged LIFT according to how they perceived its ability to increase 
PCT and individual capacities in improving procurement activities. It was 
apparent that most informants wanted LIFT to show that it could increase 
efficiency in discharging responsibilities by genuinely engaging with them 
in prioritising PCT interests. PCT managers explained their frustration 
about shortfall between what they were promised and what they 
experienced with LIFT. It is possible that they may be unclear about their 
role in LIFT and what to expect from it. Perhaps clarification about this from 
DH officials may help PCT managers in adjusting their expectations. The 
DH officials may need to specify activities where PCT managers should 
expect to be consulted and stakeholders not to be missed in consultations. 
In all this the managers should feel sufficiently empowered to demand 
their roles. These elements were missing despite being perceived as 
important for staff to invest more effort and commitment in LIFT. 
5.3 LIFT in context of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 
The Health and Social Care Act that reorganised commissioning of 
primary care became operational while this study was still ongoing. 
Previously, PCTs were central to delivery of GP surgeries through their 
coordination of LIFT. Their phasing out under the Act transferred 
governance powers and funding of commissioning activities to local non-
public sector providers with the potential to present opportunities and risks 
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for LIFT. Changes within the Act are fairly complex and a discussion of the 
Act’s intricate governance structures has been avoided since they are not 
the focus of the present research. This discussion only gives a feel of 
ways in which the research findings may apply in health service 
mechanisms and structures under the Act.  
5.3.1 Opportunities for LIFT under the Act 
The fact sheet that the DH (2012) produced in clarifying the Act shows 
parallels with logic of the previous government in introducing. This may 
indicate opportunities for LIFT in a number of ways. LIFT was previously 
explained as driven by increased demand and cost in procuring new 
buildings (DH 2001, Milburn 2004a). The same argument can be traced in 
the justifications for the reforms (DH 2012, Dixon and Ham 2010) on the 
basis that they are due to meeting the needs of an ageing population. So, 
similar to LIFT, the new Act envisages that its changes will enable the NHS 
to increase efficiency and provide more relevant and acceptable care by 
using commissioning approaches that increase value-for-money (DH 2001, 
DH 2012).   
It may be an opportunity for LIFT that the new Act is also premised on the 
DH desire to address problems of variations in patient experiences in 
accessing NHS services (DH 2010, DH/PfH 2003). The Act criticises the 
poor condition of NHS buildings, technology used to provide care, and 
management responsiveness to patient needs for causing patients to 
experience inferior services compared to those in other European 
countries (DH 2012). Its objective to address these problems appears to 
be consistent with LIFT’s current remit. LIFT was also driven by the need to 
address problems of residents within inner-cities experiencing less quality 
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of their lives and healthcare received. Then, old healthcare buildings and 
poor technology were blamed for preventing GPs from making their 
services more responsive to patient needs (DH 2001, Fitzpatrick & 
Jacobson 2002).  
Despite their different timing, LIFT and the new Act also seem to have 
been influenced by the state of public funds. The DH has always funded 
improvements in health but prefers to do this by increasing PPPs within the 
NHS to increase value-for-money (Flinders 2004). Emphasising increased 
value-for-money from reduced public investment may be the DH strategy 
for reducing challenges in maintaining previous levels of funding for NHS 
activities due to economic recession experienced since 2009 (Pollock and 
Price 2011). This may give chance for LIFT being retained as the 
appropriate strategy to deliver buildings especially given the previous 
endorsement for prioritising efficiency to save public sector expenses 
(King’s Fund 2008, NAO 2005).  
There is also chance that LIFT and reforms under the new Act may be 
dependent on each other to the advantage of both considering the DH’s 
desire to address problems due to inappropriate healthcare buildings. 
Chance exists for the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) required 
under the Act riding on LIFT’s experience to deliver better healthcare 
buildings in line with the objective for improving the quality of services. The 
Act empowers CCGs in arranging “for the provision of services or facilities 
as considered appropriate for the purposes of the health services that 
relate to securing improvement” (House of Commons 2012, page 8). 
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5.3.2 Concerns about LIFT under the Act   
Initial controversy generated by the Act makes it necessary to highlight the 
ways in which it may affect procurement and management of primary care 
buildings when CCGs’ substitute for PCTs that previously coordinated the 
activities through LIFT. Prior to the Act, PCTs and independent GPs were 
integral parts of LIFT activities. The PCTs had both a strategic role and 
equity in the LiftCo (DH/PfH 2003). As commissioners, PCT managers in 
consultation with the GPs set the terms of what buildings to deliver, 
benefiting which providers, and offering what services using LIFT. Under 
the new Act, power, responsibility and funding previously held by PCT 
managers is devolved to CCGs that mainly comprise independent GPs 
(House of Commons 2012). It is argued that substituting the CCGs for 
PCTs in commissioning activities may make the NHS more responsive and 
technically efficient in delivering patient services (DH 2012).     
But with the phasing out of PCTs, questions arise regarding the fate of the 
public equity in the LiftCo that was held by the PCTs. It is neither clear who 
may inherit the equity nor how it may be disposed under the new Act. 
What is clear is that disposing it may be seen as disinvestment in health. 
This may add up to concerns since raised that the Act privatises NHS 
functions especially if the equity was to be transferred to CCGs that are 
dominated by private GPs.     
Another concern seldom discussed in context of the Act is around risk on 
investing in healthcare buildings. Debate tends to focus on the Act’s 
potential effects on care provision and management activities without 
attention on procurement of healthcare buildings for the public. Given their 
role in driving the SSDPs from which future LIFT buildings were derived, 
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the risks in phasing out PCT structures may have been ignored if this leads 
to stagnation in growth of stock and upgrading of buildings. Any 
commissioning group will need adequate buildings – what LIFT has been 
providing - to achieve the Act’s objectives.  
There is yet another concern deriving from this research’s finding that 
having adequate and appropriate buildings matters in improving patient 
experience. It was found that despite getting help from experienced PCT 
staff, LIFT failed to satisfy demand for upgraded buildings. This raises 
questions about whether inexperienced GPs or the new CCGs will 
influence LIFT better in delivering adequate stock than the PCT staff. 
Already, a survey by King’s Fund and Doctors.net.uk (2010) revealed that 
25% of GPs were not convinced of the new Act helping them to either 
increase efficiency or patient experience. The people that previously 
endorsed LIFT for delivering quality buildings are therefore sceptical about 
the Act’s helpfulness in maintaining momentum.   
Under the new Act, the NHS Commissioning Board has the role to support 
commissioning groups in increasing their capacities and capabilities as 
effective purchasers for services (DH 2012). Further support is provided by 
local Health and Wellbeing Boards (HWBs) seeking to ensure that the 
clinical commissioning groups prioritise their communities’ needs (House 
of Commons 2012). But it is unclear whether the support extends to 
activities in procuring healthcare buildings. The Act does not specify who 
will plan, finance and coordinate delivery of healthcare buildings as 
previously done by PCT staff through LIFT. It is likely that support by the 
different boards may focus on medical activities than delivering buildings.   
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In this research, PCT managers indicated that some critical decisions in 
LIFT were neglected because of confused responsibilities between PCT 
boards and SPBs that oversee its implementation. Yet the Act does not 
provide a platform for addressing the problem and risk confusion between 
the CCGs, care providers, NHS Commissioning Board, local authorities, 
and HWBs regarding the responsibility for procuring buildings. Some 
critics of the reforms (e.g. Dixon & Ham 2010, Cotton 2010, Pollock and 
Price 2011) are doubtful whether the governance structures introduced to 
either support or oversee the clinical commissioning groups will have the 
relevant experience and skills in developing healthcare buildings.  
Essentially, procurement of buildings may require commercial skills and 
expertise. Yet even PCT managers in LIFT were found lacking this despite 
getting support from Treasury, CHP and local SPBs (Fitzsimmons et al et al 
2009). A big concern might be the governance structures under the new 
Act failing in providing adequate support in procurement. This may not 
prevent the commissioning groups from having divided attention in 
procuring and managing buildings as the PCTs did through LIFT. Some of 
the efficiency savings intended by the Act may be missed if commissioning 
groups feel tempted to hire teams of administrators, accountants, or other 
professionals to do the jobs previously done by PCT staff.  
Drastic policy changes within the NHS have been criticised for risking 
disruptions unless existing programmes are cushioned in some ways 
(King’s Fund 2008, Normand 2011). For example, the Act could have 
clarified whether and how LIFT would be protected against any possible 
challenges that may prevent it from delivering long-term benefits. 
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Considering that the first LIFT building opened is now still only 10 years 
old, you could argue that we have gained experience of how to deliver it 
well and make its future effective. Yet the Act does not seem to recognise 
this. Continual reorganization of NHS activities may also reduce GP 
commitment to LIFT if changes involve service reconfigurations that may 
threaten viability of business at LIFT buildings. The LiftCos may also 
reduce their commitment to investing in NHS buildings unless they are 
certain about continuity of LIFT as the preferred procurement method. The 
safeguard for LIFT may be its contracts that make it difficult for the DH to 
terminate them prematurely.  
During this research’s fieldwork, some GPs at LIFT buildings indicated that 
they belonged to some CCGs required by the new Act well before it 
became operational. This could be a market failure in improving service 
delivery through fair competition as desired by the Act (Cotton 2010, 
King’s Fund 2010, Pollock & Price 2011). This is because such GPs 
possibly took advantage of their current use of LIFT buildings to block 
those outside from belonging to provider consortia owning better buildings. 
GPs in LIFT know about the locations, range of services, and leverage 
carried by different LIFT buildings and this may be a barrier to competition 
in forming provider consortia required under the Act. Given Aldred (2006) 
and Pollock & Price’s (2006) criticism that LIFT restricted diversity in the 
ownership and management of buildings, you would have expected the 
changes to provide a platform for competition especially if LIFT retains role 
to deliver and maintain buildings for the GP consortia.  
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The new Act empowers Monitor in regulating NHS activities to ensure 
service purchasers respect competition and fairness in relating to each 
other (DH 2012). However, questions may arise about whether Monitor will 
have effective mechanisms for preventing existing private companies and 
those already involved in LIFT from dominating the ownership and 
management of healthcare buildings across large areas. Without strict 
regulation, it is possible that some LiftCos - currently restricted to delivery 
and maintenance of buildings - may be tempted to venture into clinical 
activities. This may risk entrenching business practices that prioritise 
efficiency and shareholder interests instead of the DH goals that the Act 
seeks to achieve. At present, LIFT’s failure in delivering some expected 
benefits is seen as the result of the LiftCo being protected from 
competition and lacking mechanisms for providing equal opportunity to 
other developers and service-suppliers.      
Other potential determinants of LIFT’s future as a procurement method 
include: shifts in patient preferences; service reconfigurations; and 
advances in technology. These factors influence whether LIFT, or its 
buildings, or using GP consortia remain as appropriate options in 
improving NHS activities. The Act could be opportunity for LIFT being 
retained as the method for procuring buildings for the CCGs. But advances 
in technology like e-healthcare or tele-healthcare now popular within the 
NHS could influence patients to change their preferences affecting the use 
of LIFT buildings.     
Again, there is a common argument that LIFT (King’s Fund 2008) and the 
Health and Social Care Act (Cotton 2010, Dixon & Ham 2010, Pollock & 
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Price 2011) lack inbuilt mechanisms for ensuring fairness in use of public 
resources. But at least LIFT gave PCTs opportunity to have part ownership 
of buildings through equity in the LiftCo while retaining land on which the 
buildings were erected. In contrast, the Act appears to entrust independent 
GPs with the management of the bulk of NHS budget (DH 2012). This 
paints the picture of government “privatising” NHS activities further to 
replacing PCT managers with DH officials in influencing commissioning of 
services. Yet LIFT sought to decentralise in order to improve performance 
by addressing imperfections in DH led procurement.    
5.4 Limitations of the Research  
This subsection acknowledges ways in which some issues in process of 
the research may have shaped decisions about what aspects of LIFT to 
focus on or the data types to collect at the expense of others. Banister et 
al (1994) consider such reflexivity important in qualitative studies. 
Whereas the views at the operational level were prioritised over those at 
the policy-making and care provision levels, the findings revealed that LIFT 
is swamped with complex yet all important issues to investigate in order to 
better understand it. The researcher believed that people charged with 
LIFT implementation may provide more realistic evidence about how it 
works than those promoting it. Potential limitations in the research design 
and usage of qualitative methods were acknowledged and ways to 
minimise their impact considered.  
5.4.1 Limitations in design of the research  
Since this research was based on only one case-study involving a single 
LiftCo operating across the concerned PCTs, its critique may be possible 
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limitations in generalizing the findings to other PCTs and LiftCos. Single 
case-studies are criticised for restricted focus which risks producing 
findings that may have limited generalisability (Yin 2009). In this case, 
there may be limited possibility of using the findings in explaining how LIFT 
could work in other areas.  
Although generalisability was not the current research’s primary goal, 
ways of accounting for this limitation were considered. The researcher 
designed an embedded case-study to understand LIFT based on an 
increased number of units of analysis (Yin 2009). It involved two PCTs, 
four LIFT buildings, the LiftCo, and 25 informants comprised of different 
categories of staff providing data on LIFT. As one of the pioneers of LIFT, 
this case-study was preferred because the informants were thought to 
have invaluable experience to inform about LIFT and its evolution 
compared to other areas served by young LiftCos.     
Another critique of this research may be its focus on evaluating 
procurement of buildings using LIFT without evaluating optional methods 
for comparison. This implies limitations in making conclusive judgement 
about which between LIFT and options is the better procurement route. For 
example, comparing LIFT to the DH route may be inconclusive because no 
comparable government delivered buildings were observed in the 
research. 
Another issue was that the research focus was at the operational level 
where it sought to reconcile DH officials’ – policy-makers - expectations 
and operational staff experiences of LIFT. It means the research did not 
give the involved officials opportunity to say their side of the story yet they 
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were the ones that conceived LIFT and provided its guidance. They 
probably needed the chance to elaborate on their expectations in 
contextualising informants’ interpretations and experiences of LIFT. Other 
groups whose views were missed yet important in understanding LIFT 
included investors in the LiftCo, contractors at LIFT buildings, and patients 
that patronise LIFT buildings. This research was interested in 
implementation process rather than all aspects of LIFT. So these groups 
were considered as not directly affected by how LIFT projects were 
planned and executed compared to staff at the PCTs, the LiftCo and LIFT 
buildings. But their views may need to be respected in the interest of 
citizenship in LIFT.   
Usage of qualitative research methods restricted the study to 
understanding how LIFT contexts and mechanisms affected the concerned 
informants in their activities. Social and behavioural perspectives were 
therefore emphasized in describing LIFT’s effects at the expense of 
quantifiable outcomes like costs and risks. This may invite disagreement 
with other studies where consensus on either precise definitions of LIFT 
outcomes or how to measure them may be lacking. Thus, it may be hard 
to compare the current findings with previous work that may have focused 
on broader or the quantifiable aspects of LIFT. The findings from previous 
work might have been also influenced by different contexts and 
circumstances from those currently surrounding LIFT.   
5.4.2 Limitations due to data collection methods 
The current research might be also limited by subjectivity emanating from 
interviewing and dependence on the experiences of people directly 
involved in LIFT. It is possible that they brought bias into the research due 
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to their interests affecting them in being more critical about LIFT where 
they felt it reduced their influence. Morgan (2001) reminds us that people 
that are directly involved in implementing public programmes may not be 
the best at informing about how the concerned programmes are valued by 
ordinary service-users. Some people may experience difficulties in 
balancing between their official positions and personal experiences. In this 
research, this potentially tempted some informants into carefully selecting 
what information on LIFT to share or withhold from the researcher. It is 
therefore possible that the research missed the benefits of non-selective 
disclosure of information; and the findings may vary from those of previous 
studies informed by other groups of LIFT participants.  
Reducing potential bias in the data that was collected involved explaining 
the purpose of the research and promising anonymity of informants and 
confidentiality of the data before the interviews. Carefulness on choice of 
the data to analyse and distinguishing facts from opinion were also 
prioritised in data analysis. Objectivity of the findings in answering the 
research questions was also increased through blind coding of interview 
transcripts and associating the coded data with informant positions rather 
than their names during data analysis in NVivo.   
There may be issues within the representativeness of the documents 
reviewed in this research. There was always going to be challenges in 
decisions about the number and types of LIFT documents to review to 
better understand it. Some documents especially from the private sector 
constituents of LIFT were possibly missed on the list of those prioritised for 
review. The researcher recognised this limitation and countered it by 
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analysing as many types and sources of documents as possible, 
prioritising publications from sources seeking to inform a critical public 
audience. This helped to avoid disproportional exposure to subjective 
information from officials interested in promoting LIFT. To this end, 
documents from Unison and King’s Fund were analysed because their 
contents may consider the public view and interpretation of LIFT and its 
impact on patient experiences. 
In general, conduct of this research was robust to counter possible 
grounds for doubting authenticity and objectivity of the findings. All 
informants volunteered to contribute data and the recorded views are 
accounts of what they understood about LIFT. Deeper knowledge about 
LIFT was developed by using interview topic guides that were designed for 
relevance to all categories of staff with different roles in LIFT. They 
complemented each other in exposing issues considered to be influential 
on progress to enable the researcher in attributing the reported outcomes 
to either LIFT design or implementation practices. Depending on their role, 
informants had different explanations for LIFT. In their explanations, the 
PCT managers used political and social perspectives; the GPs emphasized 
economics; and the LiftCo representative considered LIFT as a business 
model. 
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SECTION 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research explored with people involved in executing LIFT schemes 
their views about why LIFT produced outcomes that they experienced 
within their PCT areas. The findings were presented in Section 3; analysed 
and interpreted in Section 4; and discussed in Section 5. In this section, 
the key findings are consolidated into themes aligned to the research 
questions (Table 6.1) along which conclusions are to be drawn (6.1). The 
consolidated key findings reconcile DH officials and informant views by 
addressing: conceptual explanation for LIFT (6.1.1); perceptions and 
experiences with LIFT outcomes (6.1.2); perceived facilitating or 
constraining factors (6.1.3); and lessons learnt from the case-study (6.1.4) 
in providing answers to the research questions.  
Table 6.1: Alignment of key findings and research questions  
Consolidated thematic findings Research question answered 
Conceptual explanation for LIFT (i), (ii) and (iii) 
Perceptions / experiences with LIFT outcomes (i) and (ii) 
Facilitating and constraining factors (iii) 
Lessons from the case-study (iv) 
 
Based on the conclusions in subsections 6.1; subsection 6.2 offers 
recommendations for the DH officials; staff implementing LIFT schemes; 
and future research. Contribution of the present research is explained in 
subsection 6.3.  
6.1 Conclusions on the key findings 
It is possible that gaps in information might be observed in the conclusions 
drawn and recommendations put forth. The gaps may be explained by 
limitations already discussed in subsection 5.4 (page 279). 
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6.1.1 Conceptual explanation for LIFT 
This research provided evidence that LIFT was perceived as 
decentralisation strategy in procurement and management of healthcare 
buildings within PCTs. Decentralisation was may be driven by new 
perspectives to public service delivery, the most probable of which are 
New Public Management, Third Way, Localism, and Public-private 
partnerships. The evidence was articulated and at times implicitly 
described in the analysed literature, official documents and informant 
interviews.  
The overall conclusion drawn from this finding was that LIFT is a PPP 
model designed to decentralise aspects in procurement. It primarily 
decentralises financing of the buildings from central government to private 
financiers through the LiftCo. Traditionally, government worked through 
the DH and Treasury to directly fund delivery of public sector buildings. 
Under LIFT, the LiftCo is delegated the role to mobilise finance without 
direct recourse to the government. Decentralisation is extended through 
the LiftCo assuming leadership in coordinating activities for construction, 
delivery, and subsequent maintenance of the buildings.  
Although the PCTs lead in developing SSDPs from which LIFT buildings are 
derived, the LiftCo is expected to be an active participant. This is yet 
another indication of decentralised planning under LIFT. Previously, the DH 
and its agents were responsible without the involvement of private sector 
representatives. Further decentralisation takes the form of independent 
GPs being delegated the role to coordinate delivery of individual LIFT 
buildings. This function was previously reserved for estates and facilities 
directors at the PCTs.  
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Other dimensions of decentralisation under LIFT concern ownership and 
post-delivery maintenance and management of the buildings. That the 
LiftCo is a PPP company means that LIFT buildings are jointly owned by 
the private financiers and the concerned PCTs. The LiftCo’s maintenance 
and management functions may be an example of LIFT risking 
privatisation of some NHS activities (Pollock and Price 2006) because 
previously, PCTs would directly use own staff or hire contractors at their 
buildings. In context of decentralisation, this may indicate that PCT 
managers believe the recommended LIFT guidance constrain more than 
facilitate their activities in making LIFT an effective strategy. 
6.1.2 Perceptions and experiences with LIFT outcomes 
The first set of significant findings on this revealed that LIFT was 
recognised as relevant to addressing poor condition of primary care 
buildings. This is despite its unstable surrounding socio-economic and 
political environments making it a complex initiative. Informants felt that 
their experience made it possible to execute successful schemes in spite 
of the complexities in LIFT. This influenced the conclusion that staff within 
PCTs had the commitment and willingness to translate their experience 
into making LIFT effective.  
Their views and experience were examined to clarify how LIFT’s intentions 
and practices influenced staff activities in producing the reported 
outcomes. In context of decentralization, the findings revealed lack of 
clarity on whether LIFT was driven by administrative, economic, financial, 
or technical requirements. Neither official documents nor informants could 
articulate LIFT’s underlying intentions. This influenced the conclusion that 
most informants speculate about LIFT - particularly that political reasons 
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superseded any others in decentralising aspects of procurement using 
LIFT.  
The second set of significant findings concerned implementation 
procedures and governance in LIFT.  Elements of enhanced discretion and 
engagement of local staff are often cited as part of the benefits of 
decentralization (Sharma 2006, Bossert 1998). But PCT managers felt that 
they lacked adequate discretion and serious engagement in influencing 
governance and key procedures in executing LIFT schemes. They 
considered these elements, especially in decision-making, as helpful yet 
missing factors for progress. Hence conclusion that, LIFT does not 
convincingly help the managers in realising the major benefits of 
decentralization.  
They also expressed concern that DH officials tended to decentralise 
responsibility for LIFT but not the necessary power and authority for key 
decisions and control. This led to the conclusion that progress was 
achieved because of commitment within the PCTs rather than due to the 
strengths of LIFT. Despite feeling excluded at its conception, PCT boards 
and management staff have accepted LIFT and invest in using it to procure 
desired buildings.  There was consensus that governance at LIFT buildings 
satisfied the main expectation to increase patient experience.  
The quality of procedures followed to deliver LIFT buildings was perceived 
to affect success. Political interference in implementing LIFT was 
mentioned as a factor that restricted the PCTs from getting maximum 
benefits. PCT managers felt that the DH officials interfered in local 
activities. They also did not feel that they were sufficiently engaged to give 
289 
 
input in designing LIFT buildings despite their experience in such activities. 
GPs were delegated the role to coordinate delivery of individual buildings 
but the managers felt PCT aspirations especially in reducing costs were 
not prioritised. Two conclusions drawn from this finding were that: (i) it is 
uncertain whether designs of LIFT buildings reflect true priorities and 
aspirations of the PCTs; (ii) PCT managers are unconvinced that the 
buildings’ long-term values are commensurate to their mortgages. LIFT 
buildings were believed to risk rapid dilapidation due to frequent 
modifications to correct initial inappropriate designs. Some managers 
doubted ability of lead GPs that coordinated delivery of individual LIFT 
buildings in representing PCT aspirations. These conclusions underline the 
challenge facing DH officials in convincing PCT managers that LIFT and 
delegating the GPs some roles may help in improving procurement.   
The third set of significant findings concerned the quality of buildings. The 
majority of informants believed that LIFT improved quality with the GPs 
expressing that buildings were bigger and designed to handle heavy flow 
of patients compared to their old surgeries. The conclusion drawn from the 
findings was that tenants at LIFT buildings prefer multiple indicators in 
measuring quality at the buildings. Besides physical outlook and 
cleanliness, they are interested with relevance of the designs to local 
needs, regular availability for use, and comfort offered to patients.  
Part of the analyses examined how the LiftCo innovated in terms of 
introducing new ideas in delivery and management of buildings within 
PCTs.  The LiftCo’s ability to innovate in improving the buildings was 
acknowledged. According to the GPs, increased patronage by patients 
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was partly the result of better quality buildings. They thought the LiftCo 
was driven to innovate in order to keep pace with changes in demand 
patterns and care provision methods preferred by GPs. It was therefore 
concluded that quality of LIFT buildings reflected the LiftCo’s commitment 
to ensuring their continuous availability to tenants. In future, its ability in 
innovation might be tested by how well it will adapt LIFT buildings to 
handle increased patient demand at premises where available land may 
restrict easy expansion.           
The fourth significant set of findings considered mechanisms used to 
achieve value-for-money in LIFT. The DH officials were optimistic that LIFT 
would enhance technical and economic efficiency through PCTs getting 
opportunity to access private sector resources including skills and 
expertise in procurement (DH/PfH 2003). But the findings revealed that 
LIFT was not perceived as working to improve value-for-money in 
procurement. PCT managers and building administrators believed that it 
was an expensive option compared to conventional route whether from 
financial, economic or technical perspectives. They were concerned about 
opportunity cost arguing that it cost more per LIFT building than upgrading 
a number of old surgeries.   
These findings influenced the conclusion that LIFT sufficiently increased 
neither scope nor capacity of the PCTs to improve more buildings. This 
was because it used more money to deliver fewer and centralised 
buildings. PCT managers wanted the money spread to upgrade an 
increased number of smaller GP surgeries. Related conclusions were that 
LIFT failed to increase the stock of buildings and PCT managers are 
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sceptical about private contractors used in LIFT having better skills than 
them in maintenance activities. These elements were considered as 
important for the PCTs to obtain value-for-money from LIFT. Yet there was 
concern that PCTs paid a lot of money for few LIFT buildings of which the 
quality of maintenance was questionable.  
PCT managers and GPs perceived the manner in which LIFT’s economic 
and technical matters are managed to be an influential factor for value-for-
money especially if there is burden on the PCTs. The managers wanted 
activities of PCT staff and GPs based at same LIFT buildings to be linked 
up in order to provide seamless care. They felt that activities were 
currently not coordinated for patient convenience. This led to a conclusion 
that LIFT buildings do not necessarily stimulate efficiency savings achieved 
through coordinated and collaborative care provision. The reason could be 
partly because PCT activities are not financially supported by the DH 
towards this goal. Funding gives PCT managers impetus in preventing 
parallel activities at one building because care providers may lack motive 
to coordinate their activities despite working under one roof.    
Further, the findings gave the impression that value-for-money was 
influenced by where leadership in developing NHS buildings should lie. 
PCT managers and GPs preferred DH leadership working through PCTs 
over that of the LiftCo. Their view was that this would ensure that PCT 
interests were prioritised and cost of the buildings reduced. To this end, 
they wanted LIFT contracts to be renegotiated to give PCT staff necessary 
authority including discretion to prefer other methods of procurement. 
Hence conclusion that the lack of economic evaluations of LIFT projects 
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undertaken to determine value-for-money prior to construction of buildings 
is an undesirable result of PCTs having no options to using LIFT. Some 
projects may be done without the backing of evidence that they will work in 
the best interest of the PCTs.               
Despite the concerns, informants in this case-study agreed that challenges 
in LIFT were not insurmountable. Their optimism stems from having the 
commitment plus experience from working in partnerships with other 
health and social care providers. A number of voluntary providers, private 
Trusts, and housing associations within the PCTs had projects regularly 
monitored by PCT staff making it reasonable to conclude that they all value 
collaborative working as stakeholders in solving health problems in their 
areas. With time they may use this experience to make LIFT more 
effective.  
6.1.3 Facilitating or constraining factors 
The fifth set of significant findings concerned informant perceptions of 
what facilitated or constrained them in making progress. This included 
indications of factors that were thought as most helpful in making 
progress. A combination of factors including how other programmes 
worked was thought to influence activities and progress against LIFT 
outcomes. Having PCT boards and an experienced team of managers that 
valued commitment to improving the quality of buildings were revealed to 
be fundamental to success by influencing adoption and perpetuation of 
LIFT within PCTs. To put this into perspective, the case-studied LiftCo 
postponed activities in a neighbouring PCT because the responsible board 
and managers were not keen on LIFT despite needing improved buildings. 
The conclusion drawn from this finding was that, PCT boards and 
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managers in the case-study recognise the poor state of their buildings. It 
gives them high level commitment to using LIFT in addressing these 
problems and initiated projects are always completed despite challenges 
in execution.  
Another finding was that size of the involved LiftCo matters. A small LiftCo 
that experiences less frequent turnover of staff was believed to enhance 
progress. PCT managers argued that keeping the same CEO in charge at 
the LiftCo significantly increased value-for-money and improved solutions 
to operational problems. Stability allowed the LiftCo to familiarise itself with 
PCT priorities and increased efficiency in translation of contents of the 
SSDPs into desired buildings. Hence the conclusion that initial problems in 
executing earlier schemes are explained by high churn of CEOs at the 
LiftCo. The successful completion of LIFT projects and continued optimism 
about challenges not being insurmountable could be explained by the long 
tenure of the LiftCo CEO. Informal contact between the CEO and PCT 
managers reportedly kept the LiftCo abreast of priorities within the PCTs.  
The sixth set of findings concerned what was thought to constrain staff 
activities in LIFT. In this case inflexible guidance, lack of good information 
and insufficient discretion over critical LIFT processes were cited as major 
barriers. These findings raised two conclusions. First, PCT staff wanted 
LIFT guidance to be made flexible believing that if accompanied with 
sufficient discretion, they may adapt them to suit their local priorities. The 
current standardised guidance disregarded differences in circumstances 
that may exist between different PCTs using LIFT.  
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Second, progress was thought to be restricted when LIFT participants 
received different sets of guidance from the DH and their professional 
representative bodies. In addition to guidance issued by the DH, for 
example, GPs and pharmacists respectively received guidance from the 
BMA and NPA while private contractors received more from local business 
organizations with interests in LIFT. It was therefore concluded that 
guidance obtained from multiple sources created inconsistency in the type 
of information used by the major participants in LIFT. A framework of 
accountability for managing risks in LIFT is essential for progress. But this 
may be missed because of confusion arising from participants getting 
different sets of guidance.  
PCT managers wanted all participants to use guidance originating from the 
DH to address potential inconsistencies in awareness about new 
developments and changes in LIFT. They also thought that the DH did not 
help in keeping them abreast with developments in LIFT because it lagged 
behind the BMA and interested local businesses in issuing up to date 
information. Hence concern that the LiftCo was more informed about LIFT 
than the PCTs.       
Most PCT managers raised concern about the quality of LIFT governance. 
In their view, both CHP and the locally based SPB were not reliable 
sources of information useful for making LIFT effective. There was concern 
that critical views about LIFT raised by PCT managers were suppressed by 
the SPB while CHP was criticised for recommending governance 
arrangements that were not tailor-made for the PCTs’ individual needs. 
These findings raised a common conclusion highlighting significant 
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scepticism among PCT managers about LIFT governance’s ability to 
facilitate progress. The managers are not convinced that they are 
technically helped in discharging their responsibilities so there is counter-
passing of some roles between PCT staff and the SPB or CHP. Therefore it 
might be concluded that some operational roles such ensuring that only 
competent contractors are retained at LIFT buildings were neglected 
because of the confusion.  
Both the SPB and CHP were believed to prioritise LiftCo’s interests and 
contributions more than those of the PCTs. PCT managers felt unvalued 
and frustrated when their contributions to delivering effective LIFT 
schemes were not respected. The first of two conclusions drawn from this 
finding was that PCT managers wanted to have a stronger voice in LIFT 
because they are ultimately accountable for its outcomes. Second, it can 
be concluded that most managers are not convinced that LIFT governance 
is effective or genuinely valued their contributions. This suggests lack of 
trusting relations between key governance structures in LIFT despite it 
being perceived as a significant factor for progress. LIFT sought to 
streamline procurement yet its governance is blamed for adding to existing 
bureaucracy.     
Despite the challenges, informants indicated that they achieved progress 
to some extent. Progress does not appear to be a result of how LIFT is 
designed, its governance structures being able to support local staff 
activities, or guidance being flexible for adaptation to local circumstances. 
To some extent, these factors constrain but PCT managers and GPs have 
the determination to retain effective working relations with the LiftCo. They 
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used communication strategies like informal contacts that helped in short-
circuiting bureaucracy within LIFT. It was thus concluded that PCT 
representatives on the relevant boards and the LiftCo CEO may be sharing 
appropriate information as feedback to keep PCT managers abreast with 
critical issues in LIFT. As a result, most managers are fairly articulate 
about LIFT despite perceived inadequacy of information from DH officials. 
Progress achieved so far may be a result of the managers’ determination 
in making LIFT work than its ability to facilitate their activities. No obvious 
evidence suggested that poor relations between PCT managers and the 
LiftCo threatened LIFT’s viability. There is a belief that the LiftCo was doing 
well to retain relations conducive to collaborating in a complex initiative.     
6.1.4 Lessons from the case-study  
Overall, seven lessons deriving from this case-study are drawn as follows: 
First, LIFT is understood as a way of the DH decentralizing the financing of 
primary care buildings to private financiers led by the LiftCo and 
coordinated by the PCTs (subsection 4.4, page 240). This decentralization 
extends to the LiftCo being delegated the role to manage and maintain the 
buildings once delivered. 
Second, it became clear that the criteria perceived to contain useful 
indicators for measuring success in LIFT were its ability in: (i) supporting 
staff activities towards meeting objectives within PCTs; (ii) delivering gains 
that commensurate with amounts of capital invested by the PCTs; and (iii) 
generating future opportunities for improving primary care organisation 
within the PCTs. Completing started projects was, for example, believed to 
be a useful indicator for success under criterion (i) as was delivering 
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buildings within budget under criterion (ii). Ability of buildings in facilitating 
integration of health and social care to promote healthy communities was 
believed to be a useful indicator for success under criterion (iii). Inevitably, 
confounding factors other than LIFT were involved in each criterion 
meaning caution may be recommended against isolated use of one 
criterion in measuring success. Some indicators may crossover between 
all criteria despite being driven by different mechanisms. For example, 
increased staff morale; enjoying appropriately designed buildings; and GPs 
using relevant treatment technology may be indicators for success under 
all criteria yet could be driven by different mechanisms. Similarly, if PCTs 
experience financial challenges in meeting their obligations, it may indicate 
LIFT’s failure along all criteria when measuring success.  
The third lesson concerned the factors for success in LIFT. It was 
emphasized that success depended upon commitment by PCT managers 
and co-operation by the LiftCo in making LIFT an effective procurement 
method. The managers’ commitment is enhanced provided they feel 
engaged and their contributions respected by DH officials in making 
strategic decisions about LIFT. Prioritising LiftCo’s contribution over that of 
the PCT managers restricted success. 
Emphasizing behavioural factors in explaining progress suggests that LIFT 
may not be inherently flawed as decentralization strategy in procurement. 
A fair share of its operational problems may be due to either oversights by 
the responsible authorities in supporting PCT activities or mistakes made 
by key participants in executing LIFT schemes. The problems and 
mistakes may affect progress more than how LIFT is designed.    
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The fifth lesson highlighted LIFT contexts and mechanisms that presented 
risk of significant unexpected and unwanted outcomes. It was learnt that 
cost-effective delivery of projects is constrained by DH bureaucracy and 
occasional interference. These factors are inconsistent with desire to 
streamline procurement. At one of the buildings, the LiftCo felt pressurised 
by DH officials into producing huge tender documents resulting in 
avoidable expenses. A fair share of LIFT’s cost-ineffectiveness may be 
therefore emanating from neither the PCTs nor LIFT itself. Instead, DH 
directives and inflexible guidance may increase costs causing tension 
when the LiftCo seeks to recover them from the PCTs rather than the DH.     
The sixth lesson was that PCT managers acknowledged the importance 
and strategic roles of Treasury and DH officials in LIFT. They recognised 
that loss of experienced staff at Treasury or the DH affected progress in 
their PCT areas when technical advice required within the PCTs was 
delayed, or important decisions risked being postponed. The managers 
took some comfort from the fact that their PCTs occasionally recruited staff 
with LIFT experience from outside the NHS. They also compensated for 
lost skills by using independent GPs to coordinate delivery of individual 
LIFT buildings. Despite this, in terms of experience at the national level, 
Treasury and the DH may be losing more than they gained because better 
pay and pension in the private sector attracted more experienced 
government workers than the converse.  
But attributing the above lesson solely to LIFT might be misplaced because 
attractive conditions of service within the private sector are not due to LIFT 
but its surrounding economic context. For various reasons other than LIFT, 
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senior civil servants may join private companies giving them increased 
influence in overall NHS activities. Therefore, socio-economic contexts 
surrounding LIFT may affect progress by risking some unexpected 
outcomes.                
Conflict of interest arising from seconding PCT managers to the LiftCo 
board emerged to be one of the unexpected negative outcomes in LIFT. It 
risked the managers having the dilemma to balance between PCT 
priorities and LiftCo interests. Further, it compromised their positions and 
potentially damaged team spirit at the PCTs. But actual impropriety did not 
seem to be a major issue in LIFT at least in this case-study. 
Related to this, a seventh lesson may be that PCT managers in LIFT are 
getting sufficient feedback to enable them in carrying out their activities 
with minimum constraints. They were mainly concerned about the level of 
influence that their representatives exerted on the LiftCo board. Although 
this may be resisted by the majority shareholders in the board, the 
managers wanted their representation to be increased hoping it would 
enable them in influencing decisions more effectively. Currently, the 
representatives are outnumbered and therefore outvoted in decisions that 
prioritise PCT interests.   
Seconding PCT managers to the LiftCo board generated mixed views 
about the benefits. Some managers thought it potentially caused conflict of 
interest. But others believed it gives them chance to influence decisions in 
LIFT provided their representation is increased. It was argued that the DH 
and the SPB had incentive to promote LIFT as a success. This in a way 
influenced them in supporting board decisions that conflicted with PCT 
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priorities. Hence the seventh lesson that conflict of interest in LIFT sat with 
these officials more than PCT secondments to the board.  
Initially, the researcher believed that GPs at LIFT buildings risked conflict 
between their own financial interests and those of the patient if they held 
shares in the LiftCo. It was learnt that conflict of interest from the GPs’ 
angle is not an obvious issue. This derives from the finding that, at least 
within the case-study, GPs were neither direct nor indirect shareholders in 
the LiftCo. The only problem could be that as for-profit providers, LIFT 
facilitates the GPs in using publicly funded buildings. The GPs may avoid 
risks such as financing expenses that they individually requested at LIFT 
buildings forcing the PCTs to fund them to sustain services. Hence the 
importance of helping building administrators with a framework for 
reconciling GP and PCT responsibilities for costs at the buildings.        
It was finally learnt that the GPs are in LIFT because of perceived benefits 
on their individual businesses as opposed to influence by the BMA. For a 
variety of reasons, the BMA were initially viewed as opposed to LIFT 
raising suspicion that their advice might have sought to shape GP 
attitudes.  But GPs in this case-study reiterated that their joining LIFT was 
driven by desire for appropriate buildings to meet growing patient lists and 
demand for improved care. Their attitude may therefore reflect individual 
rather than BMA interests. 
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6.2 Recommendations 
The current research confirmed that it is the DH officials and operational 
staff that are central to making LIFT effective in procurement. DH officials 
initiated LIFT and are responsible for issuing the guidance that is overseen 
by SPBs that are based within PCTs.  PCT staff and those at the LiftCo and 
LIFT buildings are responsible for executing LIFT schemes. This makes it 
logical to offer recommendations for the DH officials (6.3.1); operational 
staff (6.3.2) and for future research on LIFT (6.3.3). Since the conclusions 
so far presented are based on experiences of one case-study, caution 
may be required in generalising the recommendations. It is possible that 
some PCTs elsewhere with the same experience may have already 
adopted similar recommendations.  
6.2.1 Recommendations for the DH officials 
The DH officials and the SPBs overseeing LIFT implementation within 
PCTs, in consultations with Treasury are recommended to consider: 
6.2.1.1  Improving the quality of LIFT guidance. The guidance need 
not only to be clear and consistent in origin but also flexible to adaptation 
for suitability to PCT specific circumstances. Currently, they are perceived 
as confusing because apart from what the DH issues, different bodies with 
interests in LIFT also issue their own versions targeting the same people. 
Strategies for quality improvement involve getting regular feedback and 
effecting changes based on practicalities of the guidance advised by those 
directly executing LIFT schemes. This eliminates constraints in guidance 
that fail to recognise PCT variations in contexts that determine the best 
way to make LIFT more effective. 
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6.2.1.2  Putting measures in place to ensure active participation of 
operational staff in LIFT’s strategic decisions. PCT staff and GPs in this 
case-study recognised involvement and engagement in strategic decisions 
as key yet missing factors. Being actors rather than passive recipients of 
decisions may give them an incentive to be more accountable for LIFT 
outcomes within their PCTs than at present.  
6.2.1.3  Revising LIFT governance to have a fairer distribution in 
influence between the LiftCo and PCTs. Currently, the LiftCo is perceived 
to wield more influence than the PCTs. Among other things, this may be 
addressed through facilitating equal shareholding in the LiftCo. Or 
decisions for enhanced progress may be ring-fenced for PCT staff and 
non-partisan stakeholders. This would prevent the existing structures from 
prioritising LiftCo interests over those of the PCTs. PCT managers wanted 
to be empowered on governance issues because their PCTs are the 
principal beneficiaries in LIFT.  
6.2.1.4  Providing financial resources additional to LIFT budgets. This 
enables PCT staff in integrating care activities by promoting collaboration 
among GPs and between GPs and PCT staff working at same buildings. 
Currently, GP providers neither sufficiently coordinated their activities nor 
linked up with those provided by PCT staff at same buildings. This raised 
the concern that activities at LIFT buildings were run in parallel due to 
inadequate funds needed to link them. PCT managers wanted restrictions 
on funds set aside to enable progress with LIFT to be relaxed for this 
purpose.   
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6.2.2 Recommendations for operational staff 
Operational staff in LIFT comprise PCT staff, LiftCo staff, and GPs and 
building administrators. As they are directly involved and affected by 
activities in executing LIFT schemes, they are recommended to consider: 
6.2.2.1  Using experiences of other PCTs to save time and money. 
While their circumstances may be different, identifying successful 
schemes in other PCTs and adapting the strategies for success may 
enable the LiftCo to cut planning and delivery cost and time currently 
believed to limit progress in improving more buildings. 
6.2.2.2  Maintaining the momentum gained so far by taking 
advantage of general satisfaction with collaboration between PCTs and the 
LiftCo. Indeed investment may be required to improve on the concerns 
raised. But this is achievable in light of existing strengths, especially the 
optimism among PCT managers and LiftCo staff that problems in LIFT 
were not insurmountable. Among other strategies, this may involve 
operational staff spelling out and agreeing on performance benchmarks in 
quality and risk assumptions. It reduces friction caused when the LiftCo 
and its contractors consider expectations of PCT managers, GPs and 
building administrators as pitched above industry norms and standards.  
6.2.2.3  Developing additional technical skills in interpreting whether 
architectural designs of buildings reflect PCT aspirations and being able to 
align the designs with cost attached to the buildings by the LiftCo. These 
were thought to be some of the main challenges in making LIFT effective. 
If PCT managers were to acquire extra skills and build on their experience 
with LIFT to date, it may make them stronger in lobbying for DH revision of 
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constraining guidance. It may also allow them in demanding 
empowerment in governance matters that make LIFT more effective. At 
present, LiftCo staff may be stronger than PCT managers because of the 
support obtained from private sector professionals.      
6.2.2.4  Capitalising on the DH’s desire for competition within the 
NHS. The LiftCo should be encouraged to open its contractors to compete 
with multiple providers including public sector trades-people. The current 
assumption that private contractors have better skills and competences 
required in maintenance of buildings was contested among GPs and 
building administrators. Some contractors’ lack of familiarity with the NHS 
potentially disconnected them from priorities at healthcare buildings risking 
the PCTs to miss some anticipated benefits from competition.   
6.2.3 Recommendations for future research  
In light of the increased role of PPPs in delivering services within the NHS, 
further research is needed to understand how their effectiveness can be 
improved.  
6.2.3.1  It was clear from analyses of the findings that DH officials’ 
inertia in providing technical, decisional and informational resources; 
robust enforcement of PCT compliance with inflexible guidance by the 
SPB; and the manner in which the LiftCo performed its role, risked 
constraining progress more than how LIFT is designed. Future research 
should consider investigating the mechanisms for effective collaboration 
between these elements in LIFT and the involved PCTs. Previous research 
including the present one has not sufficiently highlighted what is needed 
most to make LIFT effective. Investigating mechanisms for effective 
305 
 
collaboration may heed interests of PCT managers that cited promoting 
better relations as likely to increase progress with LIFT.   
6.2.3.2  The current study has the limitation of focusing on one case-
study and a single LiftCo. Research that conducts multiple comparative 
case-studies is recommended to test relevant factors that facilitate or deter 
progress with LIFT. This may enhance generalisability of the findings and 
advice to future schemes. 
6.2.3.3  This study considered LIFT in context of changes embodied 
in the new Health and Social Care Act. But still more light needs to be 
shed on how the changes mesh to influence LIFT’s future. Given most PCT 
managers and GPs’ belief that LIFT used a lot of money to deliver few 
buildings of contestable quality and services; challenges may exist in the 
DH achieving efficiency savings anticipated in the Act if LIFT is retained in 
procuring NHS buildings. 
6.3 Contribution of the Research  
The current study gained insight into how LIFT operates through analyses 
of literature and documents, in-depth interviews with operational staff, and 
tours arranged to observe essential service areas at LIFT buildings. The 
researcher consolidated the insight into new knowledge around theoretical 
contribution (6.4.1 and 6.4.2); contribution to policy and practice (6.4.3) 
and practical contributions (6.4.4).  
6.3.1 Confirmation of literature on LIFT 
The research confirms what other researchers have written about LIFT. 
Aldred (2007) explained LIFT as rooted in neo-liberal approaches that 
make it a consistent example of New Public Management, “Third Way”, 
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and PPP approaches to NHS service delivery. The research produced 
evidence that LIFT encourages going beyond DH paternalism in procuring 
NHS buildings by embracing private capital and management processes. 
Embracing market mechanisms in procurement and management of public 
service through engaging for-profit providers is the hallmark of New Public 
Management, “Third Way” and PPP approaches nested in implementing 
decentralization (Powell 2000). Consistent with Pollock and Price (2006) 
and Fitzpatrick’s (2009) characterisations of LIFT, informants in this case-
study thought this risked privatisation. They raised the concern that pro-
market mechanisms embodied in LIFT adversely affected their ability in 
procuring and managing GP surgeries more effectively.  
6.3.2 Alternative conceptual explanation for LIFT 
Despite illuminating important factors for success, previous studies on LIFT 
may be criticised for lacking an integrated framework that can be used to 
explain it. In this research emerging evidence was used to build on 
existing knowledge for arguing that LIFT might be explained better using 
decentralization concept. There is evidence that it represents 
decentralization of the responsibility to fund the procurement of buildings 
from the DH and strategic health authorities to the PCTs. This happens 
together with delegating private companies to finance the buildings. There 
is also an element of recentralisation of the ownership of buildings to the 
PCTs. This occurs because LIFT influences reduction in DH grants for 
private GPs to develop their owned surgeries encouraging them to move 
into LIFT buildings. Recentralised ownership may be running in parallel to 
recentralised control of the content of GP practices by the PCTs through 
influencing which providers to use LIFT buildings. 
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6.3.3 LIFT’s effectiveness as decentralization strategy 
Within the framework of decentralisation, the research explored how LIFT 
was effective at decentralising aspects of procuring the desired buildings. 
It produced evidence that LIFT is surrounded by contexts of DH inertia in: 
providing sufficient technical, decisional or informational resources; and 
adequate discretion needed to support effective procurement by the 
involved PCTs. The evidence was derived from the collective experiences 
of staff directly involved in executing LIFT schemes. Their interpretations 
and meanings that they attached to LIFT fitted well with the criticism that 
failure by central government departments to relinquish the support 
mechanisms, rather than flaws in decentralisation were barrier to progress 
(Bossert 1998, Sharma 2006, Saltman et al 2007). The findings may help 
to distinguish the reasons why at the national and PCT levels, LIFT may 
experience limited progress against its intended outcomes.   
6.3.4 Practical contributions 
Finally, this study argues that using LIFT procurement within the NHS may 
be more effective provided DH officials regularly considered the actual 
experiences of people that are involved and affected by its activities. The 
ideas central to this argument were diffused through presentations at 
international and local conferences (Geneva Health Forum and University 
of East London Research Day). A book chapter on PPPs as 
decentralization strategy was written drawing on aspects of this PhD. Its 
publication by Springer Publishers is planned for November 2013.     
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Afterword 
While PPPs are considered as able to improve service delivery, this 
research revealed that the LIFT model is swamped with a multitude of 
complex yet important issues in mechanisms and relations which influence 
how well it performs. Its complexity presents challenges in deciding the 
aspects to investigate and the data types to collect at the expense of 
others for someone lacking experience with the NHS. This makes it 
important to consider the views of staff directly involved in LIFT in order to 
better understand how it may work. Studying LIFT may require significant 
human skills to access the data sources and analytical skills to understand 
the values held by the different categories of participants while mustering 
the appropriate jargon. Thanks to my supervisors and interviewees – the 
research was completed within the expected timeframe. The findings 
influenced me in acknowledging that PPPs for health may not be as 
beneficial as what the proponents make us to believe.  
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Appendices 
1.0  Topic Guides for the in-depth interviews 
Evaluation of the planning and implementation of LIFT schemes in East 
London 
Oliver Mudyarabikwa, Health and Biosciences School, UEL, London E15 4LZ 
Tel: 020 8223 4269; E-mail: oliver.mudyarabikwa@uel.ac.uk 
ORGANISATION _____________________________ Voice Tracer Number: ________  
Name: _______________  Surname: ___________________ 
Position: _____________      Job Title: _____________ 
Address: ________________________________________________ 
Tel: _________________                      e-mail:_________________ 
1. What are the issues LIFT is seeking to address in your PCT area? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
2. Can you comment on appropriateness of PCTs using public funds for LIFT to procure their 
buildings? _________________________________________________________________ 
3. In what ways was LIFT the most appropriate route to address the primary care deficits in the 
PCTs? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
4. What other options were considered and how were they unsuitable? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
5. Would another route be better placed now than LIFT for the objectives in the area? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
6. Can you specify the key objectives of LIFT in PCT areas served by the LiftCo? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
7. In what ways could have some of LIFT’s objectives become redundant since delivery of the 
buildings in the PCTs? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
8. What are LIFT’s strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis the intentions and nature of tasks to be 
accomplished? Would you say its governance arrangements are the most appropriate ones for the 
tasks? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
PART 2 – PLANNING PROCESSES FOR LIFT SCHEMES: 
Processes before and leading to construction of buildings 
9. What forms of external support have the LiftCo and PCT received from any organisation or 
agency through the different stages of developing LIFT buildings?  
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______________________________________________________________________ 
10. Which departments / agencies played what role in the stages of preparing the Tenders and their 
adjudication of the right candidate: (a): who to partner with? (b): who to design and construct the 
buildings?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
11. Have designs of LIFT buildings been subject to authorisation from any government agencies? 
What specific aspects did the interest of the agencies focus on?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
12. Who participated and what were the considerations of the feasibility studies preceding setting 
up LIFT buildings – (a) health priorities of within PCTs, (b) impact of buildings’ designs on the 
economic and financial balances of the PCT?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
What further analysis was used to support LIFT as the preferred route? - e.g. service accessibility, 
effectiveness in delivery, external impact (other organisations and services beyond 
PCTs)_____________________________________________________ 
LIFT outputs delivery and financing process  
13. What infrastructure has been built or is in the pipeline using LIFT? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 Total cost of the scheme: _______________________________________________ 
 Range of services  ____________________________________________________ 
 Size of buildings  _____________________________________________________ 
 
13.1 Could you specify the nature and source of funds and proportional contribution of the funding 
partners? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
14 Who has been the key agents promoting the financing packages in LIFT and basis for this?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
15. Comment on how long it took to complete the buildings (facilitating and inhibiting factors and 
implications of the experience)               
______________________________________________________________________ 
16. Have penalties ever been applied for delays in the completion of the buildings?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
17. What are the outstanding outputs and why still outstanding (resource constraints, timing, LiftCo 
underperformance, unsatisfied need)?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Processes for selecting the private sector partners  
18. Could you comment on the process of selecting private partners to LIFT?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
19. Is there guidance for the selection process? Who determined it and on what basis?  
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______________________________________________________________________ 
20. What discretion is there to vary LIFT guidance to suit PCT needs and circumstances?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
PART 3 – THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES 
Remit of the LiftCo 
21. How was the length of the contract between the PCT and the LiftCo determined? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
22. What is the estimated life of the buildings constructed through LIFT?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
23. What is the remit of the LiftCo and how is this central to the given rationale for LIFT in the 
areas?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
24. Could you please comment on appropriateness of the skills sets of the LiftCo vis-à-vis local 
health objectives specified in the SSDP?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Contractual obligations – PCTs and the LiftCo  
25. Based on the specifications of the contract, what services does the PCT receive or will receive 
from its LiftCo? Are there penalty provisions and how do they work? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
26. What types (and criteria used) of commercial activities have been transferred to the LiftCo and 
its contractors?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
27. Will the LiftCo receive a sum (outlay contribution) based on the proportion of the value of the 
buildings? How was this determined?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
28. How, and in what ways do lease contracts distinguish between different forms of remuneration 
from the PCT to the LiftCo – e.g. payment for the use of the infrastructures from reimbursement for 
extraordinary cost of delivery of different services?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
29. What is the estimated cost (and who bears it) of writing and developing the LIFT Tenders and 
associated Contracts (this includes: external consultancy, advertisement of tenders, adjudication)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
30. In the PCT–LiftCo contract, what criteria have been considered in allocating risk sharing?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
31. Has there been any economic effectiveness analysis of the private sector partner and / or LIFT 
arrangement conducted since commissioning of the buildings?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Outcomes of LIFT buildings  
32 Has the public sector evaluated LIFT outcomes in order to assess their achievement of the 
original objectives and how has this been done?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
33. Comment on how the LiftCo has influenced on the following strategic added value outcomes of 
the buildings:  
 Strategic leadership and catalyst 
 Strategic influence   
 Leverage and Synergy   
 Engagement  
Wider impact, attribution and additionality  
34. What has been the impact of LIFT outputs and outcomes on local conditions (patterns of 
change in the local areas)? How and who explored the impact?  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
35 Which of the following factors could you say have significant play in the delivery of primary care 
and services in your area and how do they do so? 
 Wider macroeconomic influences 
 Competitors in health 
 Activities of mainstream partners 
 Other agencies and DH health intervention programmes 
________________________________________________________________________ 
36. In your view has LIFT alone been responsible for the identified impacts in the areas? To what 
extent are LIFT outputs and outcomes adding value over what would have occurred without it?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
37. Could you comment on the following regarding outputs and outcomes of LIFT schemes? 
 the extent to which LIFT reduced activities elsewhere (displacement) 
 proportion of outputs and outcomes benefiting consumers from outside the target area or 
beneficiary groups (leakage) and,  
 extra primary care services generated by other buildings / providers because of the 
presence of LIFT facility in the locality (health multiplier effect). 
______________________________________________________________________ 
38. What steps are undertaken to ensure that LIFT buildings (outputs) are fully occupied and 
translated into real benefits originally desired by the initiative (measuring effectiveness of LIFT)? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
39 Are there any potential services now seen as missing from the offer-lists and are there some 
now realised as insufficiently prioritised yet prominently profiled in the SSDP? 
40. Any other pertinent information you might want to share for LIFT performance?  
